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This study examines the political agency of Iranian immigrants. Through the 
rhetorical device of “political talk” which encompasses politically- and civically- 
oriented discourse, action and ideology, this research follows political talk as it 
presents itself in two locations within the public sphere: in the life course of Iranian 
Americans, and through online discourse. Methods used included a combination of 
conventional ethnography (participant observation, informal interviews, life history 
interviews), and virtual ethnography to develop a typology of political and civic 
action. Life history interviews provided an understanding of the meanings informants 
assigned to political and civic action within the larger trajectory of their lives, 
especially within the context of migration experiences. Virtual ethnography involved 
the analysis of three different Iranian digital diaspora communities. 
First, this research found that the civic and political spheres of engagement are 
linked, and that Iranian immigrants use organizations to learn participatory 
democracy. It illustrates how ethnic organizations, online and offline, act as both 
vehicles and activators for immigrant political participation and further civic 
  
engagement in the U.S. Additionally, this research uncovers how factors (age at 
migration, length of time in U.S., particular migration experience) impact notions of 
belonging and solidarity. It unpacks immigrant political agency to demonstrate the 
range of behaviors and activities which constitute political and civic participation. It 
contributes to understanding modes of citizenship and belonging by relating 
individual, historical, and situational variables in order to understand the relationship 
between homeland events, immigrant politicization and political behavior. Analysis 
of the three digital communities evidenced the multiple ways that digital diasporas 
can be a forum for engaging politically and in creating political community by 
allowing for a diversity of voices. Finally, merging conventional and virtual 
ethnography highlighted the dominant discourses about participation in larger society, 
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The product of a mixed parentage—and Iranian father and Mexican American 
mother made us a rarity, especially in Texas where I did the majority of my growing 
up. My family’s background was set apart for another reason. My parents met in San 
Antonio, Texas when my mother (from a tiny Texas border town where some of the 
streets are still not paved) was working as a secretary at Lackland Air Force Base and 
my father, a pilot with the Iranian Imperial Air Force was sent by the Iranian 
government for training in the late 1950s. That was in a different era of diplomatic 
relations between the U.S. and Iran-- friends then, enemies now! My parents married 
in 1960 and moved to Iran. All of us three children were born there, unlike most of 
the other Iranian “halfies” I might encounter in the United States. California was like 
a dream to me with its vibrant landscaping, blue skies, and the Pacific Ocean. It was 
my parents’ favored vacation spot because we could stay with extended family. In 
Texas, we were fairly isolated from other Iranians. In San Diego, being a tourist in La 
Jolla, you couldn’t walk 10 feet without hearing someone speak Farsi, the most 
common language spoken in Iran. 
Not following in the dominant and prevailing tradition of anthropological field 
research, I am “home” in conducting fieldwork. Though I did not grow up in San 
Diego, or California, for that matter I have had extended family there for years and it 
is now my home as an adult parent, raising children in San Diego. I have lived in San 




grasp, the edges of fieldwork are blurred to these moments of heightened interaction I 
describe above. Where does fieldwork begin and end for me?1 
In what follows here in the Preface and through the Introduction, I arduously 
describe how I arrived at my research problem, which is centered on the 
manifestation of political “talk” in different arenas among Iranian Americans. 
Perhaps I am making myself “vulnerable” (Behar 1996) to write about all these 
wanderings, and to expose my structure as visible through showing the natural history 
of its derivation. 
I now realize that the seeds of this research were implanted in me through 
enculturation as a child. As such it is deeply personal and intertwined with my 
growing up years-- on the fringes of Iranian culture as a person with a trifurcated 
identity (Iranian, Mexican/South Texas, American) during many long evenings of 
meyhmooni (social visits with food) at the homes of other Iranians and hearing daily 
telephone conversations my Iranian father had with his friends where the debate topic 
was politics—Iranian politics—always heated and passionate. Fast forward two or 
three decades, and the topics and people change but the overall scene remains the 
same. 
My partial insider status to Iranian culture as a member of its 1.25 generation 
(Rumbaut 2004) population allowed me to understand that this was more than just my 
dad and his friends-- Iranians seem to be more political. However I still had no 
understanding about why Iranians engage in more political talk. I wished to 
understand this political talk better—why do Iranian immigrants continue to talk 
                                                
1 I do not want to ignore the existing anthropological literature on studying at home 
or being “native” among your informants. However, I still maintain that leaving home to 




about home politics when they live abroad? Further does all of this political talk 
translate to political action, involvement in civic life in the United States, or into 
greater political understandings and engagement with politics?  
My insider status to American culture allowed me to understand that politics 
was one thing that you just did not talk about with your friends in the U.S. Discussing 
politics and religion among a circle of people is taboo—it might invite arguments or 
create unnecessary tension and division among friends. Friends’ or acquaintances’ 
political leanings and ideology have sometimes been such a dark hole, that I have 
often been surprised to later find out where they fall on the political or ideological 
spectrum.  
Among Iranians on the other hand, I observed, passionate and loud politically-
oriented debates during meyhmooni that were no big deal afterwards for the people 
involved. Indeed, I do not think it is uncommon for Iranians with sometimes 
drastically different political ideologies not only to be friends but to also actually 
express these views amongst each other with no ill will afterwards. One perspective 
could argue that it is Iran’s repressive politics and policies towards its citizens that 
initially politicizes its citizens, wherever they find themselves. This was certainly the 
viewpoint of one of my informants. Another possibility is the collective trauma of 
being displaced from your homeland as a result of 1979 Iranian Revolution puts you 
in the same boat as your compatriots, and that for the most part though your 
ideologies may differ you likely share and distaste for your homeland government. 
If the first reason for developing a research question was based on personal 




and evolved out of witnessing with outrage and sadness how the Iranian government 
cracked down on protesters in the streets and other dissidents in the aftermath of the 
June 2009 re-election of Iranian President Ahmadinejad. Yet I also witnessed with 
great interest how the political turmoil in their homeland ignited Iranian immigrants 
all over the world—what I will later theorize as the Iranian diaspora—for a common 
cause. I saw previously apathetic Iranians participating in rallies and marches 
throughout Europe and the United States, and circulating anti-government messages 
through Facebook, YouTube and other virtual means of communication. My Iranian 
relatives and friends were genuinely engaged and excited about post-election events. 
It was as if they saw a rip in the shroud with light peeking through. Among some 
exiles, I heard hope that an eventual return to Iran would be possible soon. 
My initial work with this topic began with my specialization in studies of 
immigrant groups during graduate school. This provided the third impetus to 
formulate my research question. The June 2009 events happened as I was completing 
my PhD requirements. I had participated in theoretical discussions about immigrant 
and transnational identities working at the Smithsonian and at the University of 
Maryland throughout my Masters of Applied Anthropology degree, but could now 
expand to consider the politics of middle-class and “elite” immigrants. 
As a scholar broadly interested in the migration process, especially in how it 
intersects with ideas of citizenship and belonging, there were so many exciting 
research avenues to explore using the June 2009 event as a trigger to understand 
immigrant politics, including the role of new media is re-shaping politics from afar, 




movements, how people use social networks across vast spaces to affect change, the 
meaning and significance of these networks, the relationship between involvement in 
homeland politics and other forms of political/civic participation, how diasporas 
contribute to the political development of their homeland, etc. I had all these 
potentialities in mind when I moved away from Maryland in October 2009 to enter 
the field and my new residence in San Diego, California.  
In what follows here I consider Iranian immigrant political agency as 
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Chapter 1  Introduction to the Setting and The Natural History 
of the Research Plan 
 
In San Diego, California to be an Iranian and visit other Iranians in an informal 
manner such as mehymooni (meaning party, but really any social gathering at someone’s 
home with food) or formally such as in a meeting, you must first get in your car and 
drive. The drive will involve only surface streets if you are lucky, but usually also include 
getting on one of the sun-bleached highways that runs north -to-south paralleling the 
Pacific coastline, or west-to-east taking you from pockets of neighborhoods nestled 
between and on top of mesas. Streets and neighborhoods end precipitously at the edges of 
canyons. Flying above in an airplane it is easy to see from this bird’s eye view that San 
Diego is really a city composed of assemblages of houses and other buildings sitting atop 
lonely mesas interconnected by only a network of roads. When visiting Iranian friends or 
family no one will live too far south closer to the border or too far east beyond Poway, 
which is in San Diego’s North County. La Jolla and Del Mar followed by Encinitas are 
the most desirable and expensive locales. In conversations with new people, others might 





Figure 2 San Diego County Map   credit: www.entersandiego.com 
Living here is not like being in Iran—no drop in visits by neighbors. In the case of 
mehymooni, it has usually been pre-arranged ahead of time through a phone call or email. 




are calendared and known about and planned for, with email reminders and opportunities 
to check in on Facebook.  
Besides this kind of social visiting you can get together with fellow countrymen 
by attending some of the yearly cultural festivals based on the ancient Zoroastrian 
calendar. The biggest one being Nowruz, the Persian New Year observed the first day of 
spring and its attendant events and festivities. Other than parties and celebrations directly 
related to Nowruz, the other events include Chaharshanbeh Soori2 that precedes the New 
Year as the last Wednesday of the year, and Sizdeh Bidar, the succeeding event that 
follows thirteen days after the New Year. Both these cases have their own public festivals 
organized by local Iranian-ethnic grassroots organizations and sponsored by local 
Iranian-owned businesses.  
 Chaharshanbeh Soori which means “burnt Wednesday” involves jumping over 
huge bonfires to ward off evil spirits in anticipation of the New Year. Sizdeh Bidar means 
the “thirteenth outside” and occurs on the thirteenth day of the New Year in the Iranian 
calendar, and involves an all-day picnic outdoors. Both events take place in meticulously 
landscaped and manicured parks in tune with the Iranian sense of aesthetics, love of 
gardens, and penchant for picnics.3 According to one longtime local leader, these events 
comprise the largest gathering of Iranians in San Diego in a public space for a public 
purpose.  
Chaharshanbeh Soori actually starts Tuesday night around seven o’clock for the 
public events that the local Iranian non-profits organize. It takes place in the darkness of 
                                                
2 See glossary for explanation of Farsi terms. 
3 Eating outdoors to celebrate nature harks back to ancient Zoroastrian values. Slightly 





evening time and has more of an outdoor party atmosphere. There is an obligatory 
bonfire on the sandy beach nearby but what predominates is the smell of kabob cooking 
and deejay music emanating from a raised stage, with a large screen flashing sponsorship 
information. 
Local Iranian-ethnic organizations call Sizdeh Bidar “Nature Day” in their 
advertisements, and in San Diego over the past several years Sizdeh Bidar takes place in 
a public park situated near the water. Imagine a huge grassy lawn the size of almost four 
city blocks completely filled with a patchwork of picnic blankets, colorful Persian sofrehs 
(mats), pop-up tents topped with flags, lawn chairs, and charcoal grills. You will see three 
or four generations of Iranian-descended families mingling, cracking jokes as they crack 
open pistachios, and of course gossiping about mutual friends and acquaintances. 
Attendees will visit friends and associates in other picnic spots and it is like being invited 
to their home. You and they will engage in ta’arof4-- you will be offered a cup of hot 
cha’i (tea) and whatever is being eaten. There seems to be a competition for the nicest, 
most substantial looking picnic set-up. Throughout the course of the days, groups of 
people--ladies arm-in-arm with men ambling behind, will promenade throughout the 
picnic grounds slyly inspecting the other picnic set-ups for someone they might know and 
check out what is being eaten. 
 These rituals and celebrations are simultaneously pre-Islamic5 and self-consciously 
                                                
4 Ta’arof, encompassing a wide range of behaviors and contexts, is the name given for 
the Iranian cultural model governing the etiquette for civility and reciprocity where self-deference 
and social rank is emphasized. 
5 The cultural celebrations described here are Zoroastrian holdovers, practices that date to 
around the 6th century B.C.E. This was the religion of Greater Iran until the Arab invasion and 




Persian6. To use Naficy’s (1993) term, these manifestations of archaic Persian heritage 
are examples of “fetishism” that occurs among Iranian migrants, meaning that Iranian 
immigrants tend to imagine these ancient Persian celebrations as upholding all the values 
and markers of their Iranian identity. According to Mobasher (2006), "By… emphasizing 
the cultural significance of Persian heritage, community organizers and political activists 
find an opportunity to construct a political community, express their grievances, and 
mobilize for collective action against the Iranian government," (114). I observed, 
however, that for the average attendee, though they may harbor anti-Islamic Republic of 
Iran sentiment, which is not uncommon for Iranian immigrants, these cultural events 
offer one of the few chances to gather with compatriots en masse to enjoy each other’s 
company and celebrate the Iranian New Year. 
Other opportunities to gather with fellow Iranians include a calendar of special 
events related to Iranian expressive culture—music concerts, poetry readings, film 
showings, and traditional dance organized by the local Iranian voluntary organizations, 
the same ones that organize the festivals described above. Beyond these kinds of cultural 
and arts events, the meetings of these Iranian grassroots organizations, or perhaps the 
Iranian grocery store, the only way to encounter Iranians is through meyhmooni.  
Meyhmooni means “party” in Farsi but in reality it includes almost any social 
visit centered around sharing a meal. It can be a birthday party, wedding celebration, or 
just having friends over for dinner. Meyhmooni involves the private realm of the home, 
inviting others to your home or visiting others in their home. I do not want to downplay 
the importance of these intimate social gatherings in the lives of Iranians, indeed I have 
                                                
6 Here, distinguishing Persian ethnicity from plethora of other past and present ethnic 
groups in Iran (Dabashi 2004). Persian ethnicity has been constructed as the national ethnicty of 




observed that it is through meyhmooni that Iranians maintain their connection to co-
ethnics, and the happenings in Iran both in discussing and debating the political events of 
their homeland and in exchanging information about friends and family.  
Iranian immigrants express their identity and heritage as Iranians through 
meyhmooni, and through ta’arof which is at its best through meyhmooni. When visiting 
someone’s home there are a set of expectations about the order, timing and content of the 
various components of the gathering. Upon first arriving, exchanging pleasantries, 
inquiring about the health and state of family members, etc. there is a first round of tea is 
offered, with candies, fruits and nuts on display as accompaniments. Sometime after, the 
meal is served. There will never be just one main dish and a couple of sides. There will 
always be several main dishes (usually a meat-based stewed with vegetables, called 
khoresh), huge platters of white, fluffy rice, and other dishes of greens, pickled 
vegetables, salad, yogurt, etc. After the meal is over, the host and guests will sit down for 
more chatting. This is followed by another round of tea, this time with pastries as well as 
candies, fruits and nuts. My own efforts at hosting Iranians for lunch or dinner filled me 
with a sense of “not being able to do it quite right”—maybe my diversity of dishes was 
not enough, perhaps I did not offer the tea quick enough, or maybe I just resented the 
gendered obligation of meyhmooni. Meyhmooni and ta’arof are indeed a tricky business. 
Because of the culturally-conditioned suspicion of outsiders Iranians have and the 
ways certain kinds of information are guarded or out rightly concealed (one informant 
actually brought up the Iranian habit of using “harmless, white lies” to protect one’s 




of meyhmooni networks here, it is difficult for an outsider to San Diego such as myself to 
break into new meyhmooni networks, beyond those somehow connected to family. 
Even if it was possible for me to acquaint myself into several new meyhmooni 
networks and get myself invited to people’s homes on a regular basis, plunging myself in 
the middle of political talk that may have sprung up during meyhmooni would have been 
awkward and out of context. First is the issue of being 1.5 generation and being perceived 
as more American, with perhaps little interest or knowledge of the day-to-day current 
affairs in Iran. As a member of a different generation than those that migrated as adults, 
the cause of emigration usually related to the 1979 Iranian revolution, I never 
experienced Iran before or after the Revolution other than as a small child. In other 
words, it was correctly perceived by others that I have no significant “life material,” or 
experience as fodder against the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) to even participate in 
these discussions.  
The second reason I might not have broken into the privacy of certain kinds of 
dialogues during meyhmooni was my gender. While meyhmooni is definitely a family 
event with both genders participating, circles of conversation tend to break apart by 
gender. Though, it is not a strict structure and there is fluidity and movement between 
circles of exchange. Discussion flowed around life events, health of family members, 
jobs, and progress of children and household sitting in a chatting circle surrounded by 
other women. In this context politics was not a topic of conversation. On the other hand, I 
did observe that among men, politics was a potential discussion topic. Someone might 
tell an anti-Islamic Republic of Iran joke, show something on YouTube, or make the 




meyhmooni as an opportunity to engage informants in not only political talk, but going 
further to open up about their own political ideologies and participation in civic and 
political spheres. 
All in all, to be an Iranian in San Diego is to blend in with the landscape of 
middle class and upper middle class life in southern California. As will be discussed later 
in this chapter, Iranian immigrants are relatively wealthy and more educated than other 
recently-arrived immigrants. Likewise, they are fairly well acculturated into American 
life, being economically and linguistically integrated. There are no ethnic enclaves here, 
no super concentration of Iranian-owned ethnic businesses as in “Teheran-geles” located 
in the Westwood neighborhood of Los Angeles. Even the grocery stores like North Park 
Produce or Balboa Market, which are in separate parts of town, might have majority 
Iranian clientele, yet actually cater to other minority groups as well like Arabs, Nigerians, 
Ethiopians, etc. 
 For the reasons discussed above, I reasoned that I would learn more about 
political talk by staying within the public, rather than the private, realm of 
communication.  I determined gatherings of Iranians were the ideal situation for 
understanding more about political talk, but informal and private gatherings based on 
contact with extensive meyhmooni networks were closed off to me. Most public kinds of 
gatherings of Iranians in San Diego are planned, organized and controlled by Iranian 
organizations. Therefore, focusing on Iranian ethnic-based grassroots voluntary 
associations became a natural choice for gaining entry. I quickly realized, however, that 
the number and diversity of such organizations is actually few in San Diego, unlike in 




I classify these Iranian ethnic-based grassroots organizations as voluntary 
associations, according to Kerri’s (1976) definition that a voluntary association is a 
private group more or less formally organized, joined and maintained by members 
pursuing a common interest, and usually by means of part-time and unpaid activities.7 
These few Iranian voluntary associations in San Diego, through their serving as a nexus 
of people and interests, they coalesce major community players and control social life in 
the public sphere through organizing: big cultural festivals centered on Nowruz and other 
celebrations, a slate of events related to Iranian arts and music, and other civic causes.8 
This is distinct from meyhmooni that serves similar functions in the private sphere. Most 
of these Iranian voluntary associations are no older than thirty years and their foundings 
date to just around the time of the 1979 Iranian Revolution when there were enough 
Iranian immigrant community members to come together for a common purpose. Finding 
informants through Iranian voluntary associations was a way to locate civically and 
politically minded Iranian Americans that could shed light on the subject of political 
ideologies and participation. 
Background: June 2009 Events and Beyond 
Iran’s tenth presidential election was held June 12, 2009 with incumbent 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad running against three challengers. The next morning Iran’s 
official news agency, the Islamic Republic News Agency, announced that President 
Ahmadinejad had won the election with 62% of the votes. The opposing candidates 
challenged the results and alleged vote rigging. Their supporters took to the streets over 
                                                
7 Throughout this work I will interchangeably use Iranian ethnic-based grassroots 
organizations as voluntary associations.  
8 Some examples would be a Farsi language school which meets weekly and has over 300 
students, and an association for Iranian professionals that holds monthly meetings with guest 




the next few weeks in massive demonstrations to protest the voting irregularities 
(Katzman 2010, Ehsani, Keshavarzian and Moruzzi 2009). At least 30 people were killed 
and more than 1,000 arrested in the wave of protests that followed. The Iranian elections, 
considered fraudulent by many inside in Iran and commentators outside Iran, fomented a 
growing opposition movement inside of Iran. Witnesses to the June 2009 protests in Iran 
say that protests of this size have not been seen in Iran since the 1979 revolution 
(Athanasiadis June 16, 2009, Washington Times). 
“Where is My Vote? (raye-man kojast)” was the motto used during protests and 
transmitted all over the globe. Protestors and opposition supporters manifested their 
disagreement with the election results to the world using newer technologies of 
communication and social networking, such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, by the 
opposition movement broadcast their efforts to a worldwide audience (Grossman 2009) 
and helped them solidify a collective conscience regardless of their residence.  
As many Iranian immigrants described to me, the images and sounds emanating 
from the media were so dramatic—massive groups of people wearing green and 
demonstrating peacefully through city streets, the brutality of Iranian police forces 
beating protestors, etc., that Iranian immigrants around the world felt compelled to 
respond in some form. The June 2009 election and its aftermath on the streets of Tehran, 
and other cities, was an event where their identities as members of a diaspora, as exiles, 
or as citizens of one country or the other, were challenged. One way in which Iranians 
throughout the diaspora responded to the election results was through virtual means using 
social media like Facebook, YouTube, blogs, Iranian expat news sites, etc. The other way 




Among the many images of protestors circulated on the Internet is one of a young 
Iranian-American college student connected with one of the growing number of 
grassroots organizations fighting for political change holding a placard that reads in Farsi, 
“Don’t be scared, don’t be scared. We’re all in this together” (Youth to Youth Campaign 
2010). In 2010 worldwide protests took place throughout the U.S. and Europe around the 
anniversary of the 1979 Iranian Revolution.  
A more longitudinal look at how this incidence of homeland conflict impacted 
individuals in a local community was initially one of this project’s research questions. 
However, now more than three years after the Presidential election of June 2009 and 
having spent time with a community of civically active and politically aware Iranian 
Americans, I cannot in good conscience place too much emphasis on the election and its 
repercussions, even though the Iranian election protests are widely considered to be the 
model for the Arab Spring of 2011 that followed 1.5 years later. Manijeh Nasrabadi, an 
Iranian American activist blogger makes this connection clear between the Green 
Movement in Iran and the Arab Spring. Her primary assertion is that the Iranian people 
have been rendered invisible,  
We need to write the story of the Green uprising back into the story of the 
Arab Spring in order to understand the internal dynamics of Iranian 
society and to see clearly where the lines of solidarity must be drawn. 
Most media coverage hasn’t made this link; instead, reporting has tended 
to reflect the nationalist divisions in the region and to assume there is a 
hermetically sealed entity called the “Arab World.”9  
 
                                                
9  Nasrabadi, Manijeh. “Iran and the U.S. Anti-War Movement.” Published May 8, 2012. 






Undeniably June 2009 homeland events in Iran impacted the Iranian diaspora, and I 
argue, was a “moment of solidarity.” While my initial research goal was to assess the 
impact of the June 2009 events on the Iranian diaspora in a localized place, as time has 
gone on now three years after that event, and through continued fieldwork, it is 
questionable as to whether June 2009 was a pivotal event for Iranian immigrants. The 
extent to which it was pivotal is determined by how we define pivotal, how we define 
activism and whether we are thinking of an Iranian diaspora “community” united for a 
common cause.  
Coming Together: Theoretical Approach 
For all intents and purposes, it is difficult to organize Iranians, and for Iranians to 
organize. First, Bozorgmehr (1998) one of the foremost social scientists concerned with 
the Iranian immigrant community has asserted that organizational life is lacking among 
Iranian immigrants in the U.S. What is distinctive about Iranians is the negligible 
presence of associations, and when present, their even more negligible role in the lives of 
Iranians. Compared to other new immigrant groups, Iranians have very few ethnic 
associations or organizations. As Bozorgmehr (1998:24) contends, the main explanation 
for this pattern is cultural: voluntary associations were uncommon in Iran. A suspicion of 
outsiders, tendencies to both conceal information and present oneself in the best possible 
light (Higgins 2004), a propensity for dissent and argumentation10 in social setting as I 
observed, and the fact that Iranian’s homeland history of repressive governments11 did 
not encourage the development of voluntary associations does equate to few experiences 
                                                
10 Some like Bernal (2005) have said that argumentation is actually central to constituting 
community. 




with formal civic structures. Local San Diego voluntary associations and online 
communities function as organizations for Iranian-Americans despite these supposed 
challenges of political history and culture. 
I am interested in focusing on moments of coming together in the public sphere 
outside of celebratory festivals and events highlighting expressive culture, or outside “all 
the pretty stuff” as one informant characterized them.12 June 2009 was such a moment of 
solidarity. Iranian voluntary associations are other examples of Iranian immigrants 
coming together to pursue common interests. Those common interests might include 
looking for community, discussing current political events, or easing the transition to life 
in the U.S. 
Preliminary research starting informally starting October 2009 when I entered the 
field and continuing through summer 2010, one year after the June 2009 events, helped to 
assess the landscape of political and civic action. My preliminary fieldwork indicated that 
the level of engagement with homeland politics and host country civic organizations 
varies among Iranians. Yet they engage in political talk in social settings and express 
their politically-related opinion, such as in the private domain of the home and during 
meyhmooni, much more often and without hesitation, than Americans. Secondly, I found 
engagement with politics in the public sphere takes place in two primary arenas. The first 
arena is local Iranian voluntary associations. I already described how local Iranian  
voluntary associations function as a nexus of people and interesting, coalescing major 
community and controlling social life in the public sphere through organizing cultural 
festivities and a slate of other events. The second arena is constituted by Iranians 
throughout the diaspora communicating and discussing politics online through forums 
                                                




like Facebook, and diaspora websites like Iranian.com. I see these as closely related to 
“on-the-ground” Iranian voluntary associations in San Diego—in other words these 
virtual online groups of Iranians come together for a common interest on a voluntary 
basis, 13 much like San Diego-based Iranian organizations. Therefore, I am 
conceptualizing Iranian voluntary associations as the organizing principle to bring these 
two arenas of discourse together. 
Voluntary associations, online and offline are where political talk takes place in 
the public sphere.14 According to Habermas’s (1989, 1992) definition, the public sphere 
mediates between the private sphere and the sphere of Public Authority (the realm of the 
state, government, ruling class). Fraser (1990) rearticulates the public sphere as “a theater 
in modern societies which political participation is enacted through the medium of talk” 
(57) to move from the idea of one public sphere to numerous “counterspheres” and 
multiple and discrete places where “talk” occurs. The public sphere is an arena of social 
life where people come together and discuss problems and the place from which political 
action springs. For this study, I erect a private/public dichotomy for where political 
discourse among Iranians potentially occurs. The public sphere stands outside the private 
sphere of the home where meyhmooni takes place. Among the public sphere, 
organizations and associations—virtual and materials, are the vehicle through which it 
ensues.  
Within anthropology, Kerri (1976a) provides a review of anthropological studies 
that consider the role of voluntary associations as adaptive mechanisms, especially 
                                                
13 Online groups that I studied, and discussed more in depth in Chapter 3, 4, and 5, 
include two Facebook groups and one diaspora website called Iranian.com. 





among rural-urban migrants, and draws from sources dated from 1940s to 1970s. The 
majority of these sources cast voluntary associations in functionalist terms. Little (1965) 
examines the role of different kinds of voluntary associations (such as tribal unions, 
syncretist cults, recreation-based, mutual benefit groups, etc) among migrants in West 
Africa to find that such groups combine Western development aims with African 
traditions to fulfill functions once filled by extended family. Kerri (1976b) looks at how 
voluntary associations aid in the adaptation of indigenous and metis migrants to 
Winnipeg, Canada. Weinberg (1976) learns that voluntary associations and kinship 
groups of the Swiss Alps express underlying factionalism within the political system. 
They serve to control and defuse conflict and opposition. Anderson (1971) traces the 
history of voluntary associations and places their firm establishment during the Neolithic 
era. His concluding paragraph mitigates the impact and role of voluntary associations 
even among urban-industrial nations: voluntary associations contribute to the stability of 
society by being an intermediate social unit between the individual and the community, 
and they play a supportive role in social change, yet they “are the vehicles of change, not 
the motors of change” (218).   
Brettell and Reed-Danahay (2008b), two anthropologists, state (with reference to 
immigration) that few contemporary anthropological sources exist about voluntary 
associations, especially among international migrants. Though several European scholars 
have begun to look at the role of organizations and in political and civic integration of 
immigrants in Europe, less attention has been given to this subject for post-1965 
immigrants in the U.S. While there is an existing literature on organizational 




has been on businesses; work and corporate culture; management and stratification (Baba 
2006) rather than community-based voluntary organizations, especially ones with an 
ethnic base and civic cause.  
Scholars such as Putnam (1993, 1995, 2000) in political science and Coleman 
(1988) in sociology have done groundbreaking work on social capital, civic 
organizations, and community participation. In the immigrant adaption literature the topic 
of voluntary associations is only obliquely related through the loose concept of 
“networks”, and the social capital that flows through them as being vital resources for 
ethnic businesses functioning in ethnic enclaves (Portes 1998). 
Social capital is a concept shared by anthropology and its sister social sciences. 
Distinguished from physical capital that is wholly tangible and human capital that exists 
in persons in the form of knowledge and skills, social capital is intangible and exists in 
the relations among and between persons (Coleman 1988). While Bourdieu (1986) 
focused on how social capital (or the absence of it) can reproduce inequality, Coleman 
(1988) focuses on how social capital functions as a resource for action. Similarly, Putnam 
(et al 1994, 2000) presents the notion that social capital is central to civic engagement 
and in creating a more cohesive society. The study of voluntary associations and their 
link to civic engagement has primarily focused on modes of social capital (shared values, 
collaboration, mutual trust, etc.) developed through participation in such organizations. 
While being an important aspect in the relationship between immigrants and 
organizations, the emphasis on social capital overlooks “processual questions about the 
specific social contexts in which knowledge and social practice, particularly the practice 




The various writings on social capital intersect with ideas first put forth with 
anthropological predecessors such as Emile Durkheim and Victor Turner. First 
Durkheim’s notions of mechanical and organic solidarity provide us with one model of 
what holds individuals together in institutions. Mechanical solidarity operates as a 
cohesive force in smaller scale societies and is based on shared beliefs, sentiments, and 
ways of life. Organic solidarity functions in larger, more complex societies to integrate 
society through interdependence, and is arranged around economic and political 
organizations (Durkeim 1997 [1883]). Another formulation of cohesiveness is the notion 
of communitas, first conceived by Victor Turner (1969). Communitas denotes intense 
feelings of social togetherness, equality, and solidarity, and to an extent standing outside 
of the normal structure of society. Social capital, organic solidarity, and communitas are 
interrelated theoretical constructions about how and why groups of people function 
together, and aid in understanding the dynamic between individuals and voluntary 
associations. 
With few outlets for expression for Iranian-American immigrant life in the public 
sphere, these ethnically-based voluntary associations in San Diego are the most self-
conscious and obvious way of displaying communitas. Therefore these voluntary 
organizations, local and online, are more than the “symbolic construction of community” 
(Cohen 1985). Instead they are the” hyper conscious” construction of community because 
they move beyond Kerri’s (1976) definition of a group maintained by members “pursuing 
a common interest.” What these organizations offer is a reification of what it means to be 
Iranian outside of Iran. The fact that members come together to maintain and display 




with what it means to be both part of and separate from political community. That 
political community simultaneously references the U.S. and Iran. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Using “political talk” as a construct for political ideology and participation, where 
and how does it manifest in the lives of Iranian Americans? This research proposes to 
examine the sites, locations, and moments where it appears within the public sphere. 
Iranian voluntary associations proved to be a vehicle to both recruit informants and 
understand these organizations from the perspective of insiders. I extend the definition of 
Iranian voluntary association to encompass online and virtual communities of Iranians. 
How are these Iranian voluntary associations’ settings (acting as forums) and sources 
(acting as instigators) for political talk? Are they “vehicles of change” as Anderson 
(1971) asserts, or rather are they “motors of change?” 
Because these organizations are composed of individuals, I selected informants 
who could guide me through the structure and landscape of political talk. The goal of the 
interviews was to understand how such persons narrate the meanings of their political or 
civic action and the role it plays in the larger trajectory of their lives, especially within 
the context of their migration experience. Using a life course perspective, another aim 
was to understand their relationship to voluntary associations and develop a list of 
political and civic action in which Iranian immigrants participate. I used virtual 
ethnography to complement the conventional ethnography in order to analyze the nature 
of political discourse among Iranian communities online and to determine if there is a 
relationship between online and offline political discourse. If so, what are the 




Based on preliminary fieldwork I hypothesized that factors such as age at 
migration, length of time in U.S., particular migration experience, and interactions with 
home country political events through the medium of the public sphere impact the 
meaning and significance of political activity. I reasoned that perhaps the political 
discourse taking place within and through local voluntary associations would mirror that 
taking place online. 
This hypothesis, I expected, would lead me to understanding the process of 
politicization among immigrants. I further hypothesized that structural factors such as 
political history in the homeland, local host country interactions, and on-going 
interactions with home country through the public sphere would impact this process. 
Significance 
Through voluntary associations, we can uncover the private and symbolically 
complex notions of community, politics, identity, belonging and citizenship among 
Iranian immigrants. Voluntary associations and civic culture comprise major institutions 
within public life, and the study of the anthropology of modernization and globalization 
(e.g. Appadurai 1996) is increasing. The concept of voluntary associations in the context 
of civic engagement dovetails nicely with the still-emerging scholarship on online 
communities and cyber cultures (Escobar 1994, Boellstroff 2008, Miller and Slater 2000, 
Freidenberg 2011).   
By applying “voluntary associations” to specific online communities in this 
research, it comprises a new extension of the term relevant to this current media age. 
Further, this research considers specific diaspora or immigrant-based online communities 




thorough way to examine sites of immigrant political discourse so that we get a better 
understanding of immigrant political agency. The study also advances anthropological 
methodology by combining virtual ethnography (in order to understand political 
discourse online) with conventional ethnography (in order to understand political agency 
among the local population). 
This research details how the civic and political spheres are linked through 
immigrant voluntary organizations, as well as processes of politicization. By looking at 
how one particular population of Iranian immigrants respond to homeland crises and 
participate in politics and civic culture, this study provides a retro-and prospective 
analysis of how diasporic citizens engage in social/political movements outside the 
territories of the borders of their nation-state and homeland, especially in instances when 
diplomatic relations between home and host prevent most forms of transnational political 
participation, such as supporting oppositional movements in home country. This kind of 
knowledge has an impact on development policy and diplomacy between nations.  
This is a critical moment for the formation of a distinctly Iranian-American 
identity within American civic and popular culture as a number of Iranians are obtaining 
a more prominent public profile. We see this in the emergence of advocacy groups, 
political action committees, and other voluntary organizations across the U.S. For the last 
several years, the national organization Public Affairs Association of Iranian Americans 
(PAAIA) has convened a series of programs in cities all over the U.S. called Passing the 
Torch which highlight Iranian-American notable achievers. More important is its 
advocacy work. PAAIA has organized town hall meetings with the Department of State 




discrimination by Apple, and furthered the conversation about the effect of sanctions and 
internet restrictions and access to media in Iran. 
There is an Iranian-American mayor of Falls Church, Virginia named Nader 
Baroukh. In Carlsbad, CA an Iranian-American woman won a city council seat, and is the 
first Iranian American to hold political office in San Diego. In November 2012 in 
Washington State, Cyrus Habib became the first Iranian American elected to state 
legislature. There are also Iranian comedians like Maz Jobrani and Nasim Pedrad on 
network and cable television and others on popular shows such as Saturday Night Live. 
Iranians, such as Reza Aslan, and Azar Nafisi (author of Reading Lolita in Tehran), both 
prominent writers and scholars, act as commentators and pundits on Iranian issues in 
popular media. In March 2009 the Persian Cultural Center in San Diego initiated an 
online petition requesting that Nowruz be officially recognized by the United Nations and 
its date be commemorated in the calendars of all UN member organizations. The UN 
General Assembly passed this resolution on February 23, 2010 recognizing the 
International Day of Nowruz (March 21), as a spring festival of Persian origin. Both 
Houses of Congress formally passed a resolution recognizing Nowruz, the Persian New 
Year, in March 2010 after the Public Affairs Alliance of Iranian Americans (PAAIA) 
introduced the initiative to a Congressman from California’s 15th District. For the 2010 
U.S. Census, for the first time ever a coalition of over 47 non-profit Iranian American 
organizations came together in an effort called “Iranians Count 2010 Census Coalition” 
with the idea of ensuring maximum participation to get a more accurate account of 




Scope and Limitations 
This research project offers an insider’s and experience-based look at a group of 
active members of an immigrant population who participate in one of the Iranian 
voluntary organizations in San Diego. To an extent, this project is about Iranian-
American civic and political identity, but more about how these informants articulate and 
narrate ideas about political ideology, social values, and their own place in American 
society, as well as how they live out those values and ideologies through their everyday 
participation in the political and civic culture of the United States, more specifically in 
the political and civic culture of a specific locality—San Diego, California. 
To say what it this study is not—it is not about how they maintain and celebrate 
Iranian-ness in the midst of changing forces and changing times in Southern California 
but how they frame their current politics and civic participation in the context of their 
attitudes and experiences with the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI). But, as I argue later, 
how they articulate to Iran also says something about how they integrate into the U.S. In 
a sense the IRI is continually positioned as the silent other, the big bad wolf that took 
their lives away and changed everything for them forever. Speaking un-metaphorically, 
the IRI in reality is the “fixed variable” or the “control” in this study because as it will 
become clear, though they may be of different political stripes, Iranians outside of Iran 





Organization of the Chapters 
In this chapter, I discussed the challenges and opportunities that presented 
themselves throughout preliminary fieldwork in San Diego during which the research 
question and design underwent further modification. This dissertation focuses on Iranian 
immigrant political agency using voluntary associations as the vehicle to understand 
political and civic practice. I set up my theoretical approach and significance, and how 
this research contributes to anthropological theory in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 reviews the 
literature pertaining to Iranian Americans in the social sciences literature, providing a 
demographic profile of Iranians in the U.S. and characteristics of the population in 
Southern California. Chapter 2 also provides an overview of the relevant literature and 
the conceptual frameworks that group the foreign born either as immigrant or diasporans. 
It posits that while we can understand Iranian migrants through the lens of immigration 
studies, the perspective of diaspora studies provides us a more refined understanding of 
their political and civic action. It reviews the current literature on immigrant politics and 
political transnationalism from political science, anthropology and sociology. It considers 
how diasporas engage with the notion of the public sphere in the realm of cyberspace, 
and the ways in which discourse in cyberspace among diasporas offer new forms of 
community at the same time challenging more established narratives. Chapter 3 describes 
the methods employed (participant observation, life histories and virtual ethnography 
being among them) and how those research methods helped address the research 
questions, as well as describing the research setting of San Diego and particular social 
media communities on the Internet. I also cover issues related to my own ethnographic 




conventional and virtual ethnography. Chapter 4 gives the background and migration 
story of each of the informants and uncovers major themes related to major life course 
events that spurred movement, (in)abilities to return to homeland, aspects of identity, and 
senses of belonging and solidarity to different people, groups, causes and how this 
motivates political and civic action. Chapter 5 explores the political as it intersects with 
the personal, examining dominant tropes in informants’ discourses about political/civic 
participation. This chapter also provides a typology of political action/behavior, the 
process of politicization among Iranian Americans, as well the role of voluntary ethnic-
based organizations in fomenting an emerging Iranian immigrant civil society, and the 
potential of immigrant political agency and organizations as the vehicle for “learning” 
about democracy. The final chapter, Chapter 6, affords the opportunity to discuss 
interpretations of the data in light of methodology, and to sum up the ways this thesis 
addressed research questions and contributed to the field of immigration studies and 





Chapter 2  Background and Literature Review 
 
In this chapter I bring together the various bodies of scholarship that have 
informed my study.  The strategy here is to juxtapose the disparate strands of scholarship 
and make them work together as applied to the case of Iranian Americans and their 
participation in political and civic structures.  In the first section, called “Iranian 
Migration and Diaspora,” I lay out the characteristics of the population in question in this 
research project. I provide a brief history of Iranians’ migration history, their 
demographic profile in the U.S., then discuss what is known about them through the 
Iranian Studies literature. The overall point of this section is to relate major social-science 
knowledge15 about the population and orient the reader to current issues and contexts. I 
conclude with a consideration of how communities mark and symbolize boundaries 
especially amidst social change. This references the point made in Chapter 1 about how 
Iranian ethnic grassroots based organizations are hyper-conscious constructions of 
community, and that community is also constructed through online diaspora groups. 
In the second section, “Diaspora or Immigrants?,” I consider the two separate but 
interrelated streams of research with regards to persons displaced from their country of 
origin: writings that use the term “diaspora” versus research that studies immigrants to 
posit that both terms are needed for understanding the case of Iranian Americans. An 
exhaustive literature is already in place about this debate and my aim is not to cover it all 
but to highlight what each field offers with respect to understanding Iranian immigrants’ 
political agency. 
                                                
15 I use “social science” because relevant sources about the Iranian immigrant population 




“Following the person” as Marcus (1995) advocates, revealed two arenas of 
political talk among Iranian migrants: formal organizations and online communities. 
These last two sections parallel the model I proposed in Chapter 1which broadly follows 
Iranian political talk or discourse in the public sphere, outside of the realm of meyhmooni 
(social gatherings with friends and family in the private sphere). I defined public sphere 
in terms of Fraser’s (1990) re-articulation of Habermasian notions of the public sphere. 
For my study, "Public sphere" lumps together political talk and political action together 
with engagement with voluntary associations online and offline. Therefore the third 
section, called “Immigrant Political Participation and Political Transnationalism” 
discusses the literature on immigrant civic/political engagement through formal 
mechanisms. Because anthropology's contribution to the topic of immigrant political 
agency is still emerging and the most similarly-oriented sources offer on-the-ground 
detailed ethnographic case studies (e.g. Reed-Danahay and Brettell 2008) it is difficult to 
get a systematic view of immigrant politics solely within anthropology. Therefore, my 
approach with this section has been inter-disciplinary drawing from sociology, political 
science, and policy research, each offering something valuable to my study.  Lastly, the 
final section “Online Communities and Constructing the Diasporic Public Sphere” delves 
deeper into newer scholarship related to how immigrants and members of a diaspora use 
new technologies of communication to construct a diasporic public sphere.  
Iranian Migration and Diaspora 
 
The first wave of migration from Iran to the U.S., which started in the mid-1950s, 
primarily consisted of college students (Hakimzadeh and Dixon 2006). As expected, 




immigration law at that point in time heavily influenced rates and patterns of migration. 
This first wave of migration primarily consisted of university students studying abroad to 
meet the needs of a rapidly industrializing oil-based economy. After 1973, the economic 
boom and dramatic increase of oil revenues propelled more student emigration to the 
U.S. From the 1950s to 1978, approximately 34,000 people left Iran (Hakimzadeh and 
Dixon 2006).  
After the revolution in 1978, there was a steady and notable increase in the number 
of Iranians classified as immigrants, tripling in size in the period of 1978-1986. 
(Bozorgmehr and Sabagh 1988). Many of these were as a result of converting their status 
from non- immigrant to legal immigrant.16 The 1979-1980 Islamic revolution and its 
aftermath was the main factor that precipitated the growth of the Iranian diaspora 
worldwide, mostly as exiles and political refugees in countries of settlement (Bozorgmehr 
1998).  
The post-revolution exodus has been referred to as the second wave of migration. 
In 1990, 637,500 Iranians were enumerated in official national censuses of the following 
ten countries: U.S., Canada, West Germany, Sweden, Great Britain, France, Norway, 
Australia, Israel, and Japan. The U.S. had nearly half (45%) of those Iranians living 
abroad (Bozorgmehr 1998). From 1980 to 2004, more than one out of every four Iranian 
immigrants was a refugee or asylee (Hakimzadeh and Dixon 2006), which were 
disproportionately members of religious and ethnic minorities, such as the Bahá’ís, Jews, 
Armenians, and Assyrians. Also included in this second wave were young men who fled 
military service and the Iran-Iraq war, followed by young women and families who came 
                                                
16 During and after the hostage crisis, the closure of the U.S. Embassy made it impossible 
to obtain a U.S. visa in Iran meaning that people had to travel to another country in order to get a 




for educational and political reasons (Hakimzadeh and Dixon 2006). Seventy-five percent 
(75%) of the current Iranian population in the U.S. entered before 2000 (Hosseini 2012). 
In 2000, the Iranian-born U.S. population was 283,000, though the Iranian-
American community claims the number is much larger than the Census Bureau figure 
suggests (Hakimzadeh and Dixon 2006). Census 2010 does not ask about country of 
origin (Dr. Mehdi Bozorgmehr, personal communication)17. The 2009 American 
Community survey enumerates 470,000 people claiming Iranian ancestry, with 57% of 
them in the West (U.S. Census Bureau 2009). 18 
Demographic Profile: Iranians in the U.S. 
Analyses of immigrant experiences tend to focus on low wage and working class 
immigrants, and far less on the experiences of middle class migrants (Freidenberg, 
personal communication). Iranian immigrants constitute a substantively different 
population within immigration research. One reason is that unlike Asians and Latin 
Americans, the passage of the 1965 Immigration Reform Act had little effect on Iranians 
emigrating to the U.S19 Rather it was the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 and its aftermath 
that was the contributing factor for Iranian emigration (Bozorgmehr 1998). 
Another reason that Iranian immigrants differ from other recently-arrived groups 
is that, as a whole, they are highly educated, professional and entrepreneurial (Amanat 
1993). This makes them more economically assimilated as compared to other recent 
immigrant groups. Data taken the American Community Survey from 2008-2010 show 
                                                
17 This information is released through the American Community Survey. 
18 It is difficult to get an accurate number of Iranians living in the United States. Even the 
Census Bureau acknowledges that the number of Iranian Americans has historically been under-
represented in Census data (Hosseini 2012). 
19 The post-1965 large-scale migration of people from Asia and Latin America into the 




that 59% of Iranians  have a bachelor’s degree or higher compared to 28% of the general 
population, and 30% have a Master’s degree or higher, versus 10% of the general 
population. Further, the median household income is $68,000 versus $51,000 for general 
population (Hosseini 2012). According to the 2000 Census, more than half (51.8%) of the 
Iranian immigrant population were employed in management, professional, and related 
occupations and the self-employment rate of Iranian foreign born (11.6%) was almost 
double the rate for the total foreign born population (Hakimzadeh and Dixon 2006). 
Iranian immigrants have higher rates of naturalization (60.7%) as compared to other 
foreign born populations. Eighty-four percent of Iranians describe themselves as knowing 
English well or very-well, yet many still speak their mother tongue at home (Bozorgmehr 
and Sabagh 1988). 
As compared to other new immigrant groups, research on Iranian immigrants is 
still lacking. Bozorgmehr (1998) provides a very general survey of the literature and 
groups the research conducted thus far around the following categories: immigrants vs. 
exiles, ethnicity and ethnic identity, economic adaptation, gender, assimilation, and the 
1.5 and second generations (though he contends that research in the last category is sorely 
lacking). 
Finally, even given their high rates of economic and educational integration into 
U.S. society, language and cultural preservation are important. Iranians have slightly 
higher rates of speaking a language other than English at home (92.1%) than the total 
foreign born (83%) (Hakimzadeh and Dixon 2006). Iranian immigrants exhibit a high 
degree of secularization: 68% of respondents to a 2005 online survey administered by the 




The metropolitan areas with the most Iranian immigrants are, respectively: Los 
Angeles–Riverside-Orange County (41%), San Francisco-Oakland-San Jose (10%), New 
York City (8%), and Washington, DC-Baltimore (7%), according to the 2000 Census. 
The next three largest destinations are San Diego (7,675), Dallas (6,376) and Houston 
(6,287) (Hakimzadeh and Dixon 2006). 
Iranian Studies in Diaspora 
Developed in the vein of area studies and orientalism (Dabashi 2004), Iranian 
Studies is an interdisciplinary field concerned with the literature, history, art and culture 
of Iranian people20. Of course it is a much older field than the study of Iranian 
immigrants. Much of the available literature about or on Iranians in the United States is 
informed by a cultural studies and literary criticism perspective, especially with the 
explosion of genres of memoir and autobiography by Iranians in the diaspora. Far fewer 
resources exist in the social sciences literature. One reason, as pointed out by Higgins 
(2004), could be because the relative low status of studying social sciences among Iranian 
Americans. Primarily carried out by Iranian sociologists living in the U.S., the focus in 
the related social sciences literature has been on the general characteristics of the 
population, especially in high-density population centers like Los Angeles and 
Washington D.C.  
With reference to the available scholarship on the Iranian immigrant population, 
Higgins (2004) conducted a meta-analysis of the available literature. Among 83 English-
language publications by 53 authors, only 15 were carried out by anthropologists. 
Methods employed typically involved a combination of participant observation, 
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interviews and surveys. Higgins (2004) also details the challenges in conducting 
fieldwork among this population. Surveys were self-administered and all had response 
rates below the U.S. Office of Budget and Management contract researchers. Large scale 
surveys with statistical samples do not exist. Semi-structured interviews were the most 
popular interview technique, with sample sizes ranging from 8 to 671 (among 10 authors 
reporting). Only two researchers mention using a tape recorder, and two others mention 
specifically not using a tape recorder because of their informants’ fears that the SAVAK 
(Iranian secret police) or the CIA was collecting information about them.  
While not directly ignoring the political activity and sentiment of Iranian-
Americans, the majority of literature about the Iranian immigrant population focuses on 
identity formation and aspects of hybridized culture that look back toward to Iran. 
Further, much of the social science studies have relied on surveys, self- administered 
semi-structured interviews, and the author’s knowledge about the community. My study 
seeks to consider Iranian immigrants’ participation in politics and the public sphere, first 
throughout their life course and more holistically considering their interaction with host 
nation structures and civil society. In what follows here I provide a brief review of the 
social sciences literature. 
 Looking at ethnic identity preservation among Iranians in Los Angeles, 
Bozorgmehr (1997) puts forth the notion of "internal ethnicity" to refer to the presence of 
ethnic groups within an immigrant group. Through the analysis of survey data of Iranians 
in Los Angeles, he found that immigrant ethno-religious sub groups who were minority 
populations in Iran (such as Armenians, Jews and Bahá’ís) were less assimilated and have 




Bozorgmehr believes that this shows that pre-migration ethnicity is an important factor in 
post-migration ethnicity. Others like Naficy (1993) believe that shared Persian language 
makes an Iranian national identity prevail over sub-ethnic affiliations. Sabagh and 
Bozorgmehr (1994) developed a link between religiosity and ethnicity to explain the high 
rates of secularization among Iranian Muslims. The secularism of Iranian Muslims in Los 
Angeles is attributed to the marked selectivity in their urban origin, high social class, 
exile status and secularism in Iran before migration. 
 Mobasher (2006) examines the impact of political events, American media and the 
anti-Iranian discourse on the formation of ethnic identity, among Iranian immigrants, and 
attempts to explain why religious (Islamic) and national identities have been veiled and 
subsumed by the emergence of Persian identity by both secular and religious Iranian 
immigrants to the U.S. Mobasher calls this diminishing religiosity and the veiling of 
national identity as "ethnic switching." With the 1978 Iranian Revolution and the 1979 
hostage crisis and subsequent Iran-Iraq war, the 1980s were a tense time period for 
Iranian immigrants. Outrage and frustration about the hostage crisis by native-born 
Americans, anti-Iranian demonstrations and a racist/prejudice popular discourse against 
Iranians, coupled with increased levels of surveillance (for example, Iranians were 
required to register with INS) meant that Iranians in the U.S. perceived that a veritable 
“mini-war” was being waged against them. 
 Mobasher (2006) asserts that the Iranian community "in exile" lacks a unified sense 
of national identity, and this is most evidenced by the differing self-identifying labels: 
Iranians, Persians, Iranian American, Persian American, etc. These labels are situational 




ashamed to be identified with Iranian national government. The glorification and 
promotion of elements of Persian culture and folkways in public becomes a central 
feature of Iranian identity. There are other Iranians who identify themselves through a 
combination of Islamic (religious) and cultural (Persian) features. The self-identification 
of many Iranians as Persians indicates a symbolic resistance against the Islamic Republic 
and dominance of Islamic ideology in Iran. In glorifying such distinctly Persian and pre-
Islamic celebrations as Nowruz , Chaharshanbeh Soori, and Sizdeh Bidar as described 
earlier and overall emphasizing the cultural significance of Persian heritage, community 
organizers and political activists find an opportunity to construct a political community, 
express their grievances, and mobilize for collective action against the Iranian 
government," (Mobasher 2006: 114). 
 Additionally Mostofi (2003) describes dual aspects in the formation of an Iranian-
American identity: American notions of freedom and liberty, plus Iranian cultural 
traditions and concepts of the family. Iranians tend to define being American as a culture 
of civic nationalism. Further certain ideals of Western democracy and political rhetoric 
are not new for Iranian immigrants, having been part of the Iranian psyche since World 
War II (Mostofi 2003), and large-scale westernization of Iranian culture goes back to at 
least the late 19th century (Kelley 1993), especially through education. A relic of this 
influence can be found in the Persian colloquial expression for “thank you” which is 
mersi, an adaptation of the French word expressing thanks. Iranian-Americans, Mostofi 
(2003) argues, are successful at constructing a hybrid identity because they keep 
important aspects of their Iranian identity in the private realm of the home among family 




Naficy (1998) maps what he terms “Iranian exile culture” in Los Angeles and 
shows how television and other kinds of cultural products and popular social practices 
transform an exile community into an ethnicity (Behdad 1996). As Naficy (1993) 
suggested, exile ethnic pop subcultures have a dual function of guiding exile 
communities to make a transition from liminality to incorporation into the host culture 
and providing a means for the preservation of ethnic culture and the expression of 
resistive, subversive, and oppositional ideas. As an important ideological tool against the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, Iranian television and radio programs produced in Los Angeles 
have been the chief purveyors of the non-Islamic Iranian national identity. With the 
exception of a few, nearly all the Iranian television programs have been dominated by 
secular anti-Khomeini royalists who support a form of constitutional monarchy (Naficy 
1998). Therefore, discussions about the social and political conditions of Iran, treatment 
of political dissidents, and loss of national dignity and international respect under the 
Islamic government have been a central feature of the Iranian media in exile.  
According to Naficy (1993:7), as part of constructing this form of national 
identity in diaspora, images of a pre-Islamic or prerevolutionary Iran were frozen into 
icons and fetishes that were repeatedly circulated in television program titles and logos, 
in the music video images, and in the programs themselves. As Naficy (1993) maintains, 
to an extent this ideology and “manufactured” Iranian community (for instance 
promoting the celebration of holidays and mannerisms of culture under the Pahlavi 
regime21) supported by Iranian exile television in Los Angeles glosses over the 
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heterogeneity of Iranian immigrants in the U.S. coming from different ethnic, religious 
and linguistic backgrounds (Naficy 1993, Mostofi 2003). 
The political demonstration is an important part of the Iranian social landscape in 
Los Angeles (Kelley 1993), and has been used by Iranian immigrants to protest the 
regime, or advocate for their particular political orientation since at least since the 1970s. 
Therefore expressing political agency as an Iranian immigrant is not necessarily a new 
phenomenon.  
In terms of organizational life, Bozorgmehr (1998) contends that the presence of 
associations among Iranian immigrants is negligible as compared to other immigrant 
groups. Even less important is the role that ethnic associations and voluntary 
organizations play in the lives of Iranians. Compared to other new immigrant groups, 
Iranians have very few ethnic associations or organizations. The main explanation for this 
pattern is cultural: voluntary associations were uncommon in Iran (Bozorgmehr 1998:24). 
However this is not something that has been borne out in my study. As elaborated 
in the Preface, conversations and debates about politics abound in the private sphere. 
While not necessarily functioning as mutual aid associations that have been common with 
other immigrant groups in history, Iranian immigrants in the U.S. have organized 
associations to preserve and present Persian22 expressive culture in areas of settlement 
throughout the U.S.   
Iranians in Southern California 
The southern California region has the highest concentration of Iranians outside of 
Iran (Bozorgmehr 1998). San Diego represents an important field site within southern 
California, with L.A. and Orange County also having large numbers of Iranian residents. 
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Southern California Iranians are more ethnically, religiously and economically 
homogenous than other settlements in the U.S. As products of the Pahlavi-era in Iran, 
they represent the middle to upper-middle class professionals who were already inclined 
to western influence and belonged to Iran’s predominantly secular middle class. They 
were successful in importing their wealth, education and experience to the U.S. (Mostofi 
2003). Therefore in terms of “studying up” (Nader 1972) researching Iranian immigrants 
in southern California means looking at an example of the migration of elites, upholding 
values like Westernization secularization, urbanization and modernization. 
Partly because of their financial, occupational, and educational capital, Iranians in 
Southern California have not formed a single ethnic residential enclave (Naficy 1993:28). 
However there is an ethnic pattern to their dispersal in the Los Angeles area: Bahá’ís in 
Santa Monica/West Los Angeles; Muslims in Santa Monica/Palms; Armenians in 
Glendale, and Jews in Westwood and Beverly Hills (Bozorgmehr 1992: 168-169 cited in 
Naficy 1993:28). Nonetheless, the idea of Iranian identity, nation and nationalism 
prevails against this sub-ethnic dispersal. Naficy (1993) argues that the lack of a single 
dominant religion and residential concentration as markers of ethnicity amplifies the 
significance of other factors of ethnicity, such as the shared Persian language (Farsi) 
transcending all internal ethnic boundaries. The fact that popular culture (television, 
radio, popular press) disseminated almost entirely in Farsi helps create an imaginary 
Iranian national identity for all Iranians, regardless of their ethnic/linguistic/religious 
affiliation (Naficy 1993).  
In conclusion, we know historically that Iran as imagined nation amalgamates 




of the Iranian population belongs to the Persian speaking community. The rest are Azeris, 
Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, Baluch, Armenians, Zoroastrians, Bahá’ís, Jews, and a myriad 
of others. It is noteworthy that sub-national ethnicity is recognized among Iranian 
immigrants in places like Los Angeles where there is high enough residential 
concentration. As others such as Mobasher (2006) have noted and through my own 
observations, both the expression of a specifically Persian cultural heritage, and the 
prevalence of Farsi language popular culture in the form of movies, radio, and television. 
as Naficy (1993) has shown, sub-ethnic distinctions (e.g. Isfahanis, Rashtis, Azaris, 
Kurds, Lors, Baluchis, Turkic, as well as Jewish), and practices are overlooked and re-
framed for the construction of a unified Iranian identity in diaspora.  
I see the construction of a unified Iranian identity in diaspora as a two-prong 
process. First boundaries between Iranians and non-Iranians become more marked. As an 
example: Adnan, one of my informants and an active community organizer pointed out as 
evidence in his “all the pretty stuff” comment that local voluntary associations host a 
public event for Mehregan, a traditional Zoroastrian celebration for the fall equinox, that 
is not even really celebrated in Iran anymore. In speaking about boundaries, symbols, and 
social change among community, especially among sub-national boundaries, Cohen 
(1985) writes, 
Indeed, the greater the pressure on communities to modify their structural forms 
to comply more with those elsewhere, the more they are inclined to reassert their 
boundaries symbolically [emphasis in original] by imbuing these modified forms 
with meaning and significance which belies their appearance. In other words, as 
the structural [emphasis in original] bases of boundary become blurred, so the 
symbolic bases are strengthened through ‘flourishes and decorations’, ‘aesthetic 





Secondly, any inherent complexity is reduced symbolically. In speaking of the 
conceptualization and symbolization of community boundaries, Cohen (1985) 
distinguishes between “private” and “public” faces of community. The latter is the 
material for comedians and tabloid journalism where “internal variety disappears or 
coalesces into a simple statement” (74), whereas the private mode makes room for 
complexity and differentiation. 
The boundary thus symbolizes the community to its members in two quite 
different ways: it is the sense they have of its perception by people on the other 
side—the public face and ‘typical’ mode—and it is their sense of the community 
as refracted through all the complexities of their lives and experience—the private 
face and idiosyncratic mode….For it is here that we encounter people thinking 
about and symbolizing their community,” (74-75). 
 
Therefore, Persian cultural heritage festivals and celebrations constitute the public face 
and symbolically simple boundary of the Iranian immigrant community in San Diego. I 
argue that in looking to conspicuous construction of community boundaries through 
virtual diasporas online and through local ethnic grassroots bases organizations, we can 
uncover the private and symbolically complex notions of community, politics, identity 
and belonging. In the next section, I argue that while we know Iranians through the lens 
of immigration studies, we can understand their political and civic action better through 
the perspective of diaspora studies. Both are needed to contextualize immigrant political 
civic action through the life course. 
Diaspora or Immigrants? 
My use of the terms “diaspora” and “immigrants” in the case of Iranians is a 
deliberate and strategic choice. At times, immigrant is appropriate because that is how 
they have been covered in the social science literature, and my dissertation research aims 




immigrant political agency. Further, the growing literature on modes of transnationalism 
(Glick Schiller, Basch, Blanc 1995; Levitt and Jaworsky 2007), especially political 
transnationalism is oriented toward the term immigrant. 
At other times, diaspora is more appropriate, for two primary reasons. The first 
reason is a semantic one. Diasporas, defined as dispersed populations across the globe, 
are less bound ideologically to the notion of the nation-state. In other words, when 
speaking of Iranian immigrants, we must ask to which country did they immigrate? When 
speaking of the Iranian diaspora, we think of a dispersed population of Iranians residing 
in many countries.  
Secondly studies of immigrants oftentimes rely on the worn-out model of linear 
integration, acculturation, and assimilation where immigrants move from one culture into 
another (Fortier 2000). Iranians may be economically integrated but have high rates of 
Farsi language maintenance in the home for example (Hakimzadeh and Dixon 2006). 
Further, the term “diaspora” signals agency on the part of the displaced individual, while 
“immigrant” is a label often put on populations by others. Immigrants are seen as 
acquiescing to the demands of an industrial society rather than actively engaging in 
shaping and negotiating their immediate circumstances to fit their requirements (Fortier 
2000).  
Definitions and uses of the term diaspora by scholars such as Cohen (1997), 
Safran (1991), and Hall (1990) are relevant to the Iranian case. Cohen (1997) finds in a 
survey of various diasporas through space and time that they share some important 
attributes: a sense of collectivity, group consciousness, solidarity, with a specific 




characterized by five components; including a belief that they will never fully be 
accepted into the host society and a desire to eventually return to their ancestral home. 
Coming out of a cultural studies framework, Hall (1990) explores issues of representation 
and identity and the two positions of cultural identity. The first has to do with a shared 
collective cultural used for mobilization and solidarity projects and important to the 
production and rediscovery of these essential identities. The second position of cultural 
identity recognizes the differences and disjuncture, and speaks to the traumatic nature of 
the colonial experience on people of color. The historical trajectory of those histories has 
material and symbolic effects on these cultural identities. The diasporic experience and 
identity is not essentialized or pure but springs forth from heterogeneity, hybridity, and 
constant reproduction. Clifford (1994) sees the usage of diaspora as a “resistance to 
assimilations” and signifier of “political struggles to define the local, as distinctive 
community, in historical contexts of displacement,” (307).  
All of these ideas about what “diaspora” offers have considerable utility for this 
study in terms of thinking about how this notion carries: 1) certain oppositional identities 
which are in themselves heterogeneous and hybrid, and 2) the potential for creating 
collectivities and mobilizing. These characteristics speak to a specific psychological 
stance associated with diaspora as being a force for new cultural expression. This 
“constructivist” approach to diaspora (Adamson 2002) as an imagined community 
(Anderson 1983) gets at internally constructed worlds and implies the possibility of 
agency and cultural production.  
However, “diaspora” can also be problematic in its over-use and conflation. 




contemporary usages of the term diaspora as a theoretical concept, he warns against the 
universalization of diaspora to all immigrant groups. Diaspora is a heuristic device and 
not a descriptive concept (Gilroy 1993 in Fortier 2000), yet the usage of the term 
proliferates in tandem with processes of globalization (Clifford 1994). Olwig (2003) finds 
that the focus on identity issues in relation to migrants’ places of origin has led to a 
certain merging of the notion of transnationalism and diaspora so that migrants are 
sometimes referred to as constituting a diaspora. Vertovec (1999) has defined social 
formations that span borders as “ethnic diasporas.” The editor of the journal Diaspora, 
Khachig Tölölyan (1996), expressing concern over the widespread use of the term 
diaspora by intellectuals, notes that “Diasporic identity has become an occasion for the 
celebration of multiplicity and mobility—and a figure of our discontent with our being in 
a world still dominated by nation-states” (1996:28 quoted in Olwig 2003) which may be 
more of an intellectual and personal project infused with intentions related to the political 
identity of particular arenas rather than an analysis of actual sociocultural practices of 
transmigrant actors (Olwig 2003). Further, the close association between identity issues 
and transnationalism23 has had negative repercussions on the range of cultural 
phenomena considered that Appadurai (1996) has termed “marked culture” and left 
unexamined the much wider range of unmarked culture on which marked culture draws. 
Marked culture in this context is defined as migrants’ assertion of their national identities 
(Olwig 2003). Gabriel Sheffer, a political scientist, describes three main criteria to define 
a diaspora: a common ethnic identity, internal organization, and third, significant contact 
with homeland (Sheffer 1993 cited in Dorai 2002). 
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Transnational” and “diaspora” also become conflated, with unnecessary binaries 
being drawn between the two. Portes et al (1999) distinguishes transnational communities 
from diasporas because diaspora’s connections to homeland are largely symbolic while 
for the latter the connections are real. I have a problem with this distinction for Iranians 
in the diaspora since they comprise a “mixed” community of those truly in exile and 
those that make regular return visits. In either case, significant and regular contact with 
homeland is maintained (Mostofi 2003). Sometimes a diaspora community can become 
transnational. In the Palestinian case Dorai (2002) distinguishes between elite members 
of a diaspora and others, and describes the emergence of a Palestinian transnational 
community via the elite who are now able to maintain “real and physical” contact through 
travel, the formation of transnational businesses, or economic investment in Palestine (for 
example in the town of Ramallah). 
According to Glick Schiller (1999) transmigrants differ significantly from people 
with a diasporic tradition. The distinguishing factor seems to be the nation-state. 
Transmigrants claim and can be claimed by two or more nation-states into which they are 
incorporated as social actors. Diasporas on the other hand attribute their common 
identity, cultural beliefs and practices, language or religion to “myths of a common 
ancestry” and whose common sense of heritage is not linked to a contemporary state.  
Thus both the terms diaspora and immigrant are useful for the purposes of this 
study and will be deployed strategically as needed. As far as how Iranians self-refer, it 
differs by individual, circumstances of migration and context of discussion. For instance, 
immediately after the Revolution, Iranian popular press in the diaspora called its 




changed for many to immigrant, the term used in the popular press also shifted to “an 
immigrant community” (jam’e-ye mohajer) (Naficy 1993: 28). The Iranian Studies 
literature alternatively uses the terms immigrant, diaspora and exile. Iranian websites 
serving the community outside of Iran use the term diaspora. On an organizational level, 
especially when vouching for recognition in the American political and civic landscape, 
Iranian organizations will use the term immigrant. The effort to get Iranians to participate 
in the 2010 U.S. Census, called “Iranians Count,” was coordinated between forty-seven 
different Iranian non-profit organizations, including the Persian Cultural Center in San 
Diego, called on Iranian’s ethnic identity in relation to other ethnic groups in the U.S. For 
this study, my goal was not to determine which category informants belonged to, but to 
examine the whole range of politically- and civically-oriented behaviors that informants 
undertook. 
My aim in the next section is to frame Iranian migrant political and civic 
discourse and action within the relevant literature on immigrant politics.  
Immigrant Political Participation/ Political Transnationalism 
The literature on transnationalism (Basch et al 1994, Glick Schiller and Fouron 
2001, Laguerre 1998, Ostergaard-Nielsen 2003) has shown that contemporary 
immigrants can and choose to be engaged politically in more than one country. 
Immigrant involvement in politics and transnational social movements has far-reaching 
implications for home and host nation-states (Adamson 2002, Lyons and Mandaville 
2008, Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad 2008). With events such as political unrest in Paris 
around national identity in fall 2005, the London bombings in July 2005, and the post-




reform debates, and granting amnesty, etc.), the political engagement and political 
incorporation of immigrants has become an important topic of political discourse.  
Looking beyond the economic impact of remittances and the effects of “brain 
drain” on homeland countries, diasporas24 are important actors in socio-economic 
development, as well as in peace and conflict in home countries (Brinkerhoff 2008). In 
most cases, such as in Kerlin (2008) and Orozco (2004), countries of origin directly 
benefit from emigrants’ involvement in homeland economic development and aid. 
However, in the case of Iran, the majority of its emigrant population is in opposition to 
the ruling government, and precluded from participating in homeland development in the 
conventional ways, such as the development of NGOs, participating in homeland politics, 
etc. 
Research on immigrants’ potential contributions and the nature and characteristics 
of their political agency remains scarce. Pero and Solomos (2010) identify three factors 
that explain the reasons for this neglect: methodological nationalism, over-reliance on 
analyzing electoral behavior as the only way to understand politics, and factors related to 
a discipline’s development—as is the case with anthropology. Movement across borders 
and deterritorialization disrupted anthropology’s original view of people as fixed 
embodiments of culture. In the past, migrants’ mobilizations were too easily explained by 
either their ethnicity or the class structure they occupied, and this further led to it being a 
neglected topic within anthropology and sociology (Pero and Solomos 2010), 
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Immigrant political behavior is an inherently multidisciplinary topic. Political 
science, sociology, and policy studies, as well as anthropology have all made 
contributions to the study of immigrant involvement in home and host country politics. 
While offering richly detailed case studies of the border-spanning political and civic 
activities of particular groups, anthropology however, has been weaker in offering any 
systematic models of immigrant/transnational political and civic behavior with which to 
make comparisons, or to move beyond political-economic explanations. Specifically, 
anthropology is falling behind with respect to the impact of immigrant voluntary 
associations. Brettell and Reed-Danahay (2008), two anthropologists, affirm this finding 
and acknowledge that while several European scholars have begun to look at the role of 
organizations and in political and civic integration of immigrants in Europe, less attention 
has been given to this subject for post-1965 immigrants in the U.S.  
Gabriel Sheffer (1993, 2003) in political science provides a strong foundation for 
the creation of models with regards to what is termed “diaspora politics.” Firstly, 
diaspora communities function on five levels in politics: the domestic level in host 
country, the regional level, the trans-state level, the level of the entire diaspora, and the 
level of homeland politics. In each of these levels, their work falls into three broad 
categories: maintenance, defense and promotion (Sheffer 2003: 173-174). In addition, 
Sheffer (2003) puts forth a developmental model of diasporas, using the development and 
maintenance of specifically diaspora organizations as the litmus test to assess levels of 
integration, maturity, and/or ethnic maintenance. Sheffer’s continuum model of diaspora 




community might change through time, based on experiences and circumstances both 
with homeland and host country.  
Also in political science, Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad (2008) examine 
community organizations in six cities throughout California and find that while 
immigrant organizations play an important role in the lives of members; their impact is 
often compromised by political marginalization and a severe lack of resources. Even in 
areas with high rates of immigrant organizing, policymakers remain unaware of local 
ethnic organizations. Looking at new immigrant destinations, Andersen (2008) finds that 
community organizations often serve as the primary vehicle for political incorporation—a 
role once played by the major political parties. Ostergaard-Nielson (2003) uses migrant 
organizations as a point of entry to research transnational political practices. In research 
among Turks and Kurds in Europe, she finds that migrant organizations stand at the 
nexus of local, national, and international political processes. Yet, in some ways this 
methodological choice is a “double-edged sword” (779-780) because it may give a biased 
understanding of the degree of engagement with the migrant group as a whole. In the 
civic participation and voluntarism literature (e.g. Putnam 2000), contemporary 
immigrants have received less attention partly because of a lack of data sources 
(Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad 2008).  
The anthropological approach has strongly emphasized the transnational aspect of 
immigrant politics (e.g. Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc, 1994, Glick Schiller 
and Fouron 2001, Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). While they highlight the importance of 
networks, flows, and the simultaneity of transnational action, they have not adequately 




of transnational political activities mean and how they impact notions of citizenship, 
beyond the judicial definition has been one of the outcomes of such research.  
Transnationality problematizes the notion of citizenship to stretch it beyond the 
realms of the nation-state (Laguerre 1998). The “diasporic citizen” (Laguerre 1998) is 
one way to note the positioning of a subject vis-à-vis the state. Though discussions of the 
meaning and impacts of diaspora abound (Clifford 1994, Cohen 1991, Safran 1991, 
Werbner 1998, Braziel and Mannur 2003, Olwig 2003), the anthropological literature 
does not differentiate between the immigrant and diasporic citizen. In other words, the 
various terms used in anthropology for a person that has crossed an international border: 
migrant, immigrant, transnational, diaspora, transmigrant, etc. all have material and 
symbolic consequences and implications. These labels do not necessarily align with the 
immigrant experience and cannot account for the myriad structural or process factors that 
make an individual or community simultaneously an immigrant with an ethnic identity, a 
member of a diaspora, and a transmigrant engaging in border-spanning activities. Further, 
immigrants engaging in transnational political activities define the agenda, which can 
simultaneously be with local, national, transnational, or global structures.  
There are a handful of sources that consider the border-spanning political 
activities of Mexican immigrants, such as the existence of hometown associations that 
advocate for bi-national political and civic rights, from an ethnographic perspective 
(Orozco 2004, Fox and Rivera-Salgado 2004, Rivera-Salgado 1999, Smith and Bakker 
2008). Additionally, Bada, Fox and Selee (2009) have edited a short collection of papers 
centered on the spring 2006 mass mobilization for comprehensive immigration reform 




Work by Brettell and Reed-Danahy (2008, 2012) is perhaps the closest to this 
dissertation research in what they offer. These authors look to issues of political 
incorporation and civic engagement, issues of naturalization and the rights and duties of 
legal citizenship, and also at political and civic participation and forms of “participatory 
citizenship” within the institutional contexts of nation states. However, there is a relative 
vacuum for research which positions immigrant political behavior along a continuum of 
effects (local, national and transnational), provides a typology of diaspora/immigrant 
political activities, and considers immigrant voluntary associations for their 
organizational possibilities in structuring immigrant civic and political participation. 
Immigrant civic and political action and discourse take place in the public sphere. 
I defined how I will use “public sphere” in Chapter 1. This definition of the public sphere 
provides a useful model for contrasting the activities which take place within and through 
organizational life among Iranian Americans, with the political sentiment and debates 
that take place in private settings. The other site of public political discourse among 
Iranians in the diaspora takes place through online cyber-communities.  
Online Communities and Constructing a Diasporic Public Sphere 
This section covers how definitions of public sphere and diaspora come together 
in the context of New Media, especially internet communication technologies to create a 
virtual diasporic public sphere. 
Werbner (1998) conceives of a “diasporic public sphere…in which different 
transnational imaginaries are interpreted and argued over, where aesthetic and moral 
fables of diaspora are formulated, and political mobilization generated, often in response 




events have the power to define the focus of diaspora populations and “demand active 
participation from viewers and generate localised interpretive communities that 
sometimes evolve into communities of action” (11). Further, diasporas are “communities 
of co-responsibility” recognizing not simply their loyalty but their existential connection 
to 'co-diasporans' elsewhere, or in a home country. This sense of co-responsibility is 
expressed in tangible material gestures of charitable giving and complex forms of 
political mobilization, "New social movements, including ethnic, religious, and gendered 
diasporic movements such as the one considered here, both sustain autonomous spaces of 
public debate and attempt to influence wider public political realms and centres of 
power,” (Werbner 1998:xx). Werbner’s description of what constitutes a diasporic public 
sphere seems almost expressly written for the case represented in this research-- how the 
Iranian diaspora localized in places across the globe and how they responded to June 
2009 events in Iran with mass rallies, sometimes on a daily basis, and an explosion of 
online political activity and news sharing. 
Bernal (2005) perceives that diaspora and cyberspace are conceptually linked. 
First both are forms of displacement. People in diaspora have to construct a social context 
for themselves that transcends their physical location. Secondly, diaspora and cyberspace 
are linked through the notion of “community”. New forms of social belonging have 
arisen from both advances in communication technology and the geographic mobility of 
populations. Bernal (2005), in her analysis of Eritreans in diaspora and cyberspace, finds 
that violence and conflict emerges as a central dynamic. Conflict is both destructive and 
productive of community and identity and the public sphere. Contrasting her analyses 




the medium of the newspaper, Bernal suggests that new media and new conditions of 
transnational migration and globalization are altering the lived experience of citizenship, 
community, and nationalism as well as the ways in which these can be collectively 
imagined. In a similar vein, Rai (1995:53) found through discourse encountered in 
electronic bulletin boards, that the Indian diaspora is “being written and re-written in the 
interstitial space.” This represents a veritable “countersphere” as imagined by Fraser 
(1990) that pluralized subject positions in its heterogeneity. Thompson (2002) sees that 
New Media use by ethnic minorities challenges the assimilation model and changes the 
paradigm of an identity with a single nation-state to a fragmented, hybridized spectrum of 
identities. Online discourse among diaspora members is an “ever-emerging text” where 
“no one is in control” and there are no grand narratives. In this, it offers more 
possibilities. 
Bernal (2005), Werbner (1998), Rai (1995), and Thompson (2002) all 
characterize the diasporic public sphere in cyberspace as one marked by argument and 
contestation. As Graham and Khosravi (2002) found, the explosion of Iranian-themed 
websites representing a vast array of opinions and insights means that what constitutes 
and Iranian virtual diaspora in cyberspace is becoming less inaccessible and less public. 
They also note that, "Some of the political programs found in cyberspace, such as 
demands for a restored monarchy in Iran or the political programs of the Iranian far left, 
if implemented, would certainly not lead to liberation and emancipation, but to new 
forms of repression and constraint,” (222).  
In the case of dispersed populations, the public sphere is often enacted through the 




public sphere also includes the media. In the case of post-election Iranian responses it 
becomes impossible to separate out the influence of mainstream and alternative media 
from how people responded online and offline. Therefore the notion of diasporic public 
sphere is a useful concept to visualize the flows of information and ideas between 
different media, and from media to different structures within the public sphere.  
This research is based on my argument that the diasporic public sphere is not just 
about interaction between diaspora members on the Internet, but interaction and 
engagement with other material structures such as voluntary associations, and the 
localized receiving community. The public sphere also includes participation and 
mobilization in “extra-local” structures such as transnational political movements. In the 





Chapter 3  Methods 
Introduction 
I have described how my interest in the topic of Iranian immigrant political 
participation was shaped by preliminary fieldwork observing the Iranian diaspora’s 
reaction to homeland conflict (in this case the fallout from the June 2009 election) and 
my experiences among Iranians in San Diego. Following what I defined as political talk 
in all its manifestations became the focus of the research question, and thus is the 
organizing principle of my methodology. I provided a rationale and theoretical 
background in Chapters 1 and 2 for using Iranian ethnic grassroots-based organizations25 
to interview informants and understand these entities as coalescing major interests and 
controlling social life among civically and politically active Iranians. Secondly, I 
conceived that virtual communities of Iranians together with on-the-ground groups 
constitute Iranian voluntary associations. A voluntary association is broadly defined as a 
private group more or less formally organized, joined and maintained by members 
pursuing a common interest, and usually by means of part-time and unpaid activities 
(Kerri 1976). To guide me through the landscape of Iranian political and organizational 
life in San Diego, I decided that informants needed to be politically and civically active 
individuals involved with one or more of the local voluntary associations, as they would 
best be able to articulate these ideas. 
This research project consisted of using the following methods to learn about my 
study population: archival research, literature research, ethnography (participant 
observation, informal interviewing, and life history interviews) and virtual ethnography. 
                                                
25 I use organizations interchangeably with voluntary associations, though organizations 




The following section describes conventional ethnography, including sampling voluntary 
associations and individuals and carrying out the life history interviews. In Section 3, I 
elaborate on the virtual ethnography component of this study, detailing the online 
communities under consideration and methods used. Section 4 discusses data analysis. In 
the last two sections, I discuss issues of building trust, and ethics online and offline, as 
well as questions of ethnographic engagement and authority. 
Conventional Ethnography26 
Preliminary fieldwork consisting of informal interviewing and participant 
observation commenced summer 2010 and continuing through summer 2011. I began to 
collect life history interviews beginning fall 2011 through spring 2012. Early virtual 
ethnography conducted in the months after June 2009 informed the design of the informal 
interview guide during preliminary field research, and later during life history data 
collection. At this stage, virtual ethnography lent broader context to the data collected 
from conventional ethnography.  
Choosing Voluntary Associations and Sampling Informants 
As noted elsewhere, San Diego’s population of Iranian immigrants mirrors to an 
extent other localities in the West Coast of the U.S., such as Orange County and Los 
Angeles, in its homogeneity and the socio-economic and educational status of its Iranian 
residents. However San Diego represents an easier, more finitely bounded “laboratory,” 
in which there is a conspicuous set of Iranian ethnic organizations from which to gain 
access to individual informants. These organizations are dominant in the landscape with 
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respect to the fact that most local Iranians know about them and their works, even if they 
themselves do not participate. It is a smaller population compared to Orange County and 
Los Angeles. 
There are no more than four Iranian voluntary associations in San Diego, not 
including University-based student-led groups. I chose the two most active ones, Persian 
Cultural Center (PCC) and the Association of Iranian American Professionals (AIAP) on 
which to concentrate my efforts. I also selected one university student group, Human 
Rights for Iran, with which I became acquainted during preliminary fieldwork, to provide 
me with the perspective of 1.5 and second generation Iranians. 
All participating individuals are active in local Iranian grassroots voluntary 
associations. I call them activists, although not all would feel comfortable with that label. 
The definition of activism as a member of a diaspora was something that I, as a 
researcher, and they as chosen informants both grappled with. I conceptualize association 
members as activists because they are passionate about the mission and aims of the local 
civic /political organizations they are members of, have attended or organized political 
rallies, post political content on Facebook, sign online petitions, or convene and attend 
monthly online conferences related to human rights issues in Iran. All of these actions 
have to do with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Further these individuals are active or 
sponsors of local civic organizations related to Iranian diaspora community. All 
informants are local to San Diego. Some are university students whose primary residence 
is another location in California, but reside in San Diego most of the year. I made an 
effort to recruit informants virtually, such as the organizers of active Facebook groups 




the research question, there is already a great deal of suspicion from getting contacted by 
a stranger online asking them to answer questions about their politics. Using purposive 
sampling (Bernard 2006), I selected eight individuals derived from my local networks in 
San Diego and as a result of participating in local rallies, meetings, events, etc. 
Two categories of Iranian immigrants emerged: a) first-generation immigrants 
that migrated as adults and have been in U.S. 25+ years and arrived just after the 
revolution; and b) those that migrated as children and constitute the 1.5 or 2nd generation. 
My life history sample consists of each of the above categories, mixed age and gender. 
Because I wanted to assess not only levels of levels of political and civic engagement 
during different points in their life, their attitudes about different political ideologies, 
their relationship to pre- and post-migration experiences, as well as their relationship to 
other community members, I decided that a life course perspective is the most beneficial 
to inform research design. Life history is the chosen method to understand the impact of 
life course events. Conducting a life history to understand political sentiment, ideology 
and action throughout the life course provides a more global view of these behaviors, 
rather than focusing on intense moments of mobilization. Through this method, I hoped 
to be able to develop a typology of the range of political and civic behaviors, among 
other goals. 
The Life Course Perspective through Life Histories 
According to Linde (1993), stories narrated through life histories express our 
sense of self, who we are and how we got that way. We use these stories to show that our 
lives can be understood as coherent, and to assert or negotiate group membership. These 




cultural assumptions about what is expected in a life, what the norms for a successful life 
are, and what common or special belief systems are necessary to establish coherence. 
Life history is an oral and discontinuous form of storytelling, consisting of stories which 
are retold in a variety of forms over a long period of time, and which may be revised and 
changed as the speaker comes to drop old meanings and add new ones to parts of the life 
story. Further, the notion of temporality in life histories can be complex, because in 
recounting the past, it is also reconstructed and often structured around key turning points 
that shape the narrator of the life story (Coutin 2011).   
Life history thus offers the best opportunity to address a research question about 
political discourse and political/civic action among Iranian migrants. Since there is little 
comparable research on this topic with this population, there is a need to deeply study and 
isolate factors and forces. Rather than trying to thoroughly address this question at the 
community level, a more micro level analysis would be beneficial. For instance, I was 
able to isolate the interplay of four components that addressed my research question: 
particular migration experience of individual and aspects of identity; political ideology 
and concomitant civic/political behavior throughout life; local Iranian organizations; and 
incidence of homeland conflict (the 1979 Iranian Revolution, or events like the June 2009 
Presidential election). The interview guide, included in Appendix 2, addresses all of the 
above components by asking the informant about their own actions, experiences, feelings, 
behavior—that is as a respondent. At the same time I ask about their observations of 





The life history approach favors a long-term perspective that connects lived 
experiences of migration and belonging. In a similar vein, Florian and Znaniecki (1918) 
with the Chicago School employed life history as written by Polish immigrants to get an 
overall picture and better understanding of the lives of Polish immigrants in Chicago. 
How are people accounting for their own engagement in political activity? Because of my 
method, I can begin to understand how an individual is related to social structures and 
historical processes. As Lessard, Johnson and Webber (2011) remind us, “…stories are 
the medium of politics at both the foundational level of creating community and the 
personal level of identity formation. For narratives take on much of their power, much of 
their verisimilitude, to the extent that they are, themselves deeply marked by the existing 
array of assumptions, value systems, practices, institutions, and material conditions,” 
(14). Therefore, narratives related through this method offer a window to understanding 
informants’ prevailing assumptions, values and boundaries.  
During preliminary fieldwork, the semi-structured interview was asking 
informants about political/civic behavior and ideology at two points in time—before and 
after June 2009. It perhaps gave too much weight to the events surrounding June 2009 as 
I found with members of the older generation the Iranian Revolution of 1978-1979 was 
the dominant event in their socio-political life that caused the biggest disjuncture. 
Further, there was no way of addressing the effect of other significant life experiences, 
such as migration and secondary education that might alter political/civic behavior. It was 
assuming a potential causal affect, which would be false and dangerous given the 




understanding the interrelationship between various components in a continuum across an 
individual’s life from the person’s perspective (Caughey 2006). 
Another reason that life history is preferred over other interview methods is 
because of the demographic characteristics of local Iranians. As mentioned previously, 
San Diego has a relatively homogenous (with respect to class, sub-national ethnicities, 
education level, and religion) Iranian immigrant population therefore striving for 
representativeness across all Iranian immigrants seems inappropriate given this 
constraint. 
Finally, life history presents an opportunity for self-reflexivity. I am embedded 
within networks of local Iranian immigrant population. I participate in local rallies, 
political meetings and civic events. I have family members living here in San Diego, and 
I understand a great deal about the cultural nuances of being Iranian American yet I am 
still on the fringes given my own tri-cultural background and lack of complete facility in 
Farsi. I myself follow current events related to the Islamic Republic of Iran. I am a dual 
citizen. The well-being of my family (parents, siblings, and children) is directly tied to 
political events in Iran and state of diplomatic relations between Iran and the U.S. A life 
history approach requires a cultural investigation of self as the researcher (Caughey 
2006). I think this is only reasonable and appropriate given my own positioning. 
Conducting Life Histories 
I conducted life history interviews with eight individuals. This set of eight 
individuals is mixed gender, mixed generation, and mixed age at migration. Life history 
interviews took place in two sittings, averaging one to two hours each. Follow up 




homes, coffee shops, organizational offices or libraries. I let the interview informant 
decide and choose the location of the interview with my only requirement that it be 
somewhere where we could talk easily, and without too much disturbance from others or 
background noise for audio recording. I tended to interview males in non-domestic 
settings. As one male informant pointed out, it was a strange and uncomfortable 
experience for an unrelated female to ask personal questions about their life and political 
ideology. 
Preliminary interviews over summer 2011 helped me determine that two 
interviews would be sufficient for both covering the topics I needed to and gaining an 
understanding of points of conflict, coherence and transformation during that person’s 
life.27 While these interviews are life histories in that they ask the respondent to narrate, 
mainly chronologically, the major events of their life, they are focused towards the socio-
political realm. Questions focused on their socio-political activities, political ideology, 
relationship to nation-states as well as basic information like family background, 
education and reason for migrating. As I began to collect interviews I did indeed find that 
data saturation began to occur during the last part of the second interview in that 
respondents and I began circle back to themes and topics we had already covered. 
The interview guide begins with basic background information, such as early life 
and childhood, migration experience, religious background, political ideology, education, 
post-migration experience, life in San Diego such as current political and civic activities, 
mode and frequency of communication with other Iranians inside and outside of Iran, 
response and activities during June 2009 events, response and feelings towards June 2009 
events currently, relationship to civic organizations/non-profits, etc., relationship to 
                                                




Iranians of other faiths or political orientation, purpose and effect of activism, electoral 
behavior, and desired goals for the future of Iran. Though I did not ask the same things in 
the same order each time, and I did not ask informants to give me their story 
chronologically (indeed most people jump around time period and topics quite regularly), 
they are still organized around linear notions of time, something that Coutin (2011) also 
noted. I also found myself trying to place the narrative events of their life on a timeline. 
As an additional note, participant-observation (attending meetings with informants, being 
part of household activities, etc) complements these interviews. 
Repeated interviews allowed me to assess not only their level of political and 
civic engagement, but its relationship to pre- and post-migration experiences.  
Participant Observation 
Participant observation commenced fall 2009 when I moved to San Diego. My 
role as a participant observer shifted back and forth between more passive and more 
active roles, depending on the situation. I enacted a passive role, for example, in the 
digital observation of the online community of Iranian.com and HRI’s and IAY Facebook 
group (which I describe more in depth below). I took on a more moderate role as a 
participant in intimate meyhmooni gatherings in households, as an attendee in the Farsi 
language class through the Persian Cultural Center on Sunday mornings between 
September 2010 and May 2011, attending various Persian cultural festivals with family 
and friends, attending AIAP or HRI meetings as a member, and attending other events 
such as a local awards show called Passing the Torch. As the hostess for meyhmooni in 
my own home, I took on a more active role. In the next section, I discuss how virtual 




Virtually Ethnography—Evolving and Adjusting Tactics 
In the realm of political discourse in cyberspace, I decided that online groups 
were to be targeted on which to conduct virtual ethnography (VE). According to 
Freidenberg (2011), virtual ethnography consists of the following characteristics:  
(1) the field site is comprised of internet users; (2) the object of their study 
is their experience; (3) the practices observed are virtual communications, 
that is, not face-to-face; and (4) the purpose of virtual interaction is 
information exchange (265). 
 
Throughout my time interviewing informants in San Diego and conducting 
participant observation, I continued the virtual ethnography, albeit in a somewhat 
“casual” manner. I devoted myself to formal and more involved virtual ethnography after 
the interviews were completed. In this study, VE is complementary to the conventional 
ethnography, not a replacement for it. My overall goal for the VE was to be able to access 
broader Iranian migrant political attitudes and discourse, outside of my small sample of 
interviewed informants.  
Digital observation constituted the dominant method I used in virtual 
ethnography. Freidenberg (2011) points out that digital observation can be as a 
participant or non-participant. I relied on both formats, but most heavily on non-
participant digital observation, and similar to Freidenberg found that the yield derived 
from such observation to be deep and considerable, and relevant to helping answer 
research questions. Like on-the-ground Iranian voluntary organizations, I found that 
Iranian online groups that I observed are hyper-conscious constructions of community. I 
sought groups that were not only overtly defined as Iranian, but also oriented toward 




after the June 2009 Presidential election, I found myself swimming in possibilities for 
investigating political discourse among Iranians online.  
Indeed, Iranians inside and outside Iran engage in cyberspace in high numbers 
(Amini 2010). Inside Iran, the Internet has become a powerful tool of the opposition 
aiding burgeoning social movements. Iranian dissident groups have employed online 
activism to broaden their reach and circumvent established propaganda mechanisms of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran. They can directly exchange information and mobilize with 
other social movements, as well as develop “solidarity and sympathy around the globe” 
that would have been impossible with traditional means of communication (Rahimi and 
Gheytanchi 2012). 
Within the diaspora, the Internet satisfies a number of needs for Iranians. It 
provides a forum for inter-generational dialogue and place for the second generation to 
learn about Persian expressive culture. Thanks to the Internet, Iranians in the diaspora can 
purchase products not available in the host country. Iranian entrepreneurs around the 
world advertise their goods and services through online magazines. The Internet serves as 
a site to engage in political debate and argumentation on a transnational scale. 
Information and debate flow across the globe. The Internet serves as a space to share 
intimate details about ones’ self that Iranian culture’s norms about privacy would not 
normally allow. For Iranian immigrants, cyberspace constitutes an “alternative territory” 
where transnational community can be constructed easily and inexpensively (Graham and 
Khosravi 2002).  
In an effort to simplify the “universe” of Iranians in the diaspora using the internet 




On the Rise and Fall of Facebook 
Facebook is an online social networking website that lets users interact with each 
other by sharing information about themselves via personal profiles. Users share their 
information by “friending” others and allowing them access to their profile. As of mid-
2009, Facebook was considered the largest online social network with over 300 million 
active users, surpassing other online social networks such as MySpace, Friendster, and 
Bebo. 
 Although the premise of Facebook rests on members sharing information via an 
online profile that contains basic information about the user, there have been important 
additions to the site that have fundamentally changed how users interact with others on 
Facebook. Facebook introduced the “groups” application in September 2004 as one of its 
basic features. Facebook groups are virtual communities linking people with some shared 
interest, attribute, or cause. Groups allows users to share common interests with each 
other by providing a common space where users can meet others interested in a specific 
topic, disseminate information about that topic, and have public discussions relevant to 
that topic. The group application was one of the earliest and still remains one of the most 
pivotal features contributing to the interactive nature of Facebook. Facebook also made 
the feed (where users can post messages on other people’s profiles), notes (where users 
can share their views with blog-like posts), share (where users can post links to external 
websites on their profile), and fan pages (where users can show support for a public 
figure), features enabling users to continually interact with each other (Feezell, Conroy 
and Guerrero 2009). In the last two years, Facebook transitioned users from having a wall 




Preliminary field research revealed that among all the options in New Media, 
Facebook and news sites (in Farsi or English) were utilized more than MySpace, Twitter, 
or even blogs. People tend to get their information from trusted news websites, then share 
and disseminate that through Facebook. Though much has been made of the proliferation 
of blogs and alternative journalism in Iran (e.g. Kelly and Etling 2008), I found that 
informants wanted to get their information from a trusted source. Facebook shares the 
dual purpose of disseminating news information about recent political events as well as 
being a site for connecting with friends in a purely social manner. Although preliminary 
fieldwork showed that not all Iranian migrants use the Internet for politically-oriented 
activities, all respondents noted a surge in online participation after the Iranian election 
among compatriots. Further, people across several generations use Facebook. I observed 
that Iranian immigrants from teenage years all the way into their early seventies who use 
Facebook, although younger generations of users tend to dominate.  
I was able to ascertain that Facebook serves as a forum for activist groups as well as 
individuals to share and exchange information. For instance groups might have their own 
website, but also a Facebook presence that likely draws more viewers. FB users will post 
links from other sites as well as YouTube videos, etc. Therefore FB might drive users to 
explore other political content that they otherwise might not have seen. For groups, 
Facebook offers users a more democratic forum for disseminating and responding to 
posts where users from differing political leanings will “meet”. For instance, Iranian 
American FB users with more conservative political ideologies might post on a group 




An easy way to determine the popularity or currency of a group page is to look at 
the number of “likes” it has and, also check the dates of the most recent posts. Based on 
this, I isolated two active “activist” groups on Facebook. Similar to the way I defined 
activist when sampling for the life history interviews, I define activist as those Facebook 
groups that advocate for regime change and publish content against the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, and hold and organize rallies and other events, generally in opposition to the 
current government.  
One group, Human Rights for Iran, is local to San Diego and composed of 
students from a local university. This is a pseudonym for the actual group’s name out of 
respect for the help they provided me and invitation to participate in their “secret” 
Facebook group, with the understanding that I was studying their politics for my 
dissertation. Their secret group has 41 members, while their public group has 112 
members. The FB group’s activity page reflects the fact that their primary identity is as 
students. Lulls in FB activity mirror their student schedules, including breaks. I have also 
seen a decline in this group’s activity both virtually and on-the-ground the further we are 
removed from June 2009. I started following this group late spring 2010 by attending 
some meetings on campus and being invited to join their secret Facebook group. They 
also have a public Facebook groups that parallels the private one, and interestingly it is 
more active than the private. Another group, Iranian American Youth, was initially local 
to the Washington D.C. region but by 2012 aimed for a national reach. This group is 
public and has 1819 members as of October 2012. Iranian American Youth (IAY) is 
primarily a Facebook group with a concomitant website. The Facebook content primarily 




was organized out of the support for Iranian protestors after the June 2009 election. 
Around June 2009, IAY did organize support protests, but no other major events since 
around that time.  
Though life history interviews continued to evidence that Facebook is the 
dominant virtual space for sharing/exchanging political news among Iranian immigrants, 
over time I found that these Facebook groups’ activity was relatively stagnant and one-
dimensional in comparison to other online communities I had observed. In short, 
members of these groups did not engage in true discussion, but rather used Facebook to 
coordinate group functions. However, one Facebook group, Human Rights for Iran used 
their group’s page to organize political rallies and share current events and news related 
to the political situation in Iran. The other group, Iranian American Youth, was virtually 
inactive since 2010. I followed each group’s Facebook wall content for a one-year period, 
September 2011-2012. 
Iranian.com as Representing a Digital Diaspora 
I found that while Iranian immigrants across the world may broadly connect to 
Facebook and use Facebook for various reasons, Facebook groups are not the way to 
understand political discourse among the Iranian virtual immigrant community. While 
these features do exist and are updated on a semi-regular basis, more politically-oriented 
discussion and interaction actually takes place on a forum like Iranian.com (IC). 
Iranian.com (IC) is a self-described community site for the Iranian diaspora, for 
“the Iranian expatriates who care about their identity, culture, music, history, politics, 
literature and each other, as well as friends and family living in Iran.” Its byline is 




This motto, according to the “About Us” page, “reflects our view that religious, political, 
cultural, or commercial considerations should not prevent the publication of any 
material.” Founded by publisher and journalist Jahanshah Javid, it has been in existence 
since July 1995. In the first year the site was updated every two months as it took that 
long to write and publish material and develop new content. According to Javid, by 1997 
it was updated every day as its readership grew and people submitted articles. In 2007, 
Javid teamed up with a group of private investors from northern California who funded 
the site to go interactive. It was fortunate and interesting timing before the post-election 
events in 2009.28 As of July 2, 2012 the site has 7830 registered members.29  
As in Facebook, users must register as members in order to post content (such as 
articles) or to comment on other’s content. Registered users are referred to as bloggers, 
and each blogger has his/her own page. Most often, usernames are pseudonyms that 
reflect their politics or origin. There are many more registered users who maybe 
commented once or twice and much fewer users who post regular content for their blog 
as an initiating point for discussion, and comment regularly on others’ posts.  
The site has quite a busy interface with various top and side banners, like an 
“Iranian of the Day” section usually featuring political prisoners. The middle area has the 
headings and links to individual blog posts. It also has areas which show recent 
comments and most commented posts, “hot today” and most viewed posts. Though the 
top tabs feature topics like “Music,” “Photos”, Arts & Lit”, “Life” and “Football,” in 
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Tehran Bureau, 28 August 2012. 
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reality the news and blog sections of the site are the most active and commented upon. 
The vast majority of the site’s content, posted by its members, is news, comments, and 
opinions of a political nature.  
Broadly, the major differences between Facebook and Iranian.com are that 
Facebook is based on an individual user employing his/her true identity and profile 
information, and “friending” others and thus creating a network. The groups function in 
Facebook is actually secondary. IC has users with no associated profile information and 
allows avatars and multiple i.d.’s. Thus IC members are mostly anonymous unless they 
choose to use their real identity, which most do not. Users can have their own blog on IC 
and post original articles, and comment and post on others’ blogs. However there is no 
“network” between members. IC is also editorialized. 
I am classifying Iranian.com as representative of a digital diaspora. According to 
Michel Laguerre a digital diaspora is, “An immigrant group or descendant of an 
immigrant populations that uses IT connectivity to participate in virtual networks of 
contacts for a variety of political, economic, social, religious, and communicational 
purposes that, for the most part, may concern either the homeland, the host land, or both, 
including its own trajectory abroad” (2010:50). These diaspora-based websites enable the 
creation of a cyber-community connecting dispersed populations and provide 
interactivity to members. Members use discussions forums to disseminate information, 
reinforce or recreate identity, connect to and participate in homeland relationships, 




Digital Observation and Participation 
In terms of virtual diasporas and the groups considered in this study, there are 
three main types: an on the ground grassroots organization with a concomitant online 
community, a group that was initiated online and organizes meetings and events 
periodically, and finally a group that is completely virtual (Brinkerhoff 2009). Human 
Rights for Iran is an example of the first type, Iranian American Youth is an example of 
the second type and Iranian.com is an example of the third type.  
Though I was a formal participant in each of these groups, in most instances, I did 
not need to enact my role as a participant in their cyber-forum in order to get the data I 
needed. Since HRI and IAY are both Facebook groups, my membership consisted of 
asking the moderators to join their group through my actual Facebook profile. IAY 
membership demanded virtually nothing from the vast majority of its 1500+ members. 
This was the least active and most impersonal of all the groups. HRI maintained two 
Facebook groups, a public one and a private one. HRI’s relative small size in comparison 
to IAY (no more than 115 members in the public group) meant that group members were 
probably more invested in it. More likely, it was the fact that HRI was initiated as an on 
the ground grassroots organization and continued to carry out its organizational functions 
through meetings and planned gatherings that leads itself to more intimacy and 
investment on the part of the members. In other words, HRI members knew other 
members in person rather than just through their mutual Facebook group. This was not 
the case with IAY. While I did post a couple of logistical questions on the HRI group 
page, for the most part I did not want to interfere with the group’s running. 
In order to take advantage of all of the features of Iranian.com (IC), the diaspora 




actual names but instead rely on an avatar, or screen name, I did likewise using the avatar 
of “SnakeCharmer.” IC does not ask or require any other personal information to register. 
Users may submit their geographic region, but the only information that IC displays is 
how long the user has been a member and their associated blog posts and comments. In 
this manner, it is easy to ascertain an individual user’s history on the site. In the four 
months that I closely monitored site content, I did pose comments and follow-up 
questions on two occasions, neither of which were of much interest for other users to 
comment or answer. I think it is noteworthy that my attempts at instigating a more 
engaged participant-observation online were not even noted by other users. It is true that 
most IC users are themselves just readers, and rarely contribute content of their own. The 
fact remains that employing digital observation on IC yielded an incredible amount of 
ethnographic data, and that for this stage of the ethnography it became unnecessary for 
me to be enact more of a participant by posting blog articles, commenting more on other 
posts, etc.  
Data collection for Iranian.com involved reading blog articles and posts over a 
four-month period of time, documenting topics and author names, and the number and 
nature of comments. When a comment by a user interested me, I clicked on their name to 
see their other articles and comments. I often looked into the area of the homepage that 
keeps a running tab of the most commented posts to check into the most relevant content 
of the day.  
Data Analysis: Merging Conventional and Virtual Ethnography 
Informants’ interviews were fully transcribed in their entirety and uploaded into 




developed using an iterative process. NVIVO employs “nodes” which are user-created to 
be assigned to the data source. Nodes were applied to the transcripts. Text analysis 
involved searching for emergent patterns and themes across all interview transcripts were 
noted, as well as instances when individual informants did not fit the theme (Bernard and 
Ryan 1998). I ended up conducting formal data analysis of the virtual ethnography data 
after the life histories were collected and transcribed.  
For the virtual ethnography commencing after the interviews, I conducted content 
analysis from the two different Facebook groups’ (HRI and IAY) postings and comments 
over a 12-month period. The method I derived was to first save all the relevant content as 
screenshot images. Each group had a minimum of 100 different files. All of the files were 
uploaded into NVIVO for coding. Each virtual group had their filed coded “in order” by 
necessity since screenshot images often overlapped or, with one post being “cut” into two 
different files. Facebook groups’ content was coded for poster name, topic, relevant links 
to news stories present, and whether there were any follow-up comments. In the middle 
of the process, I realized that this depth of coding was perhaps overkill, and switched to 
coding for news topics and categories of political action.  
Iranian.com (IC) having much more potentially relevant and richer content than 
the two FB groups, I focused on coding online discussions broadly using the following 
themes, posts or comments that a) referenced Iranian political groups b) referenced 
political/civic life in the U.S c) referenced the characteristic(s) of Iranian communities 
abroad or d) referenced another aspect of identity such as ethnicity or religion. Also, I 
needed to note the user name and date of the post. I was more interested in posts that 




The site archives from Iranian.com were also quite useful to me. To determine 
how closely IC activity is linked to Iranian news stories, I used the site archives to 
tabulate the number of posts by month and year from 2007 to 2012, focusing especially 
on 2009 the year of the Presidential election. IC keeps track of number of posts through 
its archives functions. Number of posts is not an absolutely reliable proxy for activity and 
relevancy because posts may have increased, decreased or stabilized, but may be 
independent from other markers of relevancy like number of views. Another way to 
analyze the currency or popularity of posts is tracking the number of comments, or even 
the number of views. It is difficult to track posts with the greatest number of comments or 
views through time because IC itself does not provide a tool that tracks these through site 
archives.  
Overall, virtual ethnography played a complementary role to conventional 
ethnography. It helped certain findings by providing additional “proof” about certain 
types of political/civic discourses present among Iranian migrants for instances, but it 
was also radically different in other areas, like in the tone of the discourse on IC. 
Therefore, in the writing my aim was to merge both sources of data but along the way 
had to make decisions on when it was appropriate and when it was not. For instance it 
was appropriate to integrate instances when I encountered IC members sharing migration 
stories, but it was not helpful in how migration experiences related to other aspects of 
identity, for example.  
Building Trust vs. Anonymity: Ethics Offline and Online 
Suspicion of outsiders is something that has been documented as a cultural 




especially about political orientation and activities would be doubly threatening. Part of 
this is culturally conditioned, a result of fear edging on paranoia surrounding the current 
political regime, and perhaps even the post 9/11 context of anti-Middle Eastern sentiment 
in the U.S. Mobasher (2006) points to the self-protective measures Iranians employed 
after facing public discrimination and prejudice after the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis. 
Some expressed hesitation to speak to me because they were unsure if I would be 
able to keep their anonymity or how they would be represented in my research. One 
informant even spoke of “not wanting to burn his bridges” and needing to maintain his 
ability to return to Iran without problems. Another said I would have difficulty recruiting 
people for my study because it was considered odd to sit down with a strange, unrelated 
female asking him private questions. 
It is not necessarily unusual that anthropologists work in small communities. San 
Diego is not small but there is a finite community of Iranians who participate in the local 
scene. I have tried my utmost to keep their identities confidential, and concealing their 
exact roles in local organizations. 
However, the ethics of fieldwork and keeping anonymity was made more 
complex by the fact that I was conducting fieldwork in two arenas with differing ethical 
standards. Online content is public and therefore not subject to the same protocols and 
standards. Yet my fieldwork arenas overlapped in some cases so that members of certain 
online communities knew me personally and were informants in the research. Of course 
the higher level of protection applies here. For example, Human Rights for Iran is a 
pseudonym for the actual organization’s name since the Facebook group page has the 




Another issue is that of “lurking” or acting as an unobtrusive observer 
(Freidenberg 2011) when I did not announce my presence as a researcher. While my 
presence as a researcher on HRI’s Facebook group page was known, it was almost under 
total anonymity that I obtained ethnographic data on Iranian.com and acted as a passive 
observer.  
In the analysis and writing, I made no attempt to obscure user names and 
presented them as they are on Iranian.com. I did this for several reasons. First, most IC 
users do not use their true names as their screen names; therefore for these individuals 
they “keep” their anonymity in this ethnography. Secondly, the IC members’ chosen 
avatars reflect their creativity, political stance, or aspect of their identity. Their screen 
names were purposeful. I did not feel comfortable “anonymizing” them to come up with 
a generic pseudonymic screen name. Yet there is the potential ethical dilemma of my 
own anonymity on IC versus those few users who do in fact use their true names. Of 
course I did not know the real identities or names of the people posting on IC and even 
with screen names that seemed as if they were their true names; I have no guaranties of 
this. I also have to take at face-value that each unique screener name corresponds to one 
user and that no users have multiple memberships/screener names. In other words, I am 
assuming a 1:1 correspondence between actual user and screen name, even though there 
has been some evidence to the contrary. To summarize, the standard I employed for 
digital observation and analysis was to hide/obscure Facebook identities while with IC 
members, I used their real avatars. I feel this standard protected the identities of these 




Ethnographic Engagement, Ethnographic Authority 
Alleyne asks, “Can we write culture by reading life stories?” (2000:9). The post-
modern and reflexive turn in anthropology (Clifford and Marcus 1986) made us more 
conscious about the act of creating narrative. Through our dialogue, informants and I are 
creating a narrative together. Through the act of interviewing, informants are constructed 
as ‘other,’ and in the process between interviewing and writing get enmeshed in layers of 
interpretation and translation (Crapanzano 1986, Behar 2003). The first layer is 
translation: informants trying to understand my intent and accommodate my questions. 
The second layer is of interpretation: making their lives coherent to me and vice versa, 
me trying to find coherence. The third layer involves both translation and interpretation-- 
me trying to impose order or find patterns across several individual lives. Then there is 
the effort in configuring life events into a temporal time frame, with beginning, middle 
and end. All of these tasks involve “numerous acts of judgment” (Lessard, Johnson, and 
Webber 2011:13) by the informant and me as the interviewer. Informants’ narratives may 
also contain elements of “image management” in their self-representation to me and 
prospective audiences, yet these narratives are still concerned within and articulated in a 
social field, and therefore always dialogical. Personal narrative is ‘artifact’ for at least 
two other reasons: a) they are created from memories that may exist in problematic 
relationship to historical fact; b) differing agendas between me as interviewer and 
informant (Alleyne 2000). Finally, for the purposes of building theory and making 
arguments I have constructed my research question and methods on this idea of politics 
that take place in the private sphere of home and meyhmooni and the public sphere of 




usually awkward construction, albeit a useful model. After all, as Cohen (1994) asserts, 
selfhood is a composite, the components of which vary is public and private modes. 
I wish to conclude this section by posing a question about authority and power 
differentials. Almost all of my informants were upper-middle or middle class, and elite 
migrants who were as well educated as myself in most cases, and definitely earned more 
money than me. They were also fairly socially connected. On an inter-personal level 
during the interview, can I hazard that the power differential was obliterated, or at least 
lessened? Yet I acknowledge that the ethnographic authority remains mine as I have final 





Chapter 4  Migration Stories: Narratives of Movement and 
Staying 
 “There is a systematically nostalgic displacement between where 
people have been and the grand narratives of their whereabouts—
as if the whole world has spent just one year in a forbidden domain 
then been yanked away from it, and is now condemned and blessed 
to forget and remember that space at odd and unpredictable times, 
remembering it when it thinks it forgotten, forgetting it when it 
thinks it remembered.” 
-Hamid Dabashi (2007:4) 
 
In this chapter I will provide a brief biographical sketch of each of my informants, 
and discuss their migration stories, highlighting common linkages across all the 
informants. Moving from migration narratives, I next discuss major aspects of their 
identities, or as has been framed by Caughey (2006), embed them within major cultural 
traditions, including ethnic, religious, generational and national as a way to provide 
further insight into their political and civic participation, which I cover in the next 
chapter. Based on the analyses of migration stories, I present a common theme across 
informants’ narratives: a sense of displacement and exile. I discuss the ramifications of a 
political community that exhibits “exile consciousness,” despite the fact that not all 
members are truly exiles. A sense of displacement from homeland, and by extension 
displacement from the homeland’s body politic, permeates across generations and 
differing migrations statuses and impacts political and civic participation in the host 
country. 
Migration Narratives as Stories 
The most fruitful way I learned to start an interview session with my informants 
was to ask the “how did you get here” question30. The answers about their migration 
                                                




experience took the form of stories, which can be looked at as narratives (Raj 2003, 
MacAdams 2008). Where in physical space and when in the “timeline” of their life they 
chose to start telling me their story reflects something interesting about them as 
individuals and as members of a collective. We can look to patterns related to the age at 
and reasons for migration. Their “migration story” as I call it, is likely something they 
have told several times, practiced and refined to emphasize certain themes, which they 
change depending on audience and context. Therefore it is important to look at stories, 
for “stories are the medium of politics at both the foundational level of creating 
community and the personal level of identity formation” (Lessard, Johnson, Webber 
2011:14). Using this framework provided by Lessard, Johnson, and Webber (2011) 
provides an opportunity to see stories as a window to the political. 
Informant Overviews 
Introducing my informants’ stories, I will highlight some aspect of their 
personality and identity that was significant to me. In what follows, and throughout the 
rest of the dissertation I will be using pseudonyms in place of their actual names.   
Maliheh 
Maliheh is a sophomore at a state public university. She is a member of the 1.5 
generation (Rumbaut 2004) Iranian immigrant population meaning her parents were born 
in Iran, and she was born in Iran but immigrated to the U.S. as a pre-teen She is one of 
the few respondents who actively practices the Islamic religion, and wears the hijab. Her 
family maintains an agriculture-associated business in Iran and her father travels 
frequently back and forth. Maliheh is involved with the Human Rights for Iran student 




approximately eight months after the first, she found that she had less time to actively 
participate in both these groups. She is very conscious of her hijab among other Iranians 
and finds the scrutiny and judgment coming from other Iranians to be worse than coming 
from Americans. Maliheh finds that other Iranians in the U.S. have little tolerance for 
those that ascribe to a religious doctrine. 
Niki 
Niki is a sophomore in a state public university. She is very involved with local 
politics and clearly articulates herself as an activist. Among her causes is access to voting 
for disenfranchised populations, especially students. She writes for the school newspaper. 
She self-describes as being socially and politically aware. Her personal politics and social 
values are progressive, and she contrasts this with her parents more socially conservative 
values such as modesty for women and intolerance towards homosexuality. Along with 
her family, she makes regular visits to Iran. She sees that her connection to Iran is made 
real by these trips, and also sets her apart from other Iranians in the U.S.  
Mohsen 
Mohsen is the most recently-arrived of my informants, and the only first-
generation immigrant to not emigrate as a result of the 1979 revolution. He migrated with 
his teenage son, young elementary school aged daughter and wife in 2008 at the age of 
46. He has extended family on his wife’s side in San Diego. He described the 
disappointment in his professional life-- the difficulty finding a job in his profession and 
rebuilding life here after having a comfortable middle class existence in urban Iran. He 
successfully earned his real estate license here but it coincided with the housing market 




travel agency where the majority of clients book trips to Iran. Mohsen was able to take 
advantage of family reunification policies to migrate, following wife, son and young 
daughter as well as mother-in-law. His extended family on his wife’s side has lived in the 
San Diego area since the early 1980s. Mohsen serves on the board of one of the local 
Iranian diaspora organizations and is active voicing his politics through Facebook. 
Ramin 
Ramin considers himself one of the pioneers of the Iranian-American community 
in San Diego and has been involved with local Iranian civic organizations for 25+years. 
Occupationally he is a landscaper, and has an advanced professional degree in 
horticulture. He writes periodic articles in Farsi for a local bi-lingual arts and culture 
magazine published monthly. He migrated with his wife and young son first in order to 
continue his graduate studies, and later they were granted asylum. He says he is in a 
“mixed marriage” because his background is Moslem and his wife’s background is of the 
Bahá’í faith, though neither is practicing any religion now. He and his wife chose to raise 
their children without ascribing to any religion. 
Adnan 
Born in 1961, Adnan came to the United States in 1985-86 about six years after 
the Revolution in 1979. I met Adnan in the office space where he volunteers, not his 
home, nor even his work office. Perhaps it was a form of protection for him to meet me in 
a more “neutral” setting. The interview never formally started—he just started asking 
questions of me, as if he was trying to ascertain my position and scholarly interests. After 
a period of time when he was placated with my responses, the interview began in earnest. 




concepts and Census data. Adnan is a serious visual artist and musician avocationally. He 
is the director of one of the San Diego Iranian organizations but is involved with several 
of the other local Iranian associations, and certainly seems to know everyone. During 
June 2009 he helped organize local support demonstrations in and near downtown San 
Diego. But by the time I began to speak with him, he was guarded about these efforts. 
The notoriety he received by being a more public face of anti-government sentiment in 
San Diego during 2009-2010 also exposed him to threats from others who did not share 
his political ideology. Like all of my other informants, Adnan has extended family in 
Iran. He expressed concern that this political involvement might jeopardize the safety of 
his family in Iran and being able to visit them. He grew up in a religious conservative 
family and was not able to “indulge” in art and music until he was an adult. Adnan has 
adult grown children, and mentioned that one of their bedrooms had been converted to 
studio space for his wife—he continues to do his art in the garage. Professionally Adnan 
works for an engineering firm. 
Fati 
Fati is a self-described “black sheep” and sees this mostly as a result of her non-
traditional upbringing. First it was having a very liberal father that valued teaching his 
children to make their own decisions and made no special concessions between his boy or 
girl children. Second it was growing up in Kharg, an island in the Persian Gulf and a 
seaport for the export of oil. Her father was a technician for an oil company, and the 
entire population of the island at the time was in service to the oil company. As Fati 
described, Kharg was built for the British but it provided a nice life for Iranians, yet with 




her apart was her time going to school in India. She has long been involved in women’s 
rights issues, recounting her decades-long participation in the Iranian Women’s Studies 
Foundation. The IWSF has a yearly conference, usually in Europe, which Fati always 
attends. She feels that herself and the other long-time participants “have grown up” 
through the organization. Fati works as a lab technician. 
Afareen 
Afareen first migrated to Germany in 1977 at the age of 19 to pursue higher 
education. She has a PhD in pharmacology and is a practicing pharmacologist. Along 
with her husband Behnaz, they are involved in all the local Iranian diaspora organizations 
and many other civic causes. Afareen says that is her strong commitment to her Bahá’í 
faith that drives all the hours she spends volunteering and attending meetings and events. 
She is a native Azeri-speaker, which is a Turkic language, and one of the sub-ethnic 
groups in the northwest of Iran. Besides being Bahá’í, Afareen is very proud of her Azeri 
roots.  
Behnaz 
Behnaz is an economics and finance professor, and is married to Afareen, which 
is his second marriage. They are from the same part of the country and share the same 
ethnic roots. Behnaz is the only informant that arrived significantly before the 
Revolution. He came to San Diego in 1965 as a 17 year old , attended  high school while 
living with relatives and went on to get his degrees from a local university. Behnaz shares 
the same Bahá’í faith with his wife, as well as being involved with multiple organizations 




Migration, Education and Revolution 
Immigration studies grew out of the Chicago School, the founders of which, were 
responding to transformative changes and social upheaval associated with the mass 
immigration of newcomers from rural or urban working class backgrounds (Park 1950). 
Studies of immigrant lives tend to focus on low wage and economic migrants, especially 
undocumented migrants, and how the requirements of the legal citizenship structure and 
constrain immigrant lives in the U.S. (e.g. Portes and Zhou 1993, Rumbaut 1999, 
Hirschman 1999, Alba and Nee 2003, Portes and Rumbaut 2006). While we may know 
about middle class migrants from census statistics, electoral behavior, remittance 
practices, or progress made in socio-economic, residential, political and linguistic 
integration31, there is little basis for understanding actual middle class immigrant 
experiences from the words and perspectives of the immigrants themselves32. For this 
reason I want to continuously refer to direct passages from informants as a way of giving 
voice to their experience throughout the rest of the chapters. In what follows here, I draw 
out prominent themes that presented themselves during informant interviews, and in 
some cases through online sources.33 
First generation immigrants who have been out of Iran for two decades or more 
cite the reasons for leaving Iran, then provide a succession of events which covers the 
year it was, how old they were, what they were doing at the time. Most importantly, they 
reveal the relationship between their own personal timeline and the 1979 Iranian 
                                                
31 An October 2012 search of the Migration Policy Institute website, a major think tank 
and producer of current migration scholarship yielded these kinds of topics. 
32 In anthropology, Raj (2003) and Heiman, Freeman and Leichty (2012) are notable 
recent exceptions. 





Revolution. Besides the effects of the Iranian Revolution on individual lives, seeking 
education is the other common theme I heard across all migration stories..34  
Is it a different challenge to conduct a life history where movement is the central 
theme? Susan Bibler Coutin (2011) in her life histories of Salvadoran youth shows how 
turning points in a life are experienced as an event of profound disjuncture, “one that the 
catapults the protagonist into another reality in which he or she must become, in certain 
respects, someone else?” (246). Among the youth that Coutin studied, it was the 
migration experience itself that caused the disjuncture. However, for the informants I 
interviewed, the Iranian revolution was in itself a “turning point” event that caused 
migration or impacted abilities or desires to return to Iran. In terms of life trajectory, the 
1979 Revolution caused immense disjuncture—a stark before and after.  
Here Afareen, who left Iran in 1977 at the age of 19, resorts to metaphor using 
prominent American figures to help me understand her personal and familial situation at 
the time of the Revolution. 
Afareen:  See, please don't take him in a wrong way. But I come from a family from  
  Azerbaijan. We are Azeri (ethnic group). And my family if I compare it, it  
  is like Kennedy from Massachusetts ***** from Azerbaijan. Because of  
  the faith and also the wealth. And therefore in the Revolution we were, we  
  were the first one[s] that -  
Tina:  Left.  
Afareen:  We were target[ed]. And Islamic Regime practically took over all the  
  wealth.  
Tina:   Of your family?  
                                                
34 Some background in this respect: the largest number of immigrants granted lawful 
permanent residence occurred in 1990. This peak is partially a result of people who arrived in the 
1980s and non-legal migrants but did not adjust until the early 1990s.  From 1980 to 2004, more 
than one out of every four Iranian immigrants was a refugee or asylee (Hakimzedeh and Dixon 
2006). Further, the number of Iranian students abroad increased from 18,000 in 1963 to 227,497 
in 1977 (Bozorgmehr and Sabagh 1988). Between 2000 and 2005, 20 percent of the 15,824 
nonimmigrant visas issued to Iranian nationals were student visas (3,323), 21 percent were 
temporary worker visas (3,316), and 19 percent were visas issued to representatives of foreign 




Afareen:  [Nodding] Killed several of my family member[s], including my uncle and  
my cousins. And for whatever reason my dad escaped the country and 
could come out of country. Came first to Germany and from Germany 
they got their visa and came to United States. At that point my sister and 
my brother they were here in the U.S. and this was happening in 1982, if 
I'm not mistaken. That they could come and but my sister and my brother 
way before as I left shortly after be they left too. Here to the U.S.A. 
 
Afareen actually migrated to Germany first at the age of nineteen in order to pursue her 
bachelor’s degree. She had finished one year of university in Iran but frequent school 
closings because of widespread demonstrations against the Shah disrupted her ability to 
finish. For Ramin as well, now 62 years old, it was the preceding events before the 
Revolution that caused him to emigrate from Iran, 
Ramin: …I was twenty- eight when I left Iran.  And I left Iran for the purpose of  
  continuing my education.  And the reason was at that time we were going  
  through the political conflicts before the revolution of 1979.  And uh, all  
  of the schools in Iran, they were on strike.  I thought that if I wait  
  here, I’m not going to be able to finish my studies eh, because I wasn’t  
  sure how long this turmoil was going to take.  So, I decided to apply for  
  the American universities mainly because I was going to a school that was  
  all the classes were teaching English, so it was a collaboration between the  
  Iran government and the United States government.  So English was not a  
  problem you know at that time, so the best place for me was to apply for  
  American colleges.  
 
He arrived in 1978 with his wife and one-year old boy, and initially settled in south Texas 
to attend Texas A&I University for a master’s degree in horticulture, which he completed 
in May 1980. He wished to continue with his PhD, but the Revolution disrupted his plans 
even from afar as he lost his scientific contacts with his university in Iran,  
Ramin  …I had my bachelor degree, so my supervisor, who was the man behind  
  you know as a force as a more force behind me to come out and get my  
  Master’s degree, he was supposed to get me a scholarship to go for my  
  PhD. But unfortunately right after the revolution, he was one of the first to  
  be ousted by the new government. So basically the whole thing changed  
  and I was here I financially, I couldn’t go for my PhD. And eh, the events  
  in Iran was [sic] not very promising. So I decided to stay here. Then I  
  applied through the immigration.   




Ramin   I was going from student at that time to become a permanent citizen. And  
uh,... Actually I applied for the asylum35. And uh, because I am coming 
[from] a family of uh, two religions. I am coming from a Muslim family, 
my wife is coming from a Bahá’í family. 
Tina:   Oh, your wife is Bahá’í? 
Ramin: And because of her religion and because of her status in Iran, I was  
  approved for asylum....And actually five years later we got our green card  
  and five years after that we got our citizenship 
Tina  So green card was approximately what year? 
Ramin  It started from 1980 and probably by 1985 I should say that I had [the]  
  green card. 
 
In Adnan’s case, the revolution caused a return migration to Iran. Somehow, he was able 
to make a case for leaving Iran again later in order to finish his degree, 
Adnan  I was a student at SDSU36  in 1979 [when the] revolution took place. I left  
before finishing my MS thesis. In 1984, I was given a chance to get out of 
the country to go and finish my thesis. I had to spend 2 years in England 
before coming back to the States.37 
 
For 1.5 and second generation informants, they relate their parents’ reasons for migration 
as part of the context for their own life history. However, the details and dates are more 
vague,  
Malieh  So my grandparents, my mom's parents, and all their children had moved  
to America after the revolution, I think. And my mom, so my mom lived 
in America, back in whatever like 1970, wait the revolution was 79 or 69?  
 
Niki’s parents are both from Esfahan, a “conservative large city.” Her dad obtained his 
college degree in the United States after he arrived at the age of 23, while her mom got 
her degree in Iran. Niki cannot pinpoint exactly how long her father was in the U.S. 
before returning to Iran to marry her mother, then move to the U.S., 
Niki   My dad was here for like, 10, 15, about 10/15 years before he actually  
  went back to Iran, married my mom, and brought her to United States. So  
  they did get married over there, but my dad had already moved to the  
                                                
35 After the Islamic Revolution, members of the Bahá’í faith were persecuted. 
36 SDSU is an acronym for San Diego State University. 
37 Adnan did not provide these details during our interviews. I later asked him over email, 




  United States by then.   
Tina  I see, and what was, his reason for emigrating was that he was a  
  student?   
Niki  He, yeah, he was seeking, he didn't get the opportunities he wanted, in  
  terms of education, back at home. So that's why… 
 
This “fuzziness” about the dates and orders of events was common among the younger 
informants. Yet the fact that they relate these details shows how their parents’ migration 
stories are still part of their own life history narratives. 
 In addition to hosting face to face interviews, I also sought migration stories in 
virtual documents. I observed that migration stories can be exchanged online between 
members of a virtual community. Anonymous Observer38  who was the author of a blog 
article titled “The Good American: Why Iranian Americans Will Never Advance” on 
September 3, 2012 garnered 149 comments and was the source of several heated 
discussions. The gist of the article was a criticism leveled at fellow Iranian Americans as 
being disconnected from American politics and politically unaware. I discuss and analyze 
this particular blog post and the commentary in Chapter 5, but the dialogue in question 
here meandered beyond the original point of the article and occurred toward the last of 
the 149 total comments posted thus far. “AO” stands for the avatar “Anonymous 
Observer.” Ali Mostofi, for all intents and purposes looks like to be the user’s real name. 
These two users have some history together on the site, and this is the first time that they 
recognize that they are dialoguing across generations. Here they discuss their age and 
whereabouts during the Revolution, 
Ali Mostofi:  AO, I do not know how old you are, but I am 55. I was at 
Princeton when all this was unraveling. As you can imagine, we 
                                                
38 Throughout this ethnography, I am using actual user names of Iranian.com members 





had pretty high level discussions at the time about all the 
permutations. 
AO:    Anyway, you have some very valid points.  I was pretty much an  
   infant when the revolution was happening.  But after reading so  
   much about the events of the time, listening to parents, friends and  
   relatives who were adults at the time, and watching news and other  
   footage about the devolution of 1979, I have to say that I  
grudglingly [sic] agree with Zendanian39  when he says that Shah's 
greatest enemy was himself.  From trying to appease the clergy in the 
hopes of being left alone, to abandoning power too easily, Shah brought 
this misery upon himself--and us by extension. 
 
This exchange highlights something else important about migration stories among 
Iranians in the diaspora. As Lessard, Johnson, and Webber (2011) claim, stories and 
narrative function to draw boundaries between who is in and who is out, “Their success 
as stories inheres in their resonance with familial and religious values, and with 
prevailing assumptions about who belongs and who is a stranger” (14). In the case of 
diaspora Iranians, exchanging migration stories often functions as a symbolic badge and 
way to begin to understand the other. I can compare migration stories to the way adult 
Americans remember where they were and what they were doing on September 11, 2001 
during the World Trade Center attacks, or Americans of an older generation always 
remembering where they were when they heard about the death of President Kennedy. 
Because so many Iranians outside Iran share similar themes of revolution, 
education and displacement across all their migration stories, it becomes a bridge across 
space to diaspora members everywhere, and across generations, too. Migration stories are 
ripe with symbolism also for what is forgotten and what has turned to “nostalgic 
displacement” as the quote by Hamid Dabashi above reminds us. Movement and 
migration reveal certain categories of identity into hi-relief: gender, ethnicity, religion, 
                                                




age, and politics. In this next section I discuss instances where I note aspects of identity 
shifting betwixt and between those categories as a result of the migration experience. 
Identities in Motion 
Adnan remarked on something during our first meeting that was an astute 
observation about the effect of migration on the people he had observed during all of his 
years volunteering and working with local Iranian voluntary associations. He notes that 
some aspects of identity shift and change because of the migration experience. This 
specifically depends on when people arrived: right before the revolution, right after the 
revolution, during the late 1980s-early 1990s, and post-2000, etc.; and whether they had 
to migrate to other countries like Sweden, Germany or Canada first before they could 
come to the U.S. He describes their experience in these other countries as a new chance, 
and “That it was like a drawing board for them then after they get their act together and 
establish, you know life over there then they came to United States.” He contrasted 
himself arriving as an adult to a second-generation Iranian American being raised here, 
“You know when I come here at you know twenty five, thirty years old, my personality is 
already formed and if I want to adopt new things you know I have to put the effort to do 
that and I have to be selective and I have to be choosing and the practicing and you know, 
turn away bad stuff and grabbing new, good stuff.” Adult migrants need to work at 
integrating themselves into the dominant culture, while the children tend to pick it up 
“naturally” from school and so forth. Adnan observes “waves of every ten years” of 
people arriving to take advantage of family re-unification programs. Yet, “For me the 




Iran they are so different from people who were here longer.” In this dialogue, Adnan 
elaborates on his interpretation of these cultural differences that he sees, 
 
Tina:   What do you see? 
Adnan:   Oh, a lot of differences, the way they [were] raised over there, the country  
is basically based on lies and…the what you call it… like they pretend to 
be something you are not, people have multiple personalities okay, in 
many cases because uh they have to, the way they are at home they cannot 
be the same way when their at work or their on the street or doing other 
things so for each environment they have they created certain personality 
so it’s not just, what they used to call them schizophrenic but now it 
multiple personalities. 
Tina:   Kind of like an adaptive… 
Adnan:  Adaptive and they do a great job, and then when they come here they face  
  this culture, the kind of get in a culture shock you know, with cultures I  
  guess basically it happens to everyone but when they come here and they  
  see their relatives who were here longer their culture has changed, for both  
  side is kind of shocking because you know their cousins or brothers and  
  sisters now that lived ten years apart from come from Iran, they are so  
  different so they develop different personalities and different attitudes and  
  different everything towards… 
Tina   And I bet the people who were here have a conception of Iran, the people  
  were already here have a conception of what Iran was you know in the  
  word of the culture maybe in their head is static, the moment that they left  
  it hasn’t changed for them 
Adnan   That and also, they were selective on other parts of the culture too so the  
  sister was not forced to practice those culture so there were most of the a  
  lot of them they were selective, they throw away the parts that were not  
  really good. 
Tina   Like what? 
Adnan  Like um, uh, ...uh I don’t want to use you know words that will come  
  back and haunt me. 
Tina   What could you possibly say? 
Adnan   No it’s not pretending the pretending, doing something that you  
  don’t believe in and going and pretending you know for work, pretending  
  to be Moslem yet you are not, pretending to be supporting or supporting  
  the government when you’re not, so that this double personalities stuff  
  then they come here and they were see the people who were here, it’s  
  different, but the people who were here you know, they don’t have to  
  pretend, they don’t have to they were they were a lot of stuff, they don’t  
  need to keep up.  So they selected the good stuff like upholding cultural  





In the beginning part of this passage Adnan offers an informant’s account that 
corresponds with the theoretical literature of identity change during migration, yet within 
this notion of Iranians needing to develop “multiple personalities” in order to survive in 
the Islamic Republic of Iran. A façade of pretense and lies about politics and religion 
creates a kind of schizophrenia. A “need to pretend” and “keep up” operates like a mental 
illness in the lives of those more recently-arrived, according to Adnan. This explanation 
is similar to a theoretical framework suggested by Ansari (1988) based on research 
among Iranians residing in the East Coast during 1972-74. Ansari proposes the concept of 
Iranian “dual marginality” because they are maladjusted both in Iran prior to emigration 
and as middle class professionals in the U.S., therefore living in two “antagonistic 
cultures.” They have ambivalence about living here and are detached both from Iran and 
the U.S. Though they are naturalized citizens, they are consciously opposed to what they 
see as Americanization, losing the Persian language, cultural and social values, etc. The 
group is fragmented, yet commonly exhibits a yearning to return or, what has been called 
“exile consciousness”40 by Edward Said (2000) and others. The essence of Ansari’s 
proposal about Iranian dual marginality rings true in the voices of my informants and the 
kind of discourse I encountered in virtual communities online: the criticism leveled at 
other Iranian Americans about their failure to effectively and actively take part in life in 
the United States. Yet, does this characterization ring true in the lives of experiences of 
my informants? What affiliations and forms of community come up in their narratives 
and where are the individual places of fissure? How has the experience of migration 
changed aspects of their identity? 
                                                
40 However, Abraham (1990) calls into question the validity of Ansari’s (1988) findings 
based on how long it took to publish the data, the fact that it does not take into consideration the 




Participating in the civic and political life of the U.S. is a distinct part of 
informants’ identity, and one in which they distinguished themselves from other Iranians. 
How this plays out is covered in Chapter 5. The rest of this chapter is concerned with 
considering aspects of identity that have either: a) remained the same, b) have been 
hybridized, or c) completely transformed as a result of the migration process.41 Among 
the major axes that identity can operate: ethnic/cultural, national, class, political, 
religious, generational, professional, etc. (Caughey 2006), not all of them have been 
given equal measure in informants’ narratives. Following their lead, I will focus on 
religious, political, generational and ethnic/cultural identity.  The following diagram 
helps illustrate the differentiated outcomes of each aspect of identity through the 
migration process and across the life course.  
 
Figure 3 Diagram, Aspects of Identity Model 
 
• Religious identity either transformed or remained the same. 
                                                











• Political identity hybridized in all cases. 
• Ethnic identity potentially stayed the same, not enough data. 
• National identity hybridized among second generation, but not necessarily among 
first. 
• Generational identity presents a more complex picture of life course vs. migration 
effects, and is strongly linked to political identity. It is based on shared experience 
of the 1979 Iranian Revolution for first generation immigrants, or 2009 Iranian 
Presidential election among the second generation. 
Aspects of Identity that Remained the Same 
Religious 
Mohsen migrated to the U.S. in his mid-40s and has resided in the U.S. only since 
2008. He was raised in a Moslem family in Teheran and attended a religious school 
during his elementary through high school years. In these two passages he describes the 
source of his aversion to Islam stemming from his experiences with the Revolution and 
living under the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
 
Mohsen Yeah, I don't remember anything about those times. But the major thing 
I'm not, again, I'm not a fan of any religion anymore is because of the 
Revolution. What happened during the Revolution, in the name of, you 
know, Islam and what they did to the people and in Iran. And, then started 
some, you know, studying by myself, thinking by myself. Mostly thinking, 
not too much studying. Just thinking about what they are saying, and what 
the religion is saying, and what my belief is. Right. I don't believe in any 
religion. I'm not saying I'm not believing in God, no I can't say that. I don't 
know what it is. There should be something. But I don't believe in any 
religion. 
 
This lack of adherence to an organized religion remained even after migrating. I asked a 
question about how he deals with potential conflicting religious ideologies during social 
visits, or meyhmooni. In response, he describes his attitude toward meeting people of 
different faiths in his day-to-day interactions in San Diego, including Mormon neighbors 
down the street, 
Mohsen Frankly speaking, I do not ask anybody what their religion is, because it is 




in Islam. And because of that it's not important for me what [the] religion 
[is] of the people that I'm dealing with or friends or family or anyone. As I 
said, I don't have any problem with that. But for… we have a neighbor 
here, an American neighbor, who is Mormon at the other side of the street. 
We are going with them you know to have dinner party together 
sometimes. The other one is Catholic, but as I said it's not an issue for me, 
the religion is not an issue for me. As far as they are human, you know, as 
I said everybody is asking me "what's your religion?” I said I don't believe 
in any religion but the only thing I believe in, you know, believe is in 
humanity. Anybody who is a human and accepts human, you know, rules, 
its okay no matter what religion they have 
 
Fati describes her resistance to Islam as emanating from negative experiences during 
child hood, and concurrently being influenced by a permissive father who believed in 
“freedom” and a “democratic” household [Fati’s terms] for raising his children. 
 
Fati   Like, I didn’t want to learn Qur’an, my dad didn’t know, my mom didn’t  
know. So when I was in school till the teacher died, who was very strict, I 
would always – they asked me always to stand up for two hours with one 
leg up, one leg like this. And there was a guy who was Bahá’í, he would 
go in my class and tell my mom, because he didn’t have to come to Qur’an 
class. And he would go and tell my mom, and by the time I came out of 
the class, my mom was all red in her eyes and my dad didn’t have any 
relation with these religious people in the mosque. 
 
In this passage, she recalls that her father was not a religious man. For this reason and the 
fact of her family’s association with Bahá’ís, the other townspeople shunned their family. 
Later life experiences with political movements right around the time of the Revolution 
in Iran and India (where she attended university) as a young person before migrating to 
the U.S. informed both her political views and religious views. As an adult into middle 
age, her participation with Iranian diaspora organizations in San Diego which she 
describes as “worse than Jomhooriye Islami42” in that they do not function as 
democracies to allow free speech concomitant with her heavy investment in the women’s 
rights movement in Iran have only served to reinforce her anti-religion stance. In social 
                                                




situations, the religious background of other people is not an issue, and not something she 
is aware of. Fati says, “Here in San Diego, I don’t know who is Jewish or who is Bahá’í 
really, but I – I really don’t ask their religion, personally, myself, I’m like that.”   
Ethnic 
 Ethnic identity rarely came up during informant interviews. Ethnic identity here 
actually refers to sub-national ethnicities, and what Bozorgmehr (1997) calls “internal 
ethnicity.” Some examples would be Baluchi, Azeri, Kurd43, etc. In those two 
occurrences that it was mentioned, it was described as an aspect of identity that strongly 
remained throughout one’s life course, and not necessarily affected by the migration 
process. Adnan, a long-time local leader in Iranian diaspora organizations and “amateur” 
social scientist conducts his own periodic surveys among the students and parents who 
attend the Farsi language program. Here he educates me on how sub-national ethnicities 
persist among the local immigrant population,  
Tina   Did you ask about Persian?  Did you ask about the Persian label? 
Adnan   No, It I don’t use Persian label because I don’t think it’s fair to say Persian 
Tina    People still self-identify though... 
Adnan   Right but just imagine, Persian is another race in Iran, say 1 in 27 races are  
  Persians. Persians are majority of course and they have been in power so  
  they are the dominant culture but there are other cultures in Iran but if you  
  look at that that’s one that would interest you, the different language and  
  different culture that are in Iran and the Persian are just the other ones so 
  there are a lot of people especially the minorities you want to call them,  
  they get offended when you call them Persian, they don’t like to be called  
  Persian.  
Tina   Do you see the presence of those ethnic minority groups in San Diego? 
Adnan   Yeah 
Tina  What do you see?   
Adnan   Yeah, but it there were minorities in Iran, okay, and they were survivors,  
  they were thriving against the majority rule, okay, the Persian domination  
  you know so these guys either they were Turks or Arabs or Baluchi or you  
  know, Kurds and Lurs and whatever, and these guys were just fighting to  
  keep their identity, but when they come here they identify themselves  
  more Iranian, see what I’m saying, at least they are part of a bigger group  
                                                




  not just being a part of smaller and smaller and smaller group so they can  
  identify themselves Iranian but not necessarily Persian. 
 
Adnan’s sympathetic and enlightened view of these sub-national ethnicities is not always 
maintained online, where I witnessed Iranian.com users bashing ethnic minority 
populations in Iran, most often it was Azeris. However, even those that may be 
sympathetic to Azeri rights and independence might still harbor prejudice for another 
group. For instance Iranian.com user Sasan.Khoramdin standing up for Bahá’í’s44 in one 
comment accused the previous poster of not being a “true” Iranian, and being an “Arab 
lover.”45  
 Virtually, I also saw instances of various users asserting their ethnic identity, such 
as the following by user leili2012, 
Azerbaijan will be united one day. South Azerbaijan will join North and 
live free from ignorant persian [sic] hegemony, oppression, religious 
bigotry. Whether Iranians like it or not. We want SEPARATION from 
IRAN [emphasis in original].46  
 
Also by user Savalan, who has as his/her avatar a unique image (in that it was not 
one of the stock choices of avatars provided by Iranian.com) which consists of a stylized, 
pixelated black and white photo of a man with closed eyes, and a white bandage over his 
                                                
44 Admittedly, Baha’i’s do not constitute a separate ethnic group, but a religious group. 
The context here is that frequently in Iranian.com discussions, a couple of users will start bashing 
particular individuals and groups, such as Azeris and Baha’i’s .  
45 Response to user named “Sister Basiji”, September 22, 2012. Basiji refers to the Army 
of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution. 
46 Posted August 30, 2012 in response to blog article about California congressman Dana 
Rohrbacher putting forth a proposal to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to support the 
unification of Azerbaijan. The original blog article by user Touraj Daryee, calling Rep. 
Rohrbacher’s proposal misguided and ignorant, generated a heated and contentious debate among 
users, generally falling along ethnic lines between those calling themselves “pure” Persian and 
those calling themselves Azeri/Turkish. The full text of the blog article and response posts are 




mouth inscribed with the word “freedom,” and periodically comments about Azeri rights 
on a number of posts,  
Since early childhood, I have been exposed to the racial discrimination 
against the ethnic group into which I was born. As a school boy, I was not 
allowed to speak my mother tongue, Azerbaijani Turkic. I never saw text 
books written in my language. I was not taught to read and write my 
language or learn about my culture and history. As Iran’s only official 
language Farsi, the Persian language was imposed on us. We were forced 
to learn Persian language, Persian history, and Persian culture as the 
common identity of all Iranians. I have experienced my ethnic group 
routinely and openly insulted on radio, television and in the state run 
national press. Even now, my people are depicted as intellectually 
challenged and are dehumanized as “donkeys” and “cockroaches”. Racial 
discrimination is still with us. Banning of all non-Farsi languages 
continues, ethnic groups, particularly. Turks and Semites are 
dehumanized.  
 
Where asserting ethnic identity seems to be a point of contention online, this was 
not the case in the second instance where sub-national ethnicity was mentioned by 
informants. During Behnaz and Afareen’s interviews, I asked if Azeri heritage was a 
crucial aspect of Afareen’s identity in the U.S., she answered that she was a “very proud 
Azeri” and promoted the Azeri culture and identity. Yet for her, Azeri identity is not in 
conflict with her Iranian identity, “Wherever we go we introduce ourselves from which 
part of Iran. Iranian from Azerbaijan. And always we explain to them and our events try 
always to have the music, the culture.” Afareen described a recent surprise party she 
threw for her husband with over 200 fellow Azeris and that she did not allow anyone to 
speak Farsi at the party, “Just in English and Turkish.” I asked if the adamant assertion of 
Azeri identity was ever in conflict with the Persian dominant community here. For both 
Behnaz and Afareen, it was not, 
Afareen  Actually because of my strong character, probably your cousins, all they  
  know where I'm standing with my heritage and being from Azerbaijan   




  are okay with that [laughing]. If they are not that's their problem.  
 
Persian ethnic domination over other ethnicities, such as Azeri, explains why it is an 
aspect of identity that does not change through the life course and/or as a result of 
migration. This kind of ethnic suppression would make up part of early life experiences. 
Because Persian ethnicity is predominant among Iranian migrants, it stands to reason why 
the continued assertion of such identities remains important, as Adnan surmised. I have 
no data from subsequent generations that are members of these other groups to 
understand how this might play out in their life course. This finding correlates with 
Bozorgmehr’s (1997) finding that for other ethnic groups besides Persians, pre-migration 
ethnicity is an important aspect of post-migration ethnicity. As ethnic identity was not 
mentioned during the other interviews, I can only surmise that either the other informants 
considered themselves to be “Persian” and/or sub-national ethnicity was not an 
operationalized identity in their life. Sampling more heavily from more recently-arrived 
Iranian immigrants, or if my study had taken place in Los Angeles might have yielded 
stronger sub-ethnic identity affiliations. 
Hybridized Aspects of Identity 
Political 
Fati’s politics is an excellent example of how the migration process hybridized 
her political identity. Certain political ideologies have remained the same, while others 
have changed and become more inclusive. She believes that democracy is something that 
emanates ‘from below,’ that you learn it from childhood in the society and family you are 
raised, 
Fati  So in a way, when you grow up in a country that there’s no democracy, you don’t  
 learn democracy. From home to school to society, it’s always dictatorship. You  




 else. Including myself! You have to train yourself all the time not to be – and  
 you’re always to miss it because you don’t know any better! 
 
She feels that Iranians in Iran and abroad are not ready for democracy, and therefore the 
legacy of dictatorship continues, as evidenced in the non-democratic ways San Diego 
Iranian organizations are run, and the fact that she feels silenced by many of their 
practices. The way that local efforts to support the Green Movement in Iran broke down 
into conflict along separate political factions was further proof for her that even Iranian 
immigrants have not learned equality and consensus, “Because, again, democracy doesn’t 
work if you don’t train yourself as a democratic person.”  
Though Fati has been involved as a member of local diaspora organizations for 
many years, she considers her work on women’s rights issues and particularly her 
involvement with the Iranian Women’s Studies Foundation to be the most critical to her 
identity. She acknowledges that her interest in women’s rights started at an early age, 
 
Fati  I really don’t know how it started, but it was probably a lot of affect from  
my dad.  He was really always insisting on women’s rights and human’s 
rights, even though he himself didn’t do, and I think a lot of it with my 
mom, trying to always tell us, “you have to go to college,” “you have to 
have your own bank account,” you have – she didn’t know much, but what 
she didn’t have she wanted us to have. First was education, second was 
independence.  And I think that her insisting on independency was so 
much that none of the girls got married, except one! And I think it was her 
that she always said, “Oh, you don’t need a man in life if you have 
education, if you have your own work and your own things.” So it was, 
kind of – both of them - one through intellectual way of it, and one 
through her own hard work, through what she went through.  But it started 
really for me, I think it was when I was in that Iranian group for 
democracy in India, and I was – grew up in such an open society.  Like, 
nothing was bad.  Everything we did was okay.  And then all of a sudden I 
come to India with a bunch of Iranian men who everything you did was 
not right.  So, I think it just made me think that ‘what is right, then?  What 
is wrong?’  And then [I] went from there.  By the time I was 23 or 24, I 




when I came here, actually it was only the women who were active and 
they were active on really women’s issue[s]. 
 
The ideals emanating from her mother’s words and her father’s example, and growing up 
in a relatively free and permissive household shaped her early political ideology. Upon 
arriving in India when she was 20 years old in 1976 to attend university, she was first 
exposed to more traditionally-minded Iranian men who found fault with her. For Fati, her 
core identity is strongly tied to the political causes she believes in. Being a fellow Iranian 
is not enough, they have to have a shared interest in the same political causes. An 
expansion of her women’s rights work, Fati embraces open dialogue and full rights for 
gay and lesbians, a topic that is taboo in Iranian society. 
 
Fati  Well, to me, a woman’s rights are human rights. Gay and lesbians are  
human and to me, Iranian society has not even [gotten] close to that – a lot 
of my friends who are gay and lesbian and they come to these [IWSF] 
conferences. 
When it comes to gay and lesbian issues, you see most of the political 
aggressive, progressive, and passionate human rights and democracy 
fighter, being stopped there. They will stop there, and don’t talk about it.  I 
remember ten years ago, I went to the first gay and lesbian conference, 
and I came and I told everybody, nobody wanted to go with me. And when 
I came back, a lot of people who had children, 7-8 years old, they told me, 
“Gosh, Fati, don’t talk in front of my children about you went to that!”  
And a few of [my] friends, who I was very close, sometimes you get in 
power with people and your passion is shared with other people, they told 
me they don’t want to hear about it. They’re too old to hear about it. And, 
it is sad. 
So I think as a – I really – it’s a catching point for me, if you touch this 
issue with [an] open-mind, I will consider you – it’s like a point for me 
that I will find openness, democracy, and human rights in people’s minds. 
If you don’t touch that issue, I will still think about you as a person in 
Islamic Republic of Iran system who is religious-minded, but has the 
cover instead of on her face, in his brain. 
So that’s my point. If I find you enough comfortable to talk, when the day 
comes that the Peyk or AIAP or ISTA47 or all these people, we will invite 
                                                
47 Peyk is a local Farsi-English arts and culture magazine published by the Persian 




a group of people in the Torch of Success48 – a gay or a lesbian who came 
out first, who was killed, who was beaten in Iranian society, and call him 
as somebody who has opened this window of humanity that I am human 
rights, and I am here. If from that day, invite her in the Torch of Success, 
then I will go there and attend, and otherwise I think they are still having 
the same burqa that Khomeini’s regime put it on the people’s face, they 
have it on their brain. And once they take that, I will fully go with them.  I 
think that’s for myself, that’s how I chose which organization – even in 
the women’s group, which person I will chose [sic] as a friend, or not [as 
a] friend. 
Because that’s the point that we have to catch.  Now everybody’s talking 
about – 50 years ago we were talking about the separation of state and 
church. Now everybody talks about it. The society, there’s a point that we 
catch, and that’s my catch point. When you get to the gay and lesbian 
[community] and you openly defend them as a human rights issue. 
 
A hypothetical future point in time when gay rights is embraced and defended among the 
Iranian human rights community and within the larger Iranian society is the “catching 
point” she refers to.  
 While Fati’s personal politics have been hybridized in their incorporation of more 
inclusive ideals influenced by the gay rights movement in the U.S., for the majority of 
first-generation informants hybridized politics is revealed in how and where political 
discourse takes place. It is through the experience of political talk in the context of 
meyhmooni and other social gatherings that is itself more open, diverse and inclusive of 
all ideologies, without fear of repercussions on the part of the participants, as Ramin 
discusses here, 
Tina   And you’re talking about, um, the kind of some of the range of political  
  positions and the Iranians in San Diego? 
 
                                                                                                                                            
organization in San Diego. ISTA stands for Iranian Students Association, a student group from a 
local public university. ISTA and AIAP have strong ties together. 
48 Passing the Torch of Success was a series of awards programs/performances co-
organized by the Public Affairs Association of Iranian Americans (PAAIA), a national 
organization described in Chapter 1, held in major U.S. cities. PAAIA worked with local Iranian 
non-profits, groups, diaspora organizations in each venue to produce these shows. Fati is referring 




Ramin   Yeah, yeah, I see oh yeah sure, sure, I see the political philosophies are  
very much diverse in San Diego. For some people it is very important, 
some people are gathering only around people that they feel comfortable 
with, but that has not has been ever true with me or my family, we are 
very open, and, if somebody believes in a monarchy and I don’t like 
monarchy, that’s okay, we can still discuss it, I can tell him my viewpoint 
and um, I’m willing to listen to theirs. I never, I actually never had thirty 
three years living in San Diego, I never had any conflict, regarding the 
philosophical aspect of, you know what people think. 
 
The lack of conflict in social situations, and the expression of differing viewpoints in an 
open environment provide an opportunity for political talk that represents a new 
development than what was possible living in Iran. In this passage, Ramin tells us why 
open and democratic political discourse is a new experience for Iranian immigrants, as 
the political history of Iran shows that there has been very little opportunity for 
participation, 
Ramin   I think that 50% [of Iranians in the U.S.] who are not interested in politics,  
  they are coming from a major background, you know we have to look at  
them in a social background that they came from, uh, we have to go back 
to our system in Iran. And [in] Iran participating in the political activity 
was not welcome[d] by the government as much. So the governments that 
we had in Iran, you have to consider that that the Constitution[al] 
Revolution was about 103/104 years ago so before that it was no 
participation of people in politics, so from the time of Constitutional 
Revolution on, the governments that were in power, they never 
encouraged people to be in an open, political debates, It was always 
dictated from, by the government, so people look [at] politics as 
something that has been imposed on them. 
 
Mohsen, who only arrived in 2008 to the U.S., further corroborates this point,  
Mohsen It's the good point of here in the United States that you can say whatever  
you want and yeah, I discuss. And, my point of view I have, say anything I 
want. Depends on the other party which I'm talking to. If he is also the 
same, and believes in this democracy here, no problem. But if he want to, 
you know, act like Iran, think that he is in Iran and he can do anything he 
want, he. But still I'm telling you, the people who are here usually don't 
have this problem because most of them has [come] out of Iran because of 





Therefore while personal political identities or ideologies may have stayed the same 
through the life course, the medium and mode of political discourse among Iranians has 
changed to be more democratic and inclusive, without fear of reprisal. Afareen’s best 
friend is a Mujahideen49, yet because of her friendship, she is able to look beyond a 
political ideology that she finds offensive, “I know where I'm standing with the 
Mujahideen. But I never let that come in between.”   
Political discourse that is shared and exchanged within a less restrictive 
environment also has the potential to effect the formation of political identity vis-à-vis 
American politics. Mohsen is actively trying to learn about politics and the political 
parties in the U.S., “I like to learn. How it works, and what Republicans are saying, what 
Democrats are saying, what people are saying. Because, I'm interested in learn[ing] these 
things here.” Ramin’s exposure to democratic ideals and civic culture in the U.S. as well 
as his life course experience influenced his personal political ideology with respect to 
American politics. Ramin describes himself as following more Democrat rather than 
Republican beliefs. He is, in his estimated 50% of the Iranian community that 
understands and follows American politics, “I am not on the median of the society, I am 
not the average of the society, I think that I consider myself to be a little above average.” 
Of this half, about 75% of them are also Democrat, with about 10-15% Republican, 
according to Ramin.  
                                                
49 Mujahideen-e-Khalq, the People’s Mujahideen of Iran, also called the MEK, is an 
Islamic and Marxist political mass movement. MEK participated in the 1979 Revolution to 
overthrow the Shah, and now as an opposition movement in exile advocates to overthrow the 
Islamic Republic. MEK, as of September 21, 2012, was removed from the U.S. list of terrorist 
organizations by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. (Quinn and Hosenball 2012, LaFranchi 
2012), Among the Iranian immigrant community, MEK is rumored to have many 





Niki, a second generation informant recognizes that as she grows older and learns 
more, her own political identity is shifting and changing. Yet, within that, she still 
maintains “socially liberal and progressive” values and politics that are sometimes in 
conflict with her parents’ beliefs, “They are a lot less concerned with breaking social 
barriers and allowing people to have freedoms that they wouldn't normally have in the 
current society. For example, things like gay marriage or you know even the way women 
conduct [themselves].” 
National 
National identity among my informants works in complex ways. Adnan, the 
amateur social scientist, reported from his survey results among the children and parents 
at the Farsi language school that the children tended to see themselves as “Iranian-
American” and first generation saw themselves as “Iranian.” For him the purpose of the 
school “is [to] give them a sense of identity that they need.” I would argue that this is true 
of all my informants—that their involvement with Iranian organizations serves to provide 
them a sense of identity that has been re-configured through displacement. Indeed, the 
Association of Iranian American Professionals (AIAP) and Persian Cultural Center 
(PCC), among other local organizations, formed to help recently-arrived Iranians adapt to 
their new circumstances, as Ramin explains, 
Ramin   They were the first wave of immigrants, so when we came here, it was  
  easy to find one of those psychologists that who immigrated here also to  
tell us how to cope with this new life. Okay. So that was the main core of 
those nights of poetry. And we we had all these that they come out and 
play for free. We had poets that they came out, read their poetry. We had 
writers we had, you know, thinkers....you know all sort of people, they had 
a chance to express themselves, and on the other side, people had a place 
to fill up their Friday night. So they assimilated with each other, they 
found identity. Okay, and then they felt kind of proud of themselves or 
comfortable with themselves living here. And from that point they started 





Likewise, Fabos (2002:39) also found that Sudanese NGOs were a significant tool 
for a cross-section of the Sudanese population in Cairo “to reclaim some of class and 
professional status lost through displacement.” On the one hand national identity was 
something taken for granted by informants, and hardly mentioned specifically as related 
to their identity. On the other hand, Iranian participants in local NGOs are involved in 
contradictory processes: the pull of sub-national ideologies (like oppositional political 
parties) and identities (such as non-Persian or non-Moslem) which are counter-
hegemonic to the Iranian state and a nationalistic discourse, via local Iranian NGOs that 
promote ideal of a Iranian diaspora, such that the “concept of nation remains the most 
obvious platform.” (Fabos 2002:37). Local Iranian organizations by necessity have to 
make claims to a degree of unity under a nationalist discourse, yet underneath that tent of 
“Iranian” or “Iranian-American” must be enough room to include a multiplicity of 
competing religious ideologies, political programs, generational identities, and even sub-
national ethnicities. The ways that they might negotiate these potential conflicts is 
covered in Chapter 5. 
Transformed Aspects of Identity 
Religious 
Turning away from the religion of their upbringing was a common theme among 
the majority (five out of eight) of my informants. The increasing secularization among 
Iranian immigrants has been documented by Bozorgmehr (1997). Adnan grew up in a 
religiously observant household and as he describes, “music was something that was 
pretty much forbidden in our house because we were very religious… so as soon as I got 




in his mid-20s did he really have a chance to explore visual arts and music for which he is 
so passionate about, “So I always had a passion about music and art, put all that passion 
to science so it went to science.” On the other hand, his former Moslem identity is linked 
to a current Iranian immigrant identity, 
Adnan   I wrote an article last issue back and I said, you know, I know people who  
  are not even Moslem but when they hear things about this disconnection  
  happening to Moslems and stuff they get their attention, you know this  
  friend of mine was telling me that you know, I don’t know what’s in it, I  
  am not a Muslim and haven’t been Muslim for years, you know, but still  
  that part of my culture is still brings back my mind that I can connect  
  myself to that particular story, so yet, you know, my thing was that you  
  know when I go to movies and I see the credits, I’m looking for Iranian  
  names and listening to NPR and just looking at the names you know  
  there’s Naza Ninji or Aja Lali or other things and the producers and I said  
  well when I heard that this guy Jian Ghomeshi is coming and talking to  
  and has a show, I said Jian Ghomeshi, that’s Iranian that must be Iranian 
 
Likewise, Ramin was raised in a religious household in Iran, however he and his 
wife chose to raise their children without any religious affiliation. Ramin has two 
children, the oldest of which was one year old when they migrated to the U.S. 
 
Tina   So have your children been raised in any particular faith? 
Ramin  No not me, not my wife.  When we came here, maybe you know, the first  
effect that we got from United State was freedom of religion, and I really 
appreciated that. And uh, my wife, by living here, she realized that you 
know, religion, you can have any religion you want without imposing it on 
other people, so we decided not to impose that situation to our kids.  And 
both of them, I’m sure they believe in God, but they do, they are familiar 
about Moslem[s] and they are familiar from Bahá’í, but they don’t practice 
any. 
 
Likewise, religion is a topic he steers away from among his friends, Iranian or otherwise. 
I get the sense from informants that it is not uncommon in social situations to encounter 




religion and politics are not necessarily taboo, but ones which demand sensitivity and the 
need to tread lightly on the part of actors, 
Tina   What do you in San Diego, in terms of, is there ever a conflict between, if  
  you’re in a social situation, that somebody is religious or has certain  
  religious ideologies in whatever context?  Is that ever an issue when your  
  interacting, say with other Iranians in San Diego? 
Ramin   No, no because my vision is just not to value the people by their  
  religious beliefs so for me I have I have many friends from all different  
  religions. I have Christians I have Jews, I have Bahá’í friends, I have  
  Moslem friends, I have atheist friends. But um this issue never has been  
  a part of our conversation, so maybe the way that I am and I don’t I  
  don’t ask people what kind of religion they have or if they tell me I don’t I  
  don’t judge them by the religion, so maybe I am a very, very liberal in that  
  sense, it’s not at all any importance to me. Uh, and maybe for this reason,  
  I never had any conflict regarding religion, and even on the political uh,  
  uh, philosophies, I never had any conflict, I had people, I have friends that  
  they love the monarchy, I have people that they love socialism, I have  
  people that they like capitalism, And uh, we discuss all different things  
  without, you know judging each other. 
 
Ramin, a “member from day one” of the local Iranian organizations acknowledged that 
while Iranians are sensitive about discussing religion and politics, the early founders 
intentionally decided to set these potentially divisive issues aside in favor of discussing 
other topics like art and music. One of the early functions of such organizations, 
according to Ramin, was helping its members “psychologically assimilate” to life in the 
U.S. 
As a contrast to Adnan and Ramin, two informants are very observant Bahá’ís. 
Life course events, specifically experiences during the 1979 Iranian Revolution where 
relatives were tortured and killed, as Afareen said, “I wanted to forget everything. 
Because it is very hard to when you think that these people, the Iranians, the one that you 
live with them and they did all this terrible things to the Bahá'ís or your family” 




community, only seemed to strengthen their faith. Afareen and Behnaz hold a monthly 
Bahá’í devotional in their home, among many other volunteer activities driven by her 
faith, 
 
Afareen Really if you wanted to categorize that, the belief system, the Bahá'í faith,  
  they to give the service, service of the worship. You know what I mean?  
  In my faith service is the worship. Therefore if we can be help in any way  
  to anybody or so, why not? Whether it is spiritually or it is materially or it  
  is whatever.  
 
Generational Identities: Politicization across the Life Course50 
 
Asking the questions I did about the effects (short-term and long-term) of June 
2009 political events and conflict did not answer concretely whether it was a pivotal 
event for Iranian diaspora community as a whole. Rather, informants’ narratives revealed 
a generational identity related to going through that experience together. These narratives 
reflected their positioning with respect to the Iranian regime, and informed their attitudes 
toward power (abstractly) and their own activism (concretely). Looking at the 
overarching patterns across life experience and migration experience, the 1979 Islamic 
Revolution and its aftermath was what led to politicization in the first-generation of 
Iranian immigrants. In other words, experiencing the Revolution first-hand, having 
friends or relatives jailed or tortured, and/or life lived under with the Islamic Republic 
was the hallmark of a certain generational identity.  
First-generation informants tended to see it as just another event in the 
“distressing” history of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI). Mitra*51, an early informant, is 
an example of this attitude. Mitra experienced the Revolution first-hand during her early 
                                                
50 Please also refer to Appendix 3: Case Studies of Reactions to June 2009 and Feelings 
About Green Movement through Time. 




twenties and was even jailed for some of her political activities. During the height of the 
June 2009 events she kept up with news of the Green Movement searching for 
information on its organization, and even attended local rallies. About a year after the 
June 2009 events, she had a more negative outlook on its outcomes, “Impact on me? On a 
personal level I have turned more pessimistic. Based on my experiences generally, I 
realize we can have so little impact… If there is another turn I don’t know if I going to 
carry a placard.”52 She recalled that there have been many other similarly “heated” 
moments in the history of the IRI and did not hold much hope that June 2009 events 
would change things too much. Similarly, Fati was discouraged by the arguments and 
conflict that broke out even between local demonstrators as part of the IranPeace group 
that briefly formed in San Diego as a result of the Green Movement events in Iran, and 
took that as a sign that Iran itself was not ready for true change.  
Fati    I’m just telling you about California, I think it [June 2009] was another  
  historical event. I didn’t see a lot of changes in the communities, in the  
  people’s way of thinking, it went back to the same thing. People wanted to  
  do something; they wanted to be more democratic in their organization.  
  But because they have taught the same people for so long, [that] we are  
  not political, we cannot talk this, we cannot talk that: people would throw  
  them back in their face[s]. 
 
The June 2009 presidential election and mass protests, however, was formative 
for younger generations (1.5 and 2nd) of Iranian Americans. Another early informant, 
Sia, founded a student group Human Rights for Iran at a local public university basing the 
model for his organization on another student group called Students for Justice in 
Palestine, spent the whole year after the June 2009 associated protests in Iran reading 
about the Green Movement, and “noticed a vacuum here on campus”53 Sia, who is 1.5 
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generation Iranian, calls the organization he founded and the larger Green Movement it 
sees itself part of a “transnational”54 movement. After seeing the coverage of the Green 
Movement, Sia, a student at a local university, identified himself with the youth 
protesting in Tehran. In the statement below, he describes how witnessing June 2009 
events through YouTube tapped into his conscience and re-ignited his political activism, 
Then in 2009, the Green Movement happened. What happened in was Iran 
erupted again as it did in a smaller scale ten years ago when I left Iran. I 
and many others throughout the world saw the YouTube videos of Iranian 
youth going to the streets and risking it all for democracy and social 
justice in a corrupt impoverished society. They proved to the world that 
Middle Easterners are not part of a Khamenei-George W. Bush narrative 
of Clash of Civilizations or need the United States to devastate their 
country as in Iraq they can do it themselves. My relatives who withstood 
the thirty years of repression from my uncles, cousins, and grandfather 
went to the street and called for accountability and a brighter future of 
Iran. They went knocking on the door to ask “where was their vote?” and 
were greeted with cattle prods, bullets, and batons. I and many others 
spent sleepless nights going on Twitter and Facebook My conscience went 
yelling at me that I need to spread awareness in the States of this glorious 
achievement by the people of the Middle East and help the people there in 
any way that I could to make the democracy movement and its political 
prisoners known to put international pressure. These protests were an 
existential question and these people put their lives on the line for a future 
of peace and prosperity for the world instead of war and isolation. Seeing 
students risking their lives there with the dictatorship there, I believed the 
least we could do here in the freedom of speech provided us was speak up 
for these voiceless. For the next 7 months, I immersed myself in activist 
and human rights networks and following Iranian politics as I did 6 years 
before. Then in December 2009, while I was engaged with Middle Eastern 
activism in SJP during their first year and MSA55 during the first year they 
put the wall, a video struck me. I watched the video of Bahareh Hedayat, 
as you know the well-known student leader in Iran, telling students outside 
of Iran to spread awareness of the students repressed in Iran. She paid the 
price for that interview she did through the webcast and got sentenced to 
81/2 years in prison leaving her husband and family behind. I believed 
                                                
54 At the time, Sia had recently stepped down as president of Human Rights for Iran 
(HRI) in order to concentrate on finishing his studies, but still clearly heavily influenced the 
organization. HRI’s close alignment with the Iran’s Green Movement became a bone of 
contention with other members of the group, as reported to me by another informant. 





there was something that needed to be done. But seeing the culture of 
apathy of [students at this university] and the ignorance of the Iranian 
American student population, I thought it would be mission impossible.56 
 
Niki, a second-generation Iranian immigrant, was visiting family in Iran during the June 
2009 elections. At the time she was an entering freshman into university. It was seeing 
those events unfold first-hand that helped to politicize her and initiated further action, 
Niki   Because of the after-effects I would say I'm definitely more sympathetic… 
All these things made it so much more real. So when I get involved in 
politics I try more to imagine what those, what the suppressed person is 
doing or feeling. You know, kind of make them more human. So I'm a lot 
more active, I'm a lot more sympathetic. I think that's one of the biggest 
effects. And like I said, it was very inspiring to me. So anytime I feel that I 
have more power than someone in terms of being able to change their 
government, you know I'll get behind my computer and write what I need 
to write or I will sign the petition I need to sign. I really want to use my 
freedom to help somebody else because I feel like that's a really important 
thing to do. So that's what I do a lot, to try to take advantage of my free 
speech to enable somebody else to one day be able to have their own 
rights.  
 
Two years after the June 2009 events, Niki reported getting involved with multiple causes  
on campus, including HRI, and online. Witnessing the protests and government 
crackdown made her more sympathetic to the “suppressed person,” and the protests 
themselves were inspirational. In the passage above she uses the terminology of human 
rights and free speech. In another interview more than 2.5 years after the June 2009 
events, Niki reports her continued involvement with several campus causes, yet no longer 
was an active member of HRI. During this dialogue, she was enthused by her 
involvement with another organization Student Organized Voter Access Committee 
(SOVAC), a non-partisan student organization seeking to increase voter registration rates 
                                                
56 This was part of a “farewell speech” Sia delivered to HRI as he was stepping down. He 





among university students. Yet the June 2009 events remained a strong motivator for her 
political participation, 
Niki   Well…for SOVAC, the idea of voter, like the power of a vote really 
   resonates with me because of my background with Iran and being in Iran  
  during the elections and seeing the issues that come with fraudulent votes.  
  And, it kind of opened my eyes to how valuable a person's vote is. 
 
Witnessing the post-June 2009 events unfold in Iran energized and motivated younger 
informants to establish a new activist organization as in Sia’s case or become more 
politically aware and engaged with transnational political movements in Niki’s, Sia’s, 
and Malieh’s case. In Niki’s case, while she later changed her perspective on the long-
term effect of those post-election events and what it meant for regime change in Iran, 
nevertheless witnessing these events continued to inspire her to be politically active in 
other realms. As members of the older generation of immigrants, Fati and Mitra are like 
my other informants in that while the June 2009 events caused initial excitement and 
incited short-term participation in local rallies, they were more likely to view June 2009 
as mere incidences in a longer history of political turmoil. This leads me to the thesis that 
earlier life experiences of disjuncture and political conflict contribute more to 
politicization than ones happening later in life.  
Further, these two separate experiences of homeland conflict—the 1979 Iranian 
Revolution and the June 2009 Iranian Presidential election and mass protests—not only 
have differential effects on politicization through the life course depending on the 
age/generation of the individual at the time of the occurrence, but contribute to a 
“generational identity” having to do with experiencing those events.57 That political 
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conflict in their parents’ homeland had such an impact on their participation in civic life 
and politics is contrary to the model predicted by Alba & Nee (2003) and Portes and 
Rumbaut (2001) which posits that subsequent generations of immigrants have declining 
transnational attachments and practices. 
Cosmopolitanism and the ‘New’ Spirituality 
Afareen, Behnaz and Maliheh are notable exceptions, but among the rest of my 
informants, and the countless other Iranian immigrants I have had contact with 
throughout fieldwork, the trend among Iranian immigrants is definitely one of turning 
away from religion or even strident assertions of ethnic or national identity. In its place, 
informants invoke the mantra of democracy and human rights as universal values, citing 
phrases related to a “shared humanity.” Despite differences in political and religious 
ideology and identities among my informants, they embrace the values inherent in the 
notion of cosmopolitanism. Philosopher Kwame Appiah, in describing his Nigerian 
father, gives a working definition of cosmopolitanism “[he] never saw a conflict between 
local partialities and a universal morality—between being part of the place you were and 
a part of a broader human commitment” (2006:xviii). I propose that cosmopolitanism is a 
discourse which operates among my informants, and is a source of ethics and 
“spirituality” in its own right. In trying to look at ways in which it is operationalized and 
functions as an actual ideology in the lives of certain immigrants, especially liberal 
middle class/elite ones like my informants, I found the values and identities they embrace 
result from a combination of life course events and exposure to different ideals during 
post-migration experiences.  
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Conclusion: Being Separated from Homeland and (In)abilities to Return 
“Half of my life I was in Iran—for the other half Iran was in me.” This phrase was 
not actually uttered as a phrase by any of the informants. It presented itself to me as a 
piece of artwork in the home of one of my informants, and was inscribed in Farsi over a 
painted image. The theme it represents is displacement, something of which all my 
informants were cognizant. In this passage Fati eloquently describes what it means to be 
“dislocated from what we wanted to be,” not because earning a livelihood in the home 
country was impossible, but for other reasons. She also describes how this sense of 
dislocation even carries over to subsequent generations, 
Fati   Iranian community was – even though it was [a] community, but 
dictatorship, and all this time made us be on the news all the news, or talk  
about Iran all the time. Plus, we were dislocated from what we wanted to  
be. We didn’t choose to come to America because we didn’t have money,  
because we didn’t have [a] job, because we didn’t have a country to live.  
We are not like Somalians, who don’t have food. Like Filipinos, who  
don’t have jobs and too much population. Not like India, that there was no  
job. Not like certain countries: we had food, we had work, we had  
resources. So we were dislocated. This dislocation brings all the things  
you have seen in your childhood, and so does my nieces and nephew, they  
have the effect from us, also. 
 
I qualify this sense of dislocation as an indicator of “exile consciousness.” Despite 
differing migration statuses among Iranian immigrants, the presence of an exile 
consciousness is a shared attribute. Said (2000) defines what characterizes exile 
consciousness as, an “unhealable rift forced between a human being and a native place, 
between the self and its true home: its essential sadness can never be surmounted (173).” 
My sample of informants included refugees, asylees and voluntary immigrants who had 
come to take advantage of educational opportunities for them or their children. As such, 
some informants, like Adnan, Niki, and Malieh, do actually make return visits. The 




ability to return to Iran for visits. Afareen and Behnaz, who are married to each other, are 
members of the persecuted Bahá’í religion and had relatives that had been killed in Iran. 
Another, Fati, who was technically a member of a persecuted opposition party in the 
1970s, on a whim applied for the visa lottery while studying in India and was granted a 
visa. She has not returned to Iran in her nearly three decades in San Diego, partly because 
she does not feel secure. Ramin does not feel he can return because he has, as he says, a 
“mixed marriage” in that his family is of a Moslem background and his wife’s is Bahá’í, 
and sought asylum in the U.S. because of religious persecution. Finally, Mohsen in the 
nearly four years since migration has not been able to return because he is awaiting U.S. 
citizenship.  
I found that the inability to return became more poignant through the life course 
the longer after migration, as Afareen shows here, 
Behnaz And when they played the national anthem I get goosebumps.  
Afareen Always. I get very, I always get emotional. But it doesn't mean that as a  
  Bahá’í. As I said, as a Bahá’í, we very specifically love Iran.  
Tina:  Yeah. And so, you know, and I hate to pick at a sensitive topic, but the  
  inability to go back.  
Afareen No. No. That is the hardest part. That it is at this point, specifically for  
  me and for my family, it is almost faraway dream. I can't even dream.  
  Once in a while in my talk I say if I go to Iran. Because my friends  
  they go they come. They bring video. Example, those D****58 they  
  are from my hometown.  
Tina  Oh really.  
Afareen And every time that they go they go and take, make a film or so. Just  
  because we can't go. Bring they show, oh that's the street that you live,  
  that's the school that we went, that's here or there. Sometimes with my  
  mind say if I go to Iran, what happens, what I'm gonna do. And then  
  when I hit the reality it is almost impossible at this point. Slowly,  
  slowly this dream is fading after so many, 35 years now.  
 
A couple of times during our discussion, the emotion is very near the surface as Afareen 
is almost in tears, and with long pauses in the flow of conversation. Safran’s (1991) 
                                                




definition of diaspora consciousness includes an orientation to homeland as a mythical 
place and at the same time, being the true, ideal home to which one should eventually 
return. As true exiles from their ancestral homeland, Afareen and Behnaz confront the 
real possibility that they will never be able to return to Iran to see their hometown in their 
lifetime. Their feelings for their home country are understandably complicated as they 
elaborate on here, 
  
Tina   How would you describe your relationship to, I mean given this history of  
  persecution that's happened, what is your relationship to [Iran]? 
Afareen A lot of love. A lot of love. You have to remember that as a Bahá'í we  
love Iran. Because the most important reason is because Bahá'u'lláh is 
from Iran. He's born in that country. And he promised the [u/i 00:28:30] 
future for Iran and encouraged in his writing and ordered to the Bahá'ís to 
give the, render the service to Iran and Iranians. Therefore Iran is always 
in our hearts. No matter what is happening to the Bahá'ís in that country. 
But in the same time we are sad. Because in the beginning my personal 
feeling I wanted to forget everything. Because it is very hard to when you 
think that these people, the Iranians, the one that you live with them and 
they did all this terrible things to the Bahá'ís or your family. As much that 
I get older I miss...(long silence)  
Tina   It's okay. You want me to?  
Behnaz  Yeah it’s very difficult that you cannot go back to your native country. It 
is one thing that you don't go back because you are busy or whatever life 
is here. But the other thing is by virtue of not being able to go.  
Afareen Not being able to go.  
 
Afareen is profoundly pained by being “cut off” from her hometown. When she 
first migrated she wanted to “forget everything” but the realization that she cannot ever 
return in her lifetime has forced her to confront her anger and sadness. Yngvesson and 
Coutin write in their analysis of narratives from Salvadoran youth who were forced to 
return to their country of origin and adoptees that the idea of ‘return’ is sometimes built 




a moment when one self is officially constituted and another is ‘cut away’” (2006:178). 
For Afareen and Behnaz, that part of their life has been cut away.  
While “not being able to go” is different than choosing not to go, even for those 
who have the choice, it is a decision fraught with anxiety, emotion and uncertainty. For 
Ramin and his family, there is fear left unsaid in returning to Iran for a visit. In speaking 
only of his ability to return because it was an impossibility for his Bahá’í wife, there is 
much uncertainty for him pertaining to the problems that are associated from the couple’s 
mixed marriage, “So I wasn’t really confident by going back I didn’t know, I just didn’t 
want to put myself in a situation that I have to go through interviews and tell them why I 
married and you know what is this? Am I still you know lenient toward Bahá’í or not and 
what is your religion and I just didn’t I didn’t feel comfortable…”  Being in exile implies 
an eventual return, even though return is not always possible, or even desirable.  
In contrast, Adnan, a first generation informant, makes return trips to visit friends 
and family every few years. Niki and Malieh from the younger generation of informants 
are able make periodic visits to their parents’ homeland. Mina feels these trips symbolize 
her Iranian identity, and that her connection is made more real by frequent visits,  
Niki   So, just emotionally that makes me more tied to Iran. Seeing it all the  
time, and talking to people there all the time, reminding myself that it's a 
place that's real, it exists. Whereas to someone who hasn't been to Iran in 
20-30 years, that's more of a memory than a reality. The fact that the only 
family I have here are my mom, dad, and brother. I don't have any other 
family here. I don't have any other, anything else tying me here. All of the 
family that, other than that, is in Iran. And those ties are very, very strong. 
And the sense of identity that they give me is very very strong and 
important. Yeah, I think identity is another one. I think some Iranians, 
depending on the experience they had in Iran, come here with the intention 
of abandoning that part of themselves and which I personally find 
completely understandable. They went through some very awful things 





She contrasts herself to other Iranians who have not returned, not fully 
acknowledging the ones not able to return. Later in our dialogue I probe and ask what 
other differences she sees between her family and other Iranian migrants. She attributes 
the differences to ones of class and religious upbringing, describing her family as coming 
from “very humble means” and religious, in contrast to the more middle class or elite 
migrants that came earlier. 
The Iranian immigrant population is truly a ‘mixed community’ composed of 
people with variously situated positions vis-à-vis the Iranian state in their ability to 
return, as well as differences in class and religious affiliation and ethnicity, as participant-
observation showed. Compounding these variances are several different waves of 
migrants who have different experiences of homeland and host country settlement. The 
chart below shows the breakdown of the Iranian community by time of migration.
 
Figure 4 Date of Migration, data from 2008 PAAIA National Public Opinion Telephone Survey, n=401.  
Note that the “before 1979” figure is a bit misleading because it includes the population 













does not include the migrants that first went to European countries before being able to 
immigrate to the U.S. 
How do they come together, if at all?  I would contend that the presence of exile 
consciousness constitutes community for Iranian immigrants. A sense of exile 
consciousness actually permeates through all my informants’ narratives, despite their 
ability to return to Iran or when they migrated. In other words, exile can be externally-
mandated or internally-imposed. This exile consciousness goes beyond mere nostalgia for 
something in the past, or as Brah words it, where home becomes a “mythic place of 
desire” (1996:192). Exile discourse must deal with the continued problematic of multiple 
locations, and where relationships are not so much based on shared origins (birth, nation, 
religion, gender) but an attachment to a “common imaginary construct” (Naficy 1993). 
Exile consciousness among my informants manifests itself as longing for a home you 
cannot be a part of anymore as a full political member or transnational citizen. Regardless 
of an individuals’ ability to return, or whether they do make return visits, the fact is, that 
these informants on an emotional and psychological level, and in terms of their personal 
politics, cannot be a part of the Iranian nation-state because they fundamentally disagree 
with Iran, and the Islamic Republic. However, Naficy (1993) prods us to not only to think 
of the dystopic experiences stemming from exile, but also to think of the utopic aspects of 
the exile experience, “driven by wanderlust and the desire for liberation and freedom,” 
(6). In this chapter I have particularized informants’ fixed and shifting values, ideologies, 
and identities and how they interconnect with specific political experiences in homeland 




exile consciousness and separation from homeland motivates and drives civic and 






Chapter 5  The Political and the Personal Domains of 
Immigrant Experience 
 
Engagement with politics, especially as it pertains to engagement in the politics of 
homeland, is a potential moment of “ethnic belonging” (Vega 2012). Yet, political 
engagement is different in the two sites: with original homeland it signifies reifying 
belonging to an ethnic persona that comes with birth, while with the chosen homeland, 
the U.S. it signifies being accepted into a new society. From this new perspective of dual 
and simultaneous political engagement, this chapter focuses on informants’ narratives 
that address their agency and activism, and then abstracting to how they address power 
embedded in different hierarchies. Though, with a few exceptions, Iranian migrants share 
in common by an anti-regime stance, they do embrace a variety of different political 
ideologies and political programs with respect to their homeland government. A 2011 
national telephone survey confirms this finding, showing that Iranian Americans want the 
Iranian regime to change with sixty seven percent (67%) preferring a secular democratic 
Iran, compared to 6% believing any form of an Islamic Republic would work (PAAIA 
2011). 
In Chapter 4 I discussed migration narratives and aspects of identity. Chapter 5 
delves deeper into political identity and how the individual informants intersect with 
politics on multiple levels. In the first section of this chapter, I analyze what I term 
“discourses of participation” as articulated by informants and online users, something I 
witnessed during participant observation as well. Discourses of participation, though they 
reflect a common concern do not seem to align with the PAAIA survey results, as I will 
show. In the next section I provide a typology of all the political-civic acts encountered 




consider several models to try to make the data fit current models of immigrant political 
participation. The third section focuses on diaspora organizations locally, their role, and a 
noted recent trend in their activities. Finally, I propose a model for how personal politics 
intersect with diaspora organizations. In the last section I present another dominant theme 
I encountered among my politically and civically-active informants as well as online, the 
idea that Iranians need to “practice and learn” democratic ideals in order to transform the 
nation, and why expressions of political variance take on such different forms between 
online and offline discourses. 
Discourses of Participation and “Giving Back” 
The commonality among my Iranian immigrant informants was the fact that they 
all actively participated in civic and political life in the U.S. This participation takes on a 
variety of forms, as will be discussed later in this chapter. It stands to reason then, that a 
significant part of informants’ identity in San Diego and within the larger context of the 
U.S is the perception that they see themselves as set apart from other Iranian immigrants 
because of political and civic involvement. One of the themes that came up frequently 
across my informants was a concern about and criticism of those “other” Iranians that 
either a) were politically and civically apathetic and always thinking of what is going on 
Iran rather than dealing with realities of daily life in the U.S. and working to improve the 
situation of Iranians in the U.S. b) did not attend Iranian-specific events or participate in 
voluntary associations and/or c) somehow took advantage of “the system” broadly 
meaning to take advantage of U.S. society. Related to this in the virtual community of 
Iranian.com, accusations of “hate-mongering” and inciting divisiveness are a common 




1996), why this concern with low participation and lack of community? In the rest of this 
section, I categorize the related discourse I observed during participant observation, 
among informants during interviews, and through virtual sources, and then compare with 
actual statistics derived from a national telephone survey conducted by PAAIA in 2008. 
Low Involvement with American Politics 
One of the Association of Iranian American Professionals (AIAP) meetings I 
attended serves as an illustration of the theme of low involvement with American politics. 
The guest speaker Mahbod Seraji, a San-Francisco based Iranian American writer and 
management consultant, gave a presentation in Farsi to a room full of doctors, engineers, 
and PhDs, about Iranians integrating into American culture. He discussed the measures of 
assimilation—factors like socio-economic status, language attainment, intermarriage and 
engagement with politics. He then proceeded to provide some U.S. census data about 
Iranians that I have heard trotted during these kinds of gatherings.59 This kind of data is 
used to confirm among themselves the image of Iranians as being “good” and 
“successful” immigrants, especially in comparison to other recently-arrived immigrant 
groups. The “good” immigrant is marked as one that is well-adapted to U.S. society, is 
economically successful and makes a contribution to society. 
This particular theme of the “good” immigrant is also represented in the narrative 
of national Iranian-American advocacy groups and among the discourses of virtual 
communities. The following text taken from the National Iranian American Council 
website illustrates this theme, “As one of the most highly educated minority groups in the 
United States, Iranian Americans have achieved success on many levels – technological, 
                                                
59 For instance, the per capita average income for Iranian Americans is 50% higher than 
that of the general population. Percentage wise, Iranian-Americans are among the most educated 
ethnicities in the United States. Iranians hold five times the number of doctorates than the 




scientific, academic and economic life – yet our community’s impact on civil society is a 
less impressive story.”60 From the virtual community of Iranian.com, a user named Hafez 
for Beginners in disputing a point made by the previous poster remarked, 
This seems “silly.” Last time I checked - from among 66 ethnic 
communities in the US - Iranian-Americans were ranked the most 
educated and accomplished. [emphasis in original] 
From the first female space tourist - to Ebay - to some of the best US 
surgeouns [sic]- to CNN anchors and beyond. 61 
 
Yes, Iranians in the U.S. are rich, powerful and well-educated as the discourse 
goes, yet, as Mr. Seraji continued to point out; Iranians have very low knowledge of and 
involvement with American politics. According to my informant Ramin, about 50% of 
Iranians in the U.S. do not participate in politics, “In other words, some decided not to 
participate in politics, and… most of them they never been in politics and they never see 
politics as a very vital mean[s] of them living here. They think that they can live here 
without vot[ing] or without being involved in politics.” He attributes this difference 
between people like himself and the others as being “a little above average” and “not on 
the median of the society.” This particular point went unexamined the rest of the 
interview, yet has been echoed online. A user from Iranian.com named Fesenjoon262 
disputed Hafez for Beginners earlier point in support of Anonymous Observer’s (AO) 
assertion that Iranian Americans do not know enough about American politics: 
To add to AO, the "top most educated successful minority" status of 
Iranian-Americans is contested:  
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2012/06/19/the-rise-of-asian-americans/  
                                                
60 http://www.niacouncil.org/site/PageServer?pagename=About_index, accessed 29  
September 2012 
61 Iranian.com, September 6, 2012 





The fact that we have almost no presence in American politics actually 
puts Iranian-Americans at the very bottom of the minority success 
chain.63   
Therefore, the discourse about low Iranian participation in the U.S. political system 
stands in stark contrast to the discourse about the Iranian immigrant “success story.” 
Which one is the more dominant of the two? From my experiences, the “model 
immigrant” trope outsizes the “low participation” discourse, mostly because the people 
touting this particular criticism about the Iranian population are a minority. The other 
reason is that “positive” characteristics wield more influence than negative 
characterizations of the population. 
The rest of Mr. Seraiji’s lecture during the AIAP meeting was dedicated to 
presenting social science models of cultural “types”. It seemed as if Mr. Seraji was 
teaching his audience of Iranian Americans the “whys” of American culture and how it 
differed from Iranian culture, and reminded me of the culture and personality school that 
was en vogue in anthropology half a century ago. Mr. Seraji drawing from his academic 
background, and his own life experience adapting to U.S. society made an effort to 
present this information that was palatable to his audience, by offering comparative lists 
of attributes of American culture versus Iranian culture64. Indeed it was a strange meeting 
for me as an aspiring scholar of migration and an anthropologist loathe to employ 
stereotypes of culture. Here, Mohsen, one of my informants, offers his own interpretation 
of Mr. Seraji’s lecture and explanation for Iranian under-participation in politics, 
Yeah what he was saying also was that these Iranians coming here they 
are not, you know, they are not changing themselves too much to go with 
the cultur[e] of [the] United States. So, at the end of the speech, as I said, 
                                                
63 Iranian.com September 6, 2012 
64 Some examples of items on the comparative lists—Iranian versus American attitudes 
towards time—Americans are more punctual while Iranians more lax about time. Or, that Iranians 




there was questions and answers, and somebody asked different questions. 
And the thing, one of the questions, that was mine also, was that "What's 
the reason that you think that it is?" And the reasons came out with so 
many people talking was that okay, same thing. Lot of people came out of 
Iran because they were forced to come out of Iran. They did not choose to 
immigrate. They [had] to immigrate. So when you have to immigrate you 
love everything that you have over there that you don't want to change it, 
so it's not gonna happen easily to change, you know, to get use[d] to 
American culture. The other people was that okay, there is two cultures. 
We don't want to lose our culture but we want to get the good points of 
this culture as well. This is what's going to, what should happen. You get 
the good points of this culture and you keep the good points of your 
culture and make another thing in between of that. The main idea was that, 
the thing he was saying that why this is happening, why people, Iranians 
are not into Iran, uh…American culture still after 30 years of immigrating.  
 
Mohsen’s main point is that most Iranians were involuntary migrants and migrated out of 
necessity, and their hesitation to adapt to “American culture” is borne out of fearing loss 
of their own culture. This is quite a sympathetic explanation in comparison to other 
interpretations I encountered online.  
As more evidence of the currency of this particular discourse, I offer the 
following case study from Iranian.com. “Anonymous Observer” (AO) was the author of a 
blog article titled “The Good American: Why Iranian Americans Will Never Advance” 
on September 3, 2012.65 The gist of the article was a criticism leveled at fellow Iranian 
Americans as being disconnected from American politics and politically unaware. The 
starting point was a recent discussion on Iranian.com about Texas Representative and 
Republican presidential candidate Ron Paul. Anonymous Observer in his/her blog post 
details why a Ron Paul presidency would be disastrous for Iranian Americans. AO’s tone 
is one of strong disapproval and condescension toward Iranian Americans’ lack of 
knowledge and involvement with U.S. politics, 
                                                
65 The full text of this blog post is available in Appendix 4. Posted September 3, 2012. 
This blog post and ensuing discussion on Iranian.com makes for a good case study to examine 




But none of the above facts, and Ron Paul’s scary vision for America 
seems to bother his Iranian supporters.  They have no issues with America 
being run by a racist and for their children losing their citizenship. Their 
[sic] only concern in the “old country” and the ability of mullahs to have 
access to the latest technology, free trade and lots of lots of petrodollars. 
And this, my friends, is the single most important reason why the Iranian 
American community will never advance. Iranian Americans are too 
attached to the old country. The umbilical cord has not yet been cut.  Their 
main focus should be the United States, but it’s not. It’s Iran.66  
 
Then AO chides Iranian Americans for their lack of loyalty to the U.S and goes on to 
blame Iranian people themselves for the 1979 “devolution” as AO calls it., 
Remember: your American passport is not only for ease of travel to Dubai 
of your way to Iran for your annual chelo-kabab67 feasts. You took a 
loyalty oath to this country that should not be dismissed as “alaki.”68  And 
you’re not “zerang”69 for becoming U.S. citizens. This country trusted 
you. Don’t betray that trust. Also, remember this: you don’t know more 
than an average American just because you had a “revolution” back in 
1979. Look at what that fiasco did to your homeland. If anything, your 
1979 devolution is proof positive that you know absolutely nothing about 
running a country. 
 
The blog article generated 149 total comments, which is on the higher end for the site in 
the preceding months (but nowhere near the record of 800 to over 1600 comments 
generated by a few discussion threads in 200970). Among the twenty-two users that 
posted comments, only a handful (six) agreed with AO’s main thesis while others called 
AO a traitor to Iranians and overly-insulting and accused of “generating propaganda.” A 
good portion of the comments devolved into arguments on specific points between 
posters that were divided along political fault lines—apologists for the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, also called “Islamists” by others, those that critique the American “empire” yet 
                                                
66 Posted by Anonymous Observer, September 3, 2012 on Iranian.com 
67 Skewered beef grilled over hot coals 
68 Fake 
69 Clever 
70 See http://www.iranian.com/main/most_discussed_2009 for statistics of most discussed 




adamantly against the IRI, others proudly refuse to engage with anything American. 
Frashogar, another Iranian.com user, posted a response to AO’s article accusing AO of 
engaging in hate speech. 
Ignore all you like. It doesn't change the fact that you and your friends on 
this website are engaging in clearly identifiable and legally definable hate-
speech [emphasis in original] against the entire Iranian community, where 
you and your friends here have even crossed lines into incitement and 
advocacy of murder countless times. Wrap yourself all you like under 
transparent criticisms and the flag of the American Empire. When it walks 
like a duck, quacks like a quack, by golly it is a duck. In any case, I 
understand you may know a fair bit about ducks too ;-) 
 
Hafez for Beginners, in near agreement with AO, also blamed the issue of lacking a “real  
voice” on the community’s inability to resolve differences, 
Anonymous Observer: I agree that the proportion of individual 
accomplishment doesn't match political representation. Look - I attended 
one NIAC71 event and went through hell for it, and chose to cease my 
membership. No community will survive like that and have a real voice, if 
they can't put up with differences.  
 
In referencing his attendance of a NIAC event that resulted in fighting and argumentation 
from the sound of his post, Hafez for Beginners showcases the controversy surrounding 
both NIAC and a general criticism about Iranian national organizations. Meanwhile, 
Ayatoilet172 presents a completely different alternative to AO’s vision of Iranians 
politically engaged with the American system, mostly because Americans hate Iranians 
                                                
71 NIAC refers to National Iranian American Council, a “nonpartisan nonprofit 
organization dedicated to advancing the interest of the Iranian-American community” and 
providing “knowledge and tools” to enable greater civic participation 
(http://www.niacouncil.org/site/PageServer?pagename=About_index, accessed 29 September 
2012). NIAC and its founder and president, Trita Parsi, has been the subject of recent controversy 
on Iranian.com. One user accused Parsi of “hijacking” the Iranian-American podium, “He has NO 
place talking for our community in the U.S.” 





and while the U.S. is the best place to remain until the political situation improves, there 
is no “American dream” for Iranians in the U.S. Ayatoilet1 denigrates those Iranians that 
attempt to Americanize their names and Iranian identity, 
I have been here for 26 years and I still harbor an Iranian Dream - NOT an 
American Dream.  
I do want to go back, and help Iran become a better place. My dream is to 
help Iran and Iranians advance. I dream of an Iran that can one day host 
the olympics [sic] or the world cup. An Iran that is associated with other 
nations in central asia [sic] and a major economic hub. An Iran I can be 
proud of. An Iran that is a full - worthy citizen of the world. I do not want 
to be embarrased [sic] to be Iranian or associated with Iran.  
As for America - there are big numbers of people here that hate us. There 
is no American dream for any Iranian here. They hate muslims [sic]. They 
hate anything to do with Iran. That is why all Iranians call themselves - 
Mo, Fred, Sam etc. and hide behind some baseball hat to look more 
American that Americans themselves.  
Why write an article about advancing in America - with NO Iranian 
basically wants to do that in the long-run. America is simply an escape for 
the oppression and theocracy in Iran (imposed by the West) on us. No one 
REALLY wants to be here, they just have to. There is no choice.  
The only advancement Iranians want is in the situation in Iran - so they 
can go back. Why be part of something that doesn't want you to be part of 
it (i.e. America). I really don't blame Americans - its just the propaganda, 
and I really think this is a great country and the best place to sit it out - 
until Iran gets better. Americans are better than Europeans, more decent, 
less xenophobic[sic] etc. But ultimately don't want Iranians here.  
We just have to be realistic and honest with ourselves and our 
communities. I for one - have an Iranian Dream, NOT an American One.  
 
For Ayatoilet1, in a slight nod to Martin Luther King’s famous speech, the 
“Iranian dream” is a more democratic Iran in which Ayatoilet1 can eventually return 
when the political situation is fixed. America is the “best place to sit it out” until Iran 
improves. Where Mohsen attributes the hesitation to participate in U.S. political life to 
fear of losing one’s sense of culture and belonging, for Ayatoilet1, it is sheer refusal. 
Ayatoilet1’s Iranian-ness is irreconcilable with also being American and accepted by 




look at the diverse spectrum of narratives about the possibilities of political integration 
and senses of belonging. Users of Iranian.com like Anonymous Observer and Hafez for 
Beginners see low political participation as evidence that Iranians in the U.S. are 
rejecting integration into U.S. society (or as AO’s accuses them being a “perpetual 
immigrant who psychologically lives out of a suitcase”) which further translates to a lack 
of voice in the political process. Others like Ayatoilet1 have issue with full integration 
into U.S. society even being a possibility. Among my informants, political participation 
in the American context is almost taken for granted, evidencing Ramin’s statement that 
he is not the “median of society.” 
Low Participation in Local Organizations 
In informants’ narratives, participating in the American political process is closely 
associated with being involved with other activities in civic culture and the arts,  
Tina   So what does being involved in a society politically mean to you? 
Ramin  It means that they they have an opinion, they discuss about politics, they  
listen to the political, they have political discourse. They have opinion and 
mostly they vote.  If they are citizen they vote. So, in this San Diego, some 
people say they are thirty-, twenty-five thousand Iranians, but in most of 
the cultural gatherings, I don’t see more than 3,000. So what happened to 
the other, the rest of the people? They are the people not interested to be 
involved in a cultural practices. And most likely, most likely they are not 
interested in politics either. But I have no research on that but this is just 
my thought. 
 
Citing numbers and estimates of total Iranian population in San Diego versus how many 
people attend events sponsored by Iranian diaspora organizations was something I heard 
referenced by at least two other informants. Similar to Ramin, Adnan attributes this 
difference to being “elite in a cultural way” and “valu[ing] culture,”  
Adnan  For instance, I don’t know how many people live in San Diego there are  




cultural activities, so that’s why I’m saying they are elite. See if there’s a 
nice good cultural activity a band or something Nowruz73 for instance 
which is kind of an exception because a lot of people participate, if there’s 
a play, like there was a play last weekend, very interesting play very 
modern and everything so people who go there are more cultural oriented 
and uh, so there 200 people showed up, okay so other activity that I see 
like cultural activity, concerts and stuff, I see 200, 300, 400 people 
showing up from 40,000 um so it’s a small group of them which is culture 
oriented which is not odd compared to other cultures… 
 
Lack of Community and Unity 
In this exchange, Mohsen first refers to Iranians not publicly acknowledging their 
Iranian identity as a sign of a lack of pride and unity. Then, similar to Adnan, he uses 
population numbers, but instead makes the point that not enough Iranians in San Diego 
participate in local Iranian organizations, and therefore this shows a lack of a common 
purpose and unity. 
Mohsen To be more united. Why, why not? We are here the same as the other  
nations. They have their community, we don't have anything  
Tina  So, what…  
Mohsen The main point was that  
Tina  Why do you think Iranians aren't united then? 
Mohsen You see any unity here?  
Tina  No, but why, what is the reason you think Iranians aren't united, don't  
become united?  
Mohsen These are, I say, if you see an Iranian here, usually they will not say to  
you, if you cross an Iranian here in the store, unless you, they talk to each  
other in Farsi and you find out they're Iranian. But if you face them they 
will not say that we are Iranians. You know what I mean? They don't want 
to say that we are Iranians. One of the things that reasons maybe, last night 
in speech the guy say, maybe because the Iranians are not too welcome 
here because of the problem between government and, two government. 
They don't want to, you know, have somewhere, especially shows that 
Iranians are gathering here. You know what I mean? Maybe that's the 
reason. 
Tina:  You think  
Mohsen It hasn't happened. But this guy, Dadkha started this AIAP74 18 years ago.  
18 years ago, after 18 years I think some, they are saying that something  
                                                
73 Iranian New Year celebration taking place the first of spring. 





around 60,000 Iranian people are living in San Diego. And all members 
are only 300. You know? 60,000 people in San Diego and only we have 
300 members. 
Tina  Mmhm. Well, I don't think, it's not so bad. I think if any, any group  
Mohsen It's bad. 
Tina  Any group would be like that, maybe, I don't know.  
Mohsen No, why? 60,000 people!  
 
For Mohsen, the low membership of Iranian organizations like AIAP is symbolic of a 
lack of community among the Iranian immigrant population in San Diego. He feels that 
Iranians need to be more united. And in public situations, he wonders why Iranians do 
not acknowledge each other’s presence.  
In the virtual community of Iranian.com, the discourse about lack of community 
surfaces whenever discussions between users begin to break down along religious and 
political fault lines. Phrases like “whoring for Israel and Bahá’í’s” and other similarly 
bigoted and intolerant ideologies can occur in the same post as accusations of being anti-
Iranian, and are obviously meant to incite division. Sometimes such users are 
reprimanded by other members in a more reasonable tone, as in Hafez for Beginners 
admonition here referenced earlier, 
No community will survive like that and have a real voice, if they can't put 
up with differences.  
Better luck to the next generation - I guess - and I do think those born in 
the US don't have the baggage and can learn to listen and put up with 
differences better.  
 
Or, by user Mohammad Ala, in a comment titled from November 12, 2011, “No social 
responsibility” responding to a series of increasingly insulting posts,   
Iranians come from different family backgrounds, they grow up in 
different parts of Iran, most of them pretend to be religious. Failure of our 
community demonstrates why we have not been successful (as a group). 
Many times I have observed ISP members resort to personal attacks to 




his/her title? I agree this is not limited to Iranians.  As I wrote before, we 
are good in three so-called Rs (math, reading, and writing) but fail big  
 
Taking Advantage 
Related to a lack of community is a discourse about Iranians that “take advantage 
of the system” meaning to take advantage of structures and systems in U.S. society, such 
as the social security system, Medicare, or the system of granting political asylum. In this 
passage, Fati talks about people who abuse the political asylum system,  
Fati  Because a lot of people who came at the time of [the] Islamic Republic,  
  unfortunately they abused the system. They came as somebody who  
  cannot live in Iran, but then after four years they go back and forth to Iran.  
  You are not political prisoners. I got political asylum in America for [the]  
  last 29 years, 30 years, 32 years. I’ve never been to Iran! Even though I  
know if I go I can go to Iran but I came here because my life was 
endangered in India, or going to Iran. So you are abusing that system, and 
unfortunately they did that in Europe because one of the things, for 
example, Netherlands was giving to the 7,000 refugees that was in there, 
and they were not getting permission to stay in Netherlands. It’s because 
they said that Iran Air is always full of people who are refugees and going 
to Iran! Which was true! Which was true . . . so they made it harder, but it 
was never hard to stay. Plus, it’s not only Iranians. There’s a lot of people 
from different countries, that they come. 
 
In the context of about those willing to “get involved” and those who do not, Afareen 
makes the following illuminating commentary to draw an analogy between wealthy 
bazaari75 Iranians in Iran who still support the regime in power to Iranians that vote 
Republican in the U.S. political party system, while drawing social security checks from 
the government. Afareen feels it is hypocritical, for example, for people to vote 
Republican (since she sees that Republicans are usually against entitlement programs) if 
they are at the same time using fraud to garner checks from social security, 
Afareen Oh yeah. They are ignorant. They are, see I think that in every society you  
can find those people. Those people that they just live. Just to have, you 
know, a decent life. And they don't really care who is in the power and 
what's going on around them. They are so busy with their own life they 
                                                




don't even notice what's going on. You can see this in Iran too. All those 
wealthy bazaar Iranians they don't see how life is hard for the normal, 
poor, Iranian family. Therefore they don't care. Still they are supporting 
the regime or so. There are people that really they don't care. Whether 
Bush is on the power or Obama is on the power as long [their] social 
security check is in the mail they are happy. Who cares? It is very very 
interesting when you talk to these Iranians, some of them that they get this 
benefit or so. They are supporting the Republicans and when you talk to 
them and say, "how you can, you are getting all these checks from where? 
From government that the democrats set all this for you." But they are 
Republican or they are against the -  
Tina  They’re against the help, or what other people call the welfare system. Or  
  you know social welfare? 
Afareen Or they don't mind at all. And then it bothers me really. There are people  
  that they come and they use all the benefit. And they are, on the other  
hand, they are Iranians that they came from first day they work like a dog 
here, they pay taxes or so, and they don't have health insurance like our 
friend. Poor woman. Three kids, came here, educated those kids or so. 
Still doesn't have health insurance. Because she works hard and she gets 
the money -  
Tina  So what's the difference between your friend and the people that, from  
  what you're saying, kind of take advantage of the system? 
Behnaz Different from what point of view? The difference is basically there are  
people who are willing to make a contribution to society. And there are 
people who are takers.  
Behnaz Take advantage -  
Afareen This country they think they owe them. They owe them. No.  
Tina  But where does that mentality come from, I guess is what I'm asking.  
Afareen From the Iranian mentality pretty much.  
Behnaz It comes from the lack of ethics in a way. Because ethical people would  
have some values. Some principles. To adhere to. And in this country, if 
you go on interview, average senior citizens they are having tough time 
surviving. Because social security money is hardly enought to pay for their 
medicine, their supplemental health. These people come, they have 
money, they have brought money. But they hide the money with their 
children. But their taking advantage of the government. That is not ethical. 
That is taking advantage of the country. And these were the people who 
were also responsible for the chaos in Iran. Because look, I don't care in 
which society you are. If you have the responsibility you feel like I am 
responsible to the society that has given me so much. That I'm not going to 
take advantage of this. I'm going to make a contribution. I'm going to 
work. I'm going to make a difference in society, no matter what it is. But a 
lot of people, and all the time you hear them doing this kind of things. And 
not only that, sometimes it is unfortunate to hear that there's some medical 
doctor who has overbilled Medicare. I mean these are not ethical people. 




Afareen See this kid came as a refugee, as a Bahá’í76. He could not study in Iran  
and go further. From the third week he had to work [hard] to pay off the 
ticket money that they gave him. I really admire him.  
Behnaz Yeah that's the way it should be. You know, because -  
Afareen They came as a refugee like everybody else. But he never took advantage,  
  take advantage of the system.  
Behnaz I think American people are good people. Really they are wonderful  
  people. Otherwise they would hate all the foreigners. Because of what  
  they do here. If you take average people that they have come to America,  
  not only they don't make a contribution, they are actually dow-ghort-u- 
  neem-esh-baghi77 
Afareen  Talabkar78 
Behnaz What you call talabkar. They are entitlement. Entitlement- 
minded.“Government should pay me! Ho-ghough-eh man bad bedam.79” 
Che ghough-i?80 You didn't work here two days! 
Tina  (laughing)   
Behnaz Che-ghough-i? Why because United [States] government owes you  
anything? See these are the things sometimes it gives a bad name like I, to 
Iranians. And I'm not saying that other people in this country they don't do 
the same but I don't care about other people. I care about my people. I care 
about people that I want to be associated with. I want to be able to say 
proudly, "I am Iranian".  
 
Their particular dialogue shows some interesting patterns. The notion of “not being 
involved” in politics is on a cognitive level related to larger ideas about ethics, what 
constitutes responsible behavior toward host society, perceptions about the links to 
homeland events, notions about giving back, concerns about reputation amongst 
Americans, and even political party ideology. If I were to diagram the themes highlighted 
and the flow of conversation above between Behnaz, Afareen, and I, it might look like 
this: 
                                                
76 Afareen is referencing a young man and family friend that was visiting their home that 
evening and had lived with them for a period of time after he migrated to the U.S. 
77 A phrase that roughly translates to a person that feels they are owed “two-and-half 
more bites”. 
78 A person that is owed something, or in the usage here, entitlement-minded 
79 “They have to give me my monthly pay!” Ho-ghough refers to monthly pay/salary 
received from the government or a company. 






Figure 5  Diagram of conversational flow and themes related to “taking advantage” and “not being involved” in 
Afareen’s and Behnaz’s interview 
 In another dialogue we have together, Afareen acknowledges that it is her Bahá’í 
faith as a belief system that drives her to participate in so many civic organizations and 
spend time volunteering, “In my faith service is the worship. Therefore if we can be help 
in any way to anybody or so, why not?” Behnaz, on the other hand, more directly 
connects it to the idea of giving back to society, “The way I look at my life particularly 
this country has given me so much and this is my way of putting a little bit back into the 
society. In any way I can. If I can make a contribution I can make a difference.”  
These concerns expressed by informants about a) political involvement, b) low 
levels of participation in Iranian diaspora organizations, c) overall lack of a sense of 
community and, d) taking advantage are raised in these narratives together in a discourse 
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informants’ narratives and online through virtual communities, as well as something I 
heard expressed to me as a participant in these organizations, such as when a board 
president agreeing with the writer Firoozeh Dumas’ admonishment to fellow Iranians that 
they needed to volunteer more in American society81. Moreover the discourse speaks to 
the formation of a distinct Iranian-American civic culture. It is distinct because it 
references the unique political history of Iran and Iranian categories of self-responsibility, 
personhood, and the components of communalism. Further these discourses are a product 
of individual life course and collective experience with regime change in Iran. In the next 
section, I move from what informants said about their own participation in politics and 
civic life to the actual activities they partake in. 
A Typology of Iranian Immigrant Political and Civic Activity 
In comparison to the prevalent discourses about under-participation, survey 
results actually differ. PAAIA cites a 2004 survey which indicated that sixty-eight 
percent (68%) of Iranians voted in national elections (PAAIA 2008). This is in contrast to 
55.7% of the total U.S. voting age population voting in the Presidential election and 
51.6% voting in the election for U.S. Representatives during the same time period (2004), 
with the highest percentages of voting in 2008 with 57.1% of the population casting a 
ballot in the Presidential election82. The 2008 PAAIA survey 83 specifically asked 
respondents about their participation in political and civic life, with the prompt “Have 
you ever done the following?”   
                                                
81 Memoirist Firoozeh Dumas was one of the presenters for Passing the Torch of Success 
in San Diego. 
82U.S Census Bureau. Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2012. “Elections.” 
Electronic document, http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0397.pdf, 
accessed October 15, 2012. 
83 For the 2008 PAAIA survey, n= 401. The respondents were randomly drawn from 







Figure 5 Iranian American Participation in Political and Civic Life from 2008 PAAIA Survey 
The results, presented in Figure 5, show remarkable levels of civic/political 
participation among Iranian immigrants in comparison to U.S. population overall84. This 
might be partially explained by higher levels of education and income among Iranian 
immigrants in general. A 2012 report commissioned by the Educational Testing Service 
found increasing stratification, what they called the “civic empowerment gap,” between 
those with higher income levels and education in the U.S. For instance the voting rate for 
high school dropouts is 38%, less than half the rate of those with advanced degrees, and 
                                                
84 It is difficult to find one comprehensive source that has the same comparable data for 
U.S. population. One non-profit, Americans for Campaign Reform, for example, cites that 4% of 
Americans made contributions of any amount in 2008. 
(http://www.acrreform.org/research/money-in-politics-who-gives/, accessed 2 October 2012). 
Compare this to 29% of Iranian Americans (for any time period). 
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more than 90% of individuals in households earning $100,000 or more vote, while only 
52% of individuals in the lowest income households vote (Coley 2012). In the PAAIA 
survey, the “Not Sure” category at 43% is questionable because it is a fairly high 
percentage. What their definition of an interest group might be is also unknown--we do 
not know whether interest groups encompass political causes or organizations, and 
further which entity do they reference (i.e. local municipality, state, U.S., or Iran). Most 
importantly, however, the 2008 PAAIA survey results do not corroborate the prevailing 
discourse among informants, or the sentiment expressed online. Comparing the 
assumption among informants and in online narratives to the 2008 PAAIA survey results, 
the issue becomes, therefore, a question of perception and expectation in the lived 
experiences and narratives of informants. What is to explain this difference? While these 
national surveys provide an overall framework for beginning to understand civic and 
political participation, they offer only one slice of data at a particular point in time in the 
respondent’s life, using narrower definitions of civic/political activity, with the reference 
point solely being the U.S. Under the impetus to follow and find the places where 
political discourse ensues as the overriding research question, I present here a typology of 
political action encountered during fieldwork among my Iranian migrant informants, and 
through virtual ethnography.  
Using a life course perspective, political and civic action does take on a diversity 
of forms in the lived experiences of my informants, and the “targets” and intentions vary 
in each. What patterns do we see across and between local (San Diego) and extra-local 
(U.S., Iran, transnational movements, etc.) goals? While the purpose of this section is to 




fieldwork, we need to keep in mind the simultaneity and overlapping nature of these 
activities. For instance, in the case of the Green Movement support rally, San Diego is the 
local sphere in which it takes place and its aims are primarily to make local residents take 
notice and support the cause, yet the larger goal is regime change in Iran. Figure 6 
diagrams some of these efforts as a series of nested spheres. 
 
Figure 6  Diagram “Mapping” Civic and Political Activities among Informants 
This diagram somewhat corresponds to Sheffer’s (2003: 173-174) formulation of how 
diaspora communities function on five levels in politics: the domestic level in host 
country, the regional level, the trans-state level, the level of the entire diaspora, and the 
level of homeland politics. However, as figure 6 shows, some efforts potentially reside in 
more than one sphere, such as Human Rights for Iran (HRI). HRI is both a campus group 
that aims to politicize and instruct fellow university students but also aligns itself to the 
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Green Movement Political Rallies85 
Generally, participating in a political rally or demonstration was isolated to the 
local solidarity demonstrations for the Green Movement86 that took place in the summer 
of 2009 in front of the Federal courthouse building in downtown San Diego or Balboa 
Park, which is a large public park and communal gathering space in central San Diego. 
Rallies were taking place on a weekly basis during the height of the turmoil. A new group 
was organized, called IranPeace, the led the organizing efforts. I attended one of its 
rallies, which took place in front of the federal courthouse building in downtown San 
Diego, February 20, 2011 in support of two university students murdered by the Iranian 
government.87. This particular protest was meant to correspond with worldwide protests 
around February 11-14, 2011 called “The Day of Rage”. February 11 coincides with the 
22nd day of the month of Bahman on the Iranian calendar, which in 2011 was the 32nd 
anniversary of the Iranian Revolution. 
 
Figure 7  Photo, Green Movement supporters in San Diego waving banners and flags, Feb 20, 2011 
                                                
85 Please also refer to Appendix 3: Case Study: Reactions to June 2009 and Feelings 
about Green Movement through Time. 
86 Initially, the Green Movement’s goals were an annulment of the June 2009 election. 
Broadly, the Green Movement was/is striving for reform in the regime, not necessarily a 
revolution to overthrow the regime. 





Figure 8  Photo, San Diego protestors holding up posters of murdered university students, Feb 20, 2011 
Attendees specifically invoked the political revolution overthrowing Egypt’s President 
Mubarak in their chants, “Cairo first, Tehran next!.” The local 22 Bahman protest rally 
highlights the transnational nature of the Green Movement political support by the 
Iranian diaspora. As Sia, the founder of Human Rights for Iran, told me “No protests 
there, No protests here.”88 This was a partial explanation for my enquiry to him about 
why the activity seemed to significantly die down after 2009. 
As far as I can track, this group dissolved or became inactive by 2012. A 
statement dated July 13, 2009 from their website lays out the composition and purpose of 
the group, 
We are a committee of Iranian-American volunteers who support 
democracy, freedom and human rights in Iran. Our diverse group includes 
student representatives, concerned citizens and other activists who have 
been working to support the human rights of Iranians. We have volunteered 
to help facilitate peaceful demonstrations in San Diego and are not 
connected to any political groups or organizations. 
 
The overall goals of IranPeace was 1) political transparency and participatory democracy 
in Iran, calling for a nullification of the election results; 2) freedom of speech and 
                                                




peaceful assembly in Iran, condemning the use of force against Iranian protesters; and 3) 
human rights in Iran. They also requested no flags be allowed at demonstrations because 
of the contested history and divisive nature of the Iranian flag89. 
The organizers can not [sic] favor any particular group over the others. If 
all groups bring their own flags, we increase the potential for tension and 
damage to the unity that we need at this time. We should set aside our 
differences and unite over what we have in common. Our main task is to 
echo the voices of those in Iran who are struggling for their basic human 
rights.  Therefore, we respectfully ask you to refrain from bringing any 
flags.90 
 
Yet this strategy did not work to foster unity among rally participants. As Fati, one of my 
informants recalled, protestors evidenced their internal divisions by standing on opposite 
street corners, 
This was all [of] the Iranian that gathered there. Iran Peace was organizing 
it.  And then, Iran Peace formed after that. This was in the first – second 
week when I came back.  And then, I knew some of the people who were 
pro-Mujahedin-e Khalq91, and I knew some people in the society who are 
really now, like satanat, pro-Shah’s regime. And they were standing in 
one corner, and some people were standing in [an]other corner, and the 
rest of the people [were] standing in one corner.  Like, a huge number of 
people in one corner. 
So, I knew something [was] wrong.  I told my co-worker, “No, I changed 
my mind, I’m going to go back to work.”  So I went back to work, and the 
next day I called and asked my friend, “What happened?  How come not 
everybody was together?  I noticed a couple of people I know from 
Mujahedin and a couple of Shah’s regime were on the other side of the 
street. 
 
As one of the organizers for IranPeace, Adnan, was surprised at the number of people 
who showed up for some of the rallies “…usually don’t see them anywhere, politically or 
otherwise…” and attracted people who had never been in a demonstration before. 
                                                
89 The current flag of the Islamic Republic adopted in 1980 represents in stylized script 
the word for “God” and replaces the flag that had been in place until that time which features a 
lion and a sun in the center. The Lion and Sun flag is used by Iranian communities abroad as a 
symbol of their opposition to the government. 
90Accessed 26 June 2012. “About Us” http://iranpeace2009.org/?page_id=2 




Further, these rallies were a point of inter-generational interaction, and at times inter-
generational conflict over differences in political opinion. 
Adnan   I mean we grew up with demonstrations, revolts and from Tehran  
University to all the way, I mean it was just natural for us. That’s why we 
had to explain, so that there were a lot of kids that were newer students 
and stuff, they were getting involved but they were “Oh, we gotta do this,” 
and I said, ok now, there are ways of doing this, and this is the way, so we 
tried to basically help them to get organized and that organization at 
University X* that kind of formed 
Tina  HRI?*92 
Adnan  Yeah, by few activist[s] and we were working together with them and of  
course, it wasn’t easy because you know the group there think that they 
were not monolithic and there were expectation and their thought about, 
outlook and everything was different 
Tina  Than yours? 
Adnan  Everyone that it was that peace group, they had different expectation  
different attitude, some of them were saying we should not support 
Mousavi what so ever, and these are just bunch of criminals like the other 
ones and there were people who were just fanatic about Mousavi and who 
really believe in Mousavi and that he is the guy and he is the messiah, you 
know, so that was the spectrum. 
 
The political spectrum participating in the rallies included the “far left and the far 
right”. While the San Diego Green Movement support rallies and demonstrations taking 
place in the summer of 2009 had the intention of solidarity and unification among the 
Iranian diaspora community, it had the reverse effect of becoming a moment of tension 
and conflict. As Mitra, an early informant reported from her participation in these 2009 
rallies, “That’s why I am so disappointed not everyone is one the same side. The ultimate 
goal is the same but the route is so different. When the things were really heated, and see 
a demonstration. One on side is monarchists, nationalists, religious elements, nationalists. 
Even among small groups a divide. It’s rather discouraging.” 
                                                





An “activist organization” here is one that primarily defines itself as supporting 
some kind of political or social recognition and change. An example is the northern-
California based group United4Iran (www.United4Iran.org) I know about this 
organization only through their website and learned of it after someone posted about an 
upcoming event on HRI’s Facebook feed, which works to raise awareness of human 
rights abuses in Iran and mobilize pressure on the Iranian government to uphold the 
principles in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
With respect to other activist organizations, Fati among the first generation, 
actively works for the promotion of Iranian women’s rights and equality through the 
Iranian Women’s Studies Foundation (IWSF) which she has been involved with for 
years. Among the second generation, Niki is involved with student voter rights and 
registration. Seeing the power of the vote denied after the June 2009 election in Iran 
motivates her participation with SOVAC. The idea of “being visible” to politicians to 
hold them accountable is something she does want to take for granted in the U.S., 
because of her experience with the political situation in Iran, 
Niki  Well, it, for SOVAC, the idea of voter, like the power of a vote really  
resonates with me because of my background with Iran and being in Iran 
during the elections and seeing the issues that come with fraudulent votes. 
And, it kind of opened my eyes to how valuable a person's vote is. And, I 
think that gets really overlooked here in this country because it's always 
been there. And, it's something that we've taken for granted which is 
completely expected because were born into it. And, when the executive 
director of SOVAC approached me and told me about this philosophy, 
that's just what really resonated with me. And, I wanted to be involved in 
some kind of group that re-introduces the value of a vote to the student. 
And, and just the idea of being visible to politicians and reminding 
politicians who they are supposed to be representing, is also something 
that really resonates with me because of my background in global politics 





 Also second generation Iranians are the members of Human Rights for Iran93* 
(HRI) a student group at a state public university, considers itself an activist organization. 
HRI plans events with other activist organizations on campus. Though HRI specifically 
advocates for the promotion for civil rights in Iran, it sometimes joins with other groups 
that support various other causes. However, HRI sees itself in solidarity with these 
groups. Their most visible activism takes the form of planned events for the university 
publics which are intended to educate and motivate. 
An event titled “Hijabs and Hoodies, Part I, Candlelight Vigil” took place April 4, 
2012 and was co-organized by members of HRI. The organizers linked several recent 
hate crime murders together, including the killing of Trayvon Martin, a young 17 year old 
African American male who was shot while walking down the street in a gated 
community in Florida. Organizers conceptually linked the shooting of Martin to the death 
of Shaima Alawadi, a 32-year old Muslim mother of five found killed in her living room 
in El Cajon, California (a suburb community of San Diego) with a note next to her saying 
“Go back to your country terrorist.,” as well as another young unarmed African American 
male Kendrec Lavelle McDade, aged 19, shot and killed in Pasadena. The student 
organizers wanted to draw attention to these deaths and put public pressure to classify 
them as hate crimes. Organizers wrote in the Facebook description of the event, 
These are three occurrences, of thousands that occur throughout our 
country and across time, based on race and hatred. We acknowledge that 
these are hate crimes, and would like for you to join us in this vigil to 
honor these three innocent victims, who lost their lives. 
 
Another event titled “Break the Chains: The Plight of Political Prisoners” took 
place May 8, 2012. HRI members joined together with other activist oriented groups on 
                                                
93 Data for this comes from participant observation and their Facebook group page, of 




campus such Students for Justice in Palestine, Books for Prisoners and the Student 
Sustainability Collective. The president of HRI at the time provided the event details on 
Facebook and urged members to print out an 8x11 photo copy of a current political 
prisoner in Iran to take to the event, and “stand in solidarity with our fellow students, 
professors, lawyers, engineers and people of Iran unjustly imprisoned.” Clearly part of 
the mission of these campus events is to inform and educate other students, since the 
event description reads, “What is a political prisoner? A political prisoner is a [sic] 
individual who is detained on the basis that they have opposed or criticized the ruling 
government.”  
Overall, it is difficult to gauge the relative importance of participation in activist 
organizations as compared to other forms. Most informants did not report alliances or 
actively supporting such other movements stateside. As an exception, Behnaz and 
Afareen consider their deep involvement with the Bahá’í religion and bringing public and 
widespread recognition to the plight of Bahá’ís in Iran, as activism on behalf of their 
faith. 
Iranian Voluntary Organizations (EGBO) Participation  
 
One of the issues that came up in my conversations with informants during the 
course of collecting life histories was a discomfort with applying the term “activist” to 
themselves. In some cases, the discomfort was mine, not wanting to presume too much 
about how they viewed their activities. In other cases, the discomfort was theirs—maybe 
implying a kind of strident, militant activism that did not match the reality of their 
practices. While they advocated for change in Iran, to be seriously involved in such 




activist to my study without giving too much thought to its implications. My internal 
working definition was “a person who was active in a political to civic organization or in 
a political or civic capacity.” It helped that the people who participated were often leaders 
in such organizations. In reality I posit Iranian organizations (what I have been calling 
ethnic grassroots based organization or EGBO) at the nexus of transnational political 
action and civic engagement. In informants’ narratives, the importance of EGBOs is 
taken for granted as their selection to my sample was entirely dependent on their 
participation in such organizations. It does pop up at certain times, when Ramin for 
example sees a direct link between his participation in EGBOs, “valuing culture” and 
political participation, referred to in a previous section. Mohsen provides another 
example, of why he sees local Iranian organizations as important to information flow 
similar to the way his Facebook activism provides for the flow of information. His 
overall sentiment can be expressed as “They have their own community, we don’t have 
anything” when he compares Iranians to other ethnic groups in the area,  
Mohsen The thing is, why, I was interested, because …one of the Iranian  
communities here, organizations that are gathering Iranian people giving 
information to them. The main point is the gathering and next point for me 
is the information here. Because here the information flows, anybody can 
find it. But, gathering of them, know each other more, have a monthly 
meeting, they have monthly meeting, they come over introduce to each 
other. I think that it's good for the community, find community here in the 
United States to have each other. It’s not in Iranian. If you go to other 
nations you can see for yourself, but if you go to this. Vietnamese come 
here they can easily find the job in this nail shops which are all the same 
people. 
 
It seems what Mohsen is trying to say is that other immigrant populations have an easier 
time finding compatriots. He feels this is not the case for Iranians. Therefore, finding 




For Ramin, EGBO provided an opportunity for migrants to expand their social network 
and participate in something bigger than them, 
Ramin  The democratic… yes and also they gave people identity at the time that  
they lost their identity. And we came from the country we lost our 
identity, we left everything back home...and at that time we didn’t have 
any Iranian store, we didn’t have any Iranian restaurant, we didn’t know 
where to go. The weekends we were just sitting home or you know 
inviting our close family, but then we decided to have Friday nights night 
of poetry,  twenty six seven years ago we started a night of poetry...  we 
started with five people and we ended up with 800 people... 
Tina   So the purpose of them giving them an hour was what?  Can you talk  
  about that some more? 
Ramin  They were a part of the immigrants so you should you should you should  
realize that the first wave of immigrants from Iran they were all 
elites....the you know high professions, psychologists doctors surgeons, 
engineers.  They were the first wave of immigrants, okay...so when we 
came here, it was easy to find one of those psychologists that who 
immigrated here also to tell us how to cope....With this new 
life.  Okay.  So that was the maim core of those nights of poetry.  And we 
had we had all these that they come out they come and play for free.  We 
had poets that they came out read their poetry.  We had writers we had you 
know thinkers....you know all sort of people, they had a chance to express 
themselves, and on the other side, people had a place to fill up their Friday 
night.  So they assimilated with each other, they found identity.   
 
Similarly, Fabos (2002) found that Sudanese NGOs in Cairo have been important for a 
cross-section of Sudanese in Cairo to recover some of their class and professional status 
lost through the migration process. 
My research shows that ethnic grassroots-based organization (EGBO), though 
they work to serve local members’ needs, help acculturate members to U.S. society, plan 
cultural festivals, etc. do in fact coalesce interests and members to work at multiple levels 
(local, national, transnational). EGBO are civic organizations that provide a foundation to 
work in the political realm. Additionally, Iranian organizations in San Diego provide 
perhaps one the few forums where Iranians from different religious backgrounds, classes, 




and communitarian political hinge, meaning that EGBO are the place where group level 
and individual level political action merge and emanate, as Figure 9 illustrates. Members 
may join EGBO initially to serve personal needs, but from this they begin to engage with 
other kinds of political/civic practice. 
 
 
Figure 9  Diagram, Voluntary organizations as the “crux” between personal and community-level political/civic 
action 
I found that diaspora community organizations and individuals are keyed in 
together in a mutual re-enforcing politicization. Andersen (2008) asserts that community 
organizations often serve as the primary vehicle for political incorporation, a role which 
was once played by the major political parties. Organizations not only provide an 
opportunity for engaging with civic culture, and politics, but I found that these EBGOs 
provided a way to Iranian immigrants to “practice and learn” civic culture and 
democracy, “tolerate each other,” and “growing up” through these organizations-- a 
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immigrant civil society in the past 25 years or so since the establishment of local EGBOs 
has given space to consider what a new and more democratic Iran might be like. 
 
Facebook Activism 
The term “Facebook Activism” has made its way into the Urban Dictionary, albeit 
in a sarcastic manner, “The illusion of dedication to a cause through no-commitment 
awareness groups.”94 There is an increasing sense that Facebook activism is a poor 
barometer of actual commitment to causes. Yet there is also a proliferation of how-to 
guides and manuals for organizers to take advantage of Facebook’s widespread use 
around the global, no cost for organizing, and facile ways to make use of multi-media 
tools. The manual, A DigiActive Introduction to Facebook Activism (Schultz 2008), is an 
example of such an effort. The author of the guide views Facebook as a great way to 
increase awareness and mobilize people. However, Mary Joyce, co-founder of 
DigiActive.org, commented on the low bar of entry for Facebook groups and activism in 
a 2009 article, "Maybe a maximum of 5 percent are going to take action, and maybe it's 
closer to 1 percent… In most cases of Facebook groups, members do nothing. I haven't 
yet seen a case where the Facebook group has led to a sustained movement."95  
There was indeed an explosion of Facebook groups during the height of the 2009 
Iranian election crisis and protests, including some devoted to a young woman protester 
                                                
94 The Urban Dictionary is a popular web-based dictionary of slang words and phrases. 
“Facebook Activism” Electronic document, 
http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=Facebook%20Activism, accessed 2 October 
2012 
95 Hesse, Monica. “Facebook Activism: Lots of Clicks, but Little Sticks” Washington 
Post, July 2, 2009. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp dyn/content /article/2009/07/01 
AR2009070103936.html, accessed 2 October 2012. 
This presents an interesting point for future research—how the digital activism first used 
during Iran’s Green Movement influenced or is related to digital activism during the so-called 




named Neda Agha Soltani, killed by gunfire during one of the Tehran protests. The image 
of Neda’s face lying in the streets quickly became an icon of the Green Movements 
protests and circulated around the world. Whereas the great majority of Facebook 
activism involves little effort on the part of the user or does not translate to sustained 
movement, this is not always the case.  
For Mohsen, his Facebook activism comes not from clicking “like” on particular 
groups, but through news and information-related posts. These posts on his Facebook 
wall are real-time connection to events happening in Iran, and he sees the impact of his 
posts when friends and relatives in Iran thank him for disseminating news and 
information that they might otherwise not be aware of. He does concede that these efforts 
may be small, but sees it as contributing overall to regime change in Iran, 
Mohsen I can say that. I can say that because I was worried. I always loved to  
something happened in Iran that change the regime. But I was never doing 
anything about it. And still I'm not doing anything. But the only thing I 
can do is post these things in on Facebook. You know, those days on 
Facebook some people were changing their names to I don't know, 
Mohsen Irani, Mohsen Tehrani, they don't give their pictures, don't give 
their information. Mine I didn't change it. From the first day still is the 
same thing. My name and family. And I'm posting. The only thing I am 
doing is the posting the news I'm receiving. Posting there to, for the people 
who are interested in it. And, just wish that it helps and it brings another 
person to the, to this , to think it, to think and to act. I am not there. If I 
was there maybe I was more active. But here whatever I can do is that. 
And yes I get more active in political issues when I, when this happens in 
Iran. Give me some hope that something can happen in Iran, regime can 
change in Iran. It's not a dream. It can be done. Maybe takes time, but can 
be done.   
 
Besides creating, joining, or liking a group that supports a specific cause, and 
posting news/information for the benefit of others without access to such sources, I 
observed other types of online activism especially as part of HRI’s Facebook group page. 




significantly more activity in the form of posts and comments, and I did not notice that 
the closed HRI group wall had significantly different content that might be labeled as 
secret. My sense was the closed group was deemed “secret” primarily to restrict and 
control membership96, and not necessarily for content. It is important to distinguish that 
HRI is a group that exists beyond its Facebook group incarnation. HRI is in actuality, as 
described elsewhere, a student-led university-based organization that uses Facebook to 
communicate with members, disseminate information, and coordinate events and 
meetings.  
HRI’s group page extends the reach and effort of their organization. For example, 
what is posted on Facebook and discussed is actually broader than what transpires at 
meetings, such as the following effort posted on their public Facebook wall May 2, 2012, 
by the president of the organization.  
Hot off the presses! A wonderful campaign for all Iranians, Iranian 
Americans, and Americans to join hands against the possible war Iran. 
Everyone "Like" the page 
https://www.facebook.com/4MinutesToPreventWarWithIran and take a 
few seconds to write a letter expressing your feelings to Michelle Obama. 
Together we will be heard. 
 
The president also announced that individual letters were going to be written during the 
next meeting and urged members to share the effort on Facebook, and reminded members 
that “the cause is bigger than any one of us but together we will be the legs that life the 
slumbering giant.” This particular initiative was first introduced online through the 
group’s Facebook page, and seemingly completed at a meeting. The most frequent kind 
of posts comes in the form of links to headlines and news stories from major journalistic 
                                                
96 The closed or “secret” group has 42 members on Facebook, while the public group has 
more than double that at 114 members. The closed HRI group has been increasingly inactive. 
There were no news posts between May 30 and September 22, 2012, for example. The public 




outlets, trending topics like Iran banning university women from certain courses, the 
effects of U.S. sanctions, and the jailed U.S. hikers. Over the one year I tabulated posts, 
the news stories of interest include posts related to the anti-war on Iran movement (7 
posts), the detrimental effect of U.S. sanctions on the citizens of Iran (4 posts), the 
political situation in Syria (2), for example. 
One of the more important functions of Facebook for HRI is to publicize their 
special events (movie screenings, rallies, lectures, etc). Among the political rallies posted 
on Facebook include an University of California-system wide rally for Syria, a 
candlelight vigil for victims of hate crimes, and a Los Angeles event sponsored by 
Democracy in Action which called for “No war on Iran” and against foreign intervention 
in Iran, and a lesser commented event post related to another event in Los Angeles about 
the oppression of the Bahá’í Faith. 
Posting links to online petitions for certain causes, such as the anti-war with Iran 
effort, was yet another use of HRI’s Facebook wall. Online petitions “compete” in an 
environment on HRI’s Facebook page already crowded with news information and calls 
for action, such as YouTube videos, political rallies, documentary movie screenings, etc. 
Additionally, Niki, among my informants specifically counted signing and forwarding 
online petitions among her political activities.  
Facebook as a social networking site is one arena where political activity takes 
place—on the individual level through Mohsen who sees Facebook as a useful tool to 
advance regime change in Iran, and on the group level through HRI. While Facebook is a 
useful medium to disseminate information and bring together like-minded people to 




consideration by users and members, it was not utilized for any engaged discussion of 
political topics that I observed. In other words, Facebook was used as a tool of civic 
engagement but not as a locale for political discourse. Political discourse in an online 
format actually takes place in other forums, like Iranian.com.  
Even though I did not see any evidence of online petitions or calls for rallies and 
protests being shared on Iranian.com, the other venue where I conducted virtual 
ethnography, Iranian.com (IC) was an incredibly rich source for engaged, lengthy, and 
oftentimes heated political discussion. This in fact speaks to the diversity of ways that the 
internet can not only create “community”, but the multiplicity of ways that people can 
engage in politics online through virtual communities. Part of the explanation in their 
different uses lies in the different formats of Facebook as a social networking site and 
Iranian.com as a self-described community website for the diaspora and the “rules of 
engagement” for each. 
 Diaspora Websites as Sites for Political Discourse 
Throughout this study, I have referred to content from Iranian.com. The purpose 
of this section is to elaborate on the characteristics of the discourse encountered on 
Iranian.com and posit it as a “diaspora website.” According to Michel Laguerre a digital 
diaspora is “An immigrant group or descendant of an immigrant populations that uses IT 
connectivity to participate in virtual networks of contacts for a variety of political, 
economic, social, religious, and communicational purposes that, for the most part, may 
concern either the homeland, the host land, or both, including its own trajectory abroad,” 
(2010:50).  
To determine how closely the activity on Iranian.com is linked to Iranian news, I 




not available before July 2007. As might be predicted, the summer of 2009 during the 
height of the post-election drama in Iran shows the highest number of posts. July (1859), 
June (1724), and August (1580) of 2009 constitute the three highest monthly totals for 
posts in the five-year period where archives are available, in that order. This is followed 
by December 2009 and September 2009. Excluding 2007, when the site was first going 
interactive (thus the number of posts are artificially low), June, July, August and 
December (in that order) have the highest monthly averages from 2008-2010, as the 
graph below shows. 
 
 
Figure 10  Graph, Iranian.com Post by Year and Month 
 
For this chart, I tabulated most number of posts since that is what the site itself uses.  
Whereas my informants in San Diego assured me that differences in political 
ideologies were never a big issue in social situations, meyhmooni, or during meetings, 
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convince others of the rightness of their view. The general finding is that online political 
discourse is much more strident and divisive than is heard and experienced in face-to-
face life. IC is certainly a community, with dissent and disagreement at its core. After a 
bit of time you get to know the personalities involved. It is instructive to hear some news 
about Iran in mainstream media, and then to go check on Iranian.com to gauge how the 
news is being received and analyzed by the Iranian diaspora community. Online political 
discourse here, besides a propensity to being insulting or even bigoted at times, consists 
of ardent declarations of specific political programs and ideologies that turn into 
animated debates in many instances. This commentary by user Esfand Aashena posted 
September 14, 2012 is an example. Esfand Aashena takes issues with others insulting 
Islam, at the same time pointing out the ineffectiveness of their insults in regime change, 
Agents of Outrage. So I turn to those who insult Islam routinely on this 
website and refer to Muslims (directly or indirectly) as savages and 
Muhammad as a pedophile and so on, dirt on your heads!  NONE of your 
insults on this website has ever been able to incite anything in Iran!  ALL 
of the protests in Iran have been because of insults of non-Iranians! 
 
Or, this comment by user Darius Kadiver on September 4, 2012, who clearly articulates 
his pro-monarchy stance, 
I'm a Monarchist Period not a Celebrity Seeking "FB Pahlavist" Fashion 
Victim ... And have been So From DAY ONE !  
 
I didn't wait to join the Pahlavist bandwagon (if any ?) 3 Decades later to 
express my Pro Monarchist views, because I believe in them, and did so 
even before contributing to this website some 12 years ago ...  
So no need to be grandstanding when lecturing me on an era you clearly 
never lived under.  
Dunno how old you are or from which planet you are speaking from ( I'm 
sure Armstrong could tell ... Sorry I can't ... ) but clearly you like your like 
minds are talking on a period you either were too young to remember or 
are one of those Post Revolution generation Schizos who was brainwashed 
into believing any crap fed to them by your own intellectually bankrupt ex 




Then I guess probably following the Post Election Crackdown, you 
suddenly realized that your Joon Jooy Republic was not such a "Behesht" 
your former "Presidenteh Mahboub" Khatami claimed it to be but rather 
the unreformable shit hole it always was from Day On [sic]. 
 
Other times, I witnessed users hurling accusations at others about being “agents of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran.” There also exists more diversity in political and religious 
ideology, and even ethnic diversity as described in Chapter 4, on IC than encountered in 
among the Iranian population in San Diego. It is difficult however, to gauge if all the 
ideas presented on IC have equal weight and measure among the Iranian diaspora at 
large. Because users can hide behind almost total anonymity if they choose to, without 
even any knowledge about where they are posting from, and because this political 
discourse is isolated from other phenomenon related to life course and identity, it is 
difficult to get a sense of how political talk on IC relates to other types of political 
practice on the part of users. In other words, do the most active users of IC engage in 
other types of political or civic acts? Another real possibility is that there is not 
necessarily a 1:1 correlation between user i.d.’s and actual users. One accusation that is 
bandied about are users that have multiple i.d.’s and thus post similar inflammatory 
content under different user names, thus seemingly driving up the popularity of their 
views. Perhaps it is instructive that no informants reported participating in this forum. 
Political discourse on IC, however, does show a diversity of opinion and serves to give 
foreground and context to political talk and participation among informants. 
Electoral Behavior 
Transitioning again back to personal politics, this sub-section briefly looks at 
electoral behavior. According to the 2008 PAAIA survey results, four of every five 




Americans surveyed identified themselves as registered Democrats, in contrast to one in 
eight as Republicans and one in four as independents. The political science literature has 
tended to view electoral behavior as a robust indicator of political participation. All of the 
informants in my study reported voting in local, state, and national elections. 
Interestingly, Maliheh, one of the 1.5 generation informants, reported trying to vote in the 
2009 Iranian Presidential election in a hotel in San Francisco, which was one of the 
polling centers set up for diaspora members. Unfortunately she was turned away at the 
polls because Iran had recently changed the voting age from 16 to 18, and in 2009 she 
was not yet old enough. The other people she was with were eventually also turned away 
because the polling center had run out of ballots. Maliheh holds dual citizenship like a 
couple of other informants, and was the only one that recounted she had attempted to 
practice her electoral rights vis-à-vis the Iranian state. Iran does allow absentee voting for 
anyone who holds an Iranian passport. 
Finding a Model That Fits for Iranian Migrant Politics 
On the whole, immigrants’ political agency has received little academic interest. 
In recent years, work by Ostergaard-Nielsen (2003), Reed-Danahay and Brettell (2008), 
and Ramakrishnan and Bloemraad (2008) signifies a growing interest in the topic. Patrick 
Ireland’s (1994) work was a break-through by merging migration studies with the 
concept of political opportunity structures (POS) developed in political science. POS 
looks to the institutional set up of migrants’ receiving context to consider the strategic 
importance of opportunities to mobilize (Pero and Solomos 2003). Ostergaard-Nielsen 
(2003) offers a further refinement of the POS approach because she takes into 




origin such as conflicts, regime change and nation-building, environmental disasters, etc.) 
that may mobilize both recently departed migrants and established diasporas and the 
effect of receiving contexts to look at immigrants’ transnational political practice. Below 
is the basic typology set out by Ostergaard-Nielsen (2003): 
 
Figure 11  Table, Categories of Migrant Political Participation, cf Ostergaard-Nielsen (2003) and Levitt & 
Jaworsky (2007) 
It is important to note that the last two categories, diaspora politics and translocal politics 
are actually viewed as subsets of homeland politics by Ostergaard-Nielsen (2003), though 
I assert that they deserve their own category, as will be shown below. 
This particular model is valuable for first, distinguishing between different types 
of immigrant political action, and taking into account transnational behaviors and actions. 
Secondly, in defining and providing examples of each of these. It helpfully 
conglomerates all the other associated and related scholarship on political-economic 
phenomena such as hometown associations and the development of hometown 
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communities, for example. Finally, through the category of diaspora politics this model is 
sensitive to cases of transnational immigrant politics when groups are prevented and/or 
prohibited from direct participation in the political system of their homeland, as is the 
case with segments of the Iranian immigrant population. 
While Ostergaard-Nielsen does recognize overlapping and blending between 
these categories and the fact that these activities tend to be multi-scalar in nature, the 
model does not distinguish between individual level and group level political practices. In 
this section I have described political and civic activities in which individuals engage in. 
Next, I discuss group-level political/civic practice through local organizations. 
The Landscape of Voluntary Associations in San Diego: Increasing 
Politics 
Earlier in this chapter I covered the role of voluntary-based ethnic organizations 
in the life of Iranian migrants as expressed by informants, and proposed a schema that 
places these voluntary associations as brokering between the social and political, and 
between the individual/personal and community-level political practice. This 
methodological view which places associations and organizations as central components 
in understanding migrant political practice has been used by Ostergarrd-Nielsen 
(2003:780), and she sees organizations as relevant to migrants negotiating multi-level 
political institutional environments. In this section, I delve deeper into these 
organizations as entities unto to themselves. 
Informants were members of one or both of the two Iranian grassroots based 
voluntary associations in San Diego that I focused on as part of this research. There is no 
exclusivity in either group and both groups share much of the same membership. Indeed, 




ones in San Diego.97AIAP is the Association of Iranian American Professionals and has 
been in existence since the early 1980s. On their website they explicitly state they are a 
non-religious and non-political organization. According to the “About Us” page of their 
website, the object of AIAP is to be a “positive element in the professional, social and 
economical [sic] well being of its members and the community.” They convene monthly 
meetings and invite guest speakers that are “successful professionals within or outside the 
Iranian-American community.” Individual memberships cost $40 per year. Membership 
is open to all professionals interested in the Persian/Iranian culture. In addition they 
coordinate the cultural festivals for Nowrooz, Sizdeh Bidar, Chaharshanbeh Soori98, etc 
as well as hold other networking events for their members. 
The Persian Cultural Center (PCC) is an umbrella organization for music and 
dance ensembles, a language school, and a monthly bilingual Farsi-English arts and 
culture magazine. The language school, also called the Iranian School of San Diego 
(ISSD), convenes twice weekly to offer Farsi language instruction to K-12 children and a 
handful of adults. Approximately 200 families participate in ISSD. ISSD borrows space 
from a local high school to hold their classes. They maintain a small office in another part 
of the city, and have one full time paid staff person. PCC and AIAP work closely together 
on many initiatives, the most recent example is a capital campaign to raise funds for 
PCC/ISSD to purchase a piece of land to build their own school. 
                                                
97 The House of Iran (HOI) and Mehregan Foundation were the two other local groups. 
HOI is completely volunteer-driven and focused on traditional Persian culture and heritage. It 
maintains a “house” in Balboa Park, in a “village” composed of other houses coordinated by other 
ethnic immigrant groups in San Diego. Mehregan seems to be inactive. 




Though I have been focusing on AIAP and PCC for only a relatively short period 
of time99, I begun to understand through informants and my participation in these 
organizations that AIAP and PCC themselves have changed through time, and 
experienced their own “life course.” Diasporas and immigrant groups are dynamic, and 
this dynamism is expressed through their organizations. Sheffer (2003) puts forth a 
developmental model of diasporas100, using the development and maintenance of 
specifically diaspora organizations as the litmus test to assess levels of integration, 
maturity, and/or ethnic maintenance. Sheffer’s continuum model of diaspora called 
“phased dynamic processes” helps in understanding how and why a diaspora community 
might change through time, based on experiences and circumstances both with homeland 
and host country. The first phase is immigrants permanently settling in host country. The 
second phase is joining forces with co-ethnics to create support groups and associations. I 
heard the history of PCC and AIAP through informants’ narratives—their early 
beginnings meeting in people’s home as “salons”, their foundings and formalization by 
other elite immigrants, and their support role to “psychologically” acculturate its 
members. Most recently, a cadre of younger members in their twenties and early thirties 
has become active in AIAP and has been vying for board positions. Mohsen explained 
that he decided not to re-new his board position in order to make way for the younger 
generation, feeling that AIAP needs new blood. 
Further, though there is not a time scale provided in the model. The Iranians in the 
U.S. may represent an accelerated case, partly because of the violent disjuncture of the 
Iranian Revolution, concentrated wave of migration after this, and the receiving context 
                                                
99 Initially, I participated as an ISSD student during the 2010-2011 academic year. 




of Los Angeles and Southern California with its mass proliferation of Farsi language 
popular media (newspapers, television shows, news programs) during the 1980s—all of 
which helped establish an “exile culture” (Naficy 1993). 
The next phase is really of interest here, and it is when immigrants formulate their 
goals and become better acquainted with their new social, political, and economic 
environments, and become aware of the advantages for further organization. They also 
begin to ask questions pertaining to identity, loyalty, etc. In this third phase, according to 
Sheffer, committed members will gradually work out their main strategies vis-a-vis their 
homelands and host countries. They will also adjust their goals to account for the 
circumstances prevailing in homelands and host countries, agree on operational 
procedures, determine the structure of their organizations, build those organizations, and 
establish patterns of their relationships with all relevant actors. This is the phase in which 
incipient diasporas “mature”. During this phase diaspora may become dormant, may 
integrate into host societies, show less interest in homelands, experience hybridizations, 
reduce activity of organizations, and so forth. Active membership of diasporas fluctuates. 
When circumstances change, a commitment to diaspora can be renewed (Sheffer 
2003:142). My findings show that the Iranian immigrant population in San Diego, and 
their organizations like AIAP and PCC, exhibit characteristics of this third phase of 
maturation. In this case, integration, interest in homeland and hybridizations are all 





In Sheffer’s model, dynamism is reflected in levels of membership in and 
commitment to diaspora organizations101 among the diaspora. However, I found that it 
was the diaspora organizations themselves that changed and were dynamic. Local 
EGBOs throughout recent years have experienced increasing politicization. This is seen 
in the kinds of lectures presented at AIAP meetings, and in the articles for Peyk. AIAP 
and PCC in their mission statements specifically take a non-partisan, non-political stance, 
and have historically been “sensitive about ideology.” Yet, in recent years, that does not 
mean the speakers are not political nor discuss political ideology. In this passage, Ramin 
acknowledges the changes in the organizations towards more political topics with the 
view that it represents a natural development in AIAP since its members have “grown 
up” in civil society,  
 
Ramin  Okay, and then they felt kind of proud of themselves or comfortable with  
themselves living here.  And the from that point they started to open up 
and now I have American friends and their kids are raised here so they are 
in contact with the society at large but at that time in twenty seven years 
ago, that was their need.  And I think those cultural organizations at that 
time, they filled this need and at that time they had to get the religion and 
political away.  But as I said, if now they write a new by law and they said 
we’re going to be politically active, I don't think that is going to be that 
much problem anymore.  Not religiously but politically. 
Tina  Do you see that happening? 
Ramin  I think without saying it’s happening...Yes, most of the speakers who  
come to AIAP they have political ideologies.  But you know some of them 
are very contradicting each other.  But people seem to sit and listen. And 
nobody screams or say anything at the end of the session people go by 
the  microphone and ask their question which is the best forum that you 
can have. 
Tina   So what are the different ideologies that have been presented recently in  
  the AIAP? 
Ramin   They have they have they have people that they are in favor of Sufism.102 
Tina    As a political ideology? 
Ramin   No, as a living ideology 
                                                
101 Sheffer (2003) does not consider internet politicization. 




Tina    Yeah, Okay 
Ramin  We haven’t had the people with the very sharp political ideology that they  
come to talk about that, but the subjects that they discuss, and the in 
between all the subjects you can see that this this person is coming 
from....uh, a certain ideology, without talking about the Shah but the way 
that that he proceeds with his speech you can tell that person is...uh, pro 
Shah or this person is pro Khomeini or this person is anti Khomeini.  Or 
this person is anti Shah103 without them saying it 
Tina  Oh really? 
Ramin   Yeah, without them saying it, they can’t say it but the way that they  
talk.....  Can tell you that they are coming from a certain ideology but the 
people sit there and listen however they don’t agree with him but at the 
end, they stand up and they ask their question.  So it is the most 
democratic way of doing it and people come with their different ideas and 
talk and nothing happens, there is no disturbance there is no fight there is 
nothing so that means that we have grown the society of Iranian in the 
diaspora we have grown and uh, uh, even you know last year you paid that 
you were in they had eh they had a very controversial speaker the Mr. 
Ganji and people at AIAP they wanted to hire some security officers for 
that session.   
 
The speaker Ramin refers to is Akbar Ganji, a well-known political dissident and 
pro-democracy journalist who spent time in Evin Prison in Iran, and spoke at the 
September 2011 AIAP meeting. His lecture was titled “Why Didn’t Iran Evolve into a 
Democracy?” Just as Ramin had predicted to the board president, extra security was 
unnecessary for that meeting. Another recent lecturer (June 2012) was Abdolali Bazargan 
who spoke on the issue of whether Islam can be married to Modernism in Iran into one 
system or whether they are in contradiction with each other. For Ramin, increased 
politics at AIAP meetings is not problematic and in fact represents a level of maturation 
in an organic development.  
Local organizations reflect their memberships. Twenty-five years ago people were 
politically energized, and pro- or against something. Everyone was terrified to talk 
politics, lest meetings devolve into political factions shouting at each other. Now they 
                                                
103 Shah was a monarch and was overthrown by Khomeini, an Islamic religious cleric 




have learned democracy, and “people have learned to live together,” as Ramin expressed. 
For others, like Fati, this change has been hypocritical because she sees certain types of 
politics allowed to be discussed but not others. Likewise, Behnaz and Afareen are “sick 
and tired” of the trend towards more political topics, and explains it as a bias of the board 
of directors who decide on the meeting topics, 
Afareen Not what you heard is correct. Yeah the Iranian American Association  
changed in many different ways and one of them also as I say in recent 
years the only topic that hear in the monthly meetings are regarding the 
democracy in Iran, what the Iranian people are facing regarding the regime 
and religion.  
Tina  You said that the focus, you think, has shifted because of board of  
  directors? 
Afareen Yeah the member of the board of directory. They play a big role.  
Tina  In deciding. So what about, do you think anything had to do, at all, do you  
think anything had to do with the recent political events in Iran? Like June 
2009 and everything that happened- 
Afareen: See the board of the membership, each one of us we have our own  
ideology. And dependent on what my ideologies I'm going to pursue. If 
maybe, if as a, I'm a board in the AIAP maybe I convince the rest of the 
members one time also topic is going to be Bahá’í Faith. You know what I 
mean? And I feel that some of the member they are biased practically. 
And they are by bringing all this stuff. 
Tina   Sure.  
Afareen  I have the feeling that is my feeling. That is my personal feeling and idea.  
Behnaz Of course the organization bylaw is not supposed to be religious or  
  political.  
Afareen There is pure political and religious.  
Behnaz But unfortunately it has become that way. And the reason for it, I'm not  
sure if there's a conscience process. I think part of this they are just 
curious. What's gonna happen, who this person can tell us what is the 
magic? Truth is there is no magic. People have their own perspective of 
what this country is all about. What the politics is all about. And no one 
has an answer. If they had an answer by now that society would have 
transformed itself. So the truth is these people that lead that country come 
to such a time that either they're removed from power just like Libya or 
some other countries or they're gonna basically remain. There is no quick 
fix to this thing. So I think a lot of the people that live here they are 
looking for people to give them answer. What's going to happen, tell us. 
How can we, what's going to happen. Nothing's going to happen. As long 
as they're in power this is the religious fanatic regime is going to be in 




doesn't matter. They have their own version that they are practicing. And 
everybody else is wrong. Even within the government itself now there are 
3 or 4 different secular beliefs.  
 
They would like to see more professional or educational topics, “like a NASA engineer 
or heart surgeon,” also remembering fondly a couple of sessions with professional 
psychologists talking about Iranian marriage, family life and adjustment to American 
society. For their part, they are “sick and tired” of the majority of meetings being 
dominated by political topics for the last two years. 
Informants have recounted a trend in local organizations towards more 
politicization, despite an established history of “being sensitive to ideology” and bylaws 
that specifically mention a non-partisan anti-religious stance. Is this truly part of the “life 
course” of the organization and represents a natural maturation of both the organization 
and its members, as in Ramin’s view? Or is it the product of specific political events and 
worldwide responses to them, as in June 2009 and/or the board’s bias? I would maintain 
that it not a single reason, but because of multiple factors and forces that work towards 
increasing organizational politicization, and is a reflection of the population’s 
“maturation” (cf Sheffer 2003). This debate also serves to show that an organization and 
its leadership do not necessarily speak for its membership at all times (Jones 1980). 
In a previous section I asserted that Iranian voluntary associations and members 
are keyed in together in a mutually enforcing politicization. This is still the case, and thus 
far I have shown that politically/civically active Iranian migrants engage in multi-level 
and multi-scalar political acts partially conditioned by life experiences. I have also shown 
that local ethnically based voluntary associations have their own life course, reflecting 




that it is through voluntary associations and the practice of civic culture that Iranian 
immigrants “learn” democracy. 
‘Learning and Practicing’ Democracy 
Iranian voluntary associations in San Diego take participatory democracy as the 
model with which to lead the organization and convene meetings. At AIAP, there are 
democratically elected board members and members vote on particular items at meetings, 
and encourage members to speak up and ask questions. Yet in practice, full participatory 
democracy where every voice is recognized equally may be an unrealized ideal. A few 
informants felt a sense of exclusion based on religious affiliation, youth, gender, sexual 
orientation, etc. Maliheh and Niki attended one meeting of AIAP together because they 
were interested in hearing the lecturer but felt they were being surveilled and “got a lot of 
different stares,” 
Niki   So I found that really weird. In our separate experiences, not only were we  
getting stared at because we were two different people. I think separately 
we were getting stared at for not fitting the norm. Maliheh felt kind of like 
alienated because she was of the few women in there wearing a headscarf 
and she felt like, there's a lot of backlash, like you mentioned against 
religion within the Iranian community. And, sometimes prejudice against 
religious people and Maliheh felt that. 
 
Niki felt she did not fit the norm partly because of the way she was dressed, less 
conservatively than the other attendees, and also because of a tattoo on her arm. Maliheh, 
already sensitive to negative attitudes toward Islam, felt in the spotlight because of her 
hejab. Iranian immigrants might want to disassociate with state politics but are not 
exempt of politicizing the personal, like how a body or a dress should look like 
Fati, as a person who finds herself both inside and outside of Iranian organizations 




associations but not others. She recounted the time when she was trying to arrange a 
public lecture featuring a prominent Iranian female lawyer and political dissident and 
could not get some of the organizations to publicize the event because she was told it was 
too political. She also has a problem with the way meetings are run, and with how 
discussions are shut down in the Q&A session that follows the presentation, and does not 
see the democracy accurately reflected in the forum of AIAP meetings. 
For Fati, San Diego Iranian organizations, through their sometimes less than 
democratic practice, perpetuate the hegemonic structures in Iran. Guarnizo and Smith  
(1998:5) found that transnational practices may develop creolized or hybrid cultural, 
political or social forms that may be counter hegemonic, but are not always resistant 
(cited in Fabos 2002). Looking at the scene of Sudanese NGOs in Cairo, Fabos (2002) 
found that the transnational condition of Sudanese migrants in Cairo has opened up new 
opportunities for Sudanese women, youth, and ethnic minorities in some cases, but also 
perpetuated the hegemonic structures of Sudan in other cases. 
Yet I also heard in informants’ narratives “personal” metaphors inscribed onto the 
national body politic and how growth in the personal as in “being able to tolerate 
differences” signaled fundamental change for the larger community and nation. Iranian 
voluntary associations therefore may act as catalysts for such changes. In this passage 
Fati presents several interesting ideas about the source and growth of democratic ideals. 
Using the analogy of her decades-long participation in the Iranian women’s studies 
conference, the first idea she presents is that people have to learn democracy and this 
learning flows from individuals to the nation-state. There is also the feeling that it too 




using the metaphor of plant life taking root and growing, she expressed the idea that 
democracy grows organically from the “little things” that might remain even if the 
regime falls. Finally, we find in her narrative the surprising and unexpected idea that the 
lack of alternatives under the Islamic Republic of Iran has forced people to mature and 
learn more. 
Fati  I think it’s – sometimes I think the problem in Iran is deeper than what we 
think if this regime goes. If this thing goes, the little things will still stay 
and it can grow again. So, to me, it was good in a way that this regime 
stayed for longer and there’s no alternative because people are learning 
more. 
It’s the learning process that makes it hard. It’s under the pressure that you 
learn more, that not being even among the Iranian women activists that I 
go to this conference for 23 years I see how each one of us grew so much 
and learned so much. 
  
Behnaz and Afareen felt that democracy and freedom is a universal and natural desire for 
all humans, but these ideals come with a responsibility to learn democracy. 
Behnaz And of course democracy comes with responsibility. And that  
responsibility is something that is a learning process. So it is, I am certain 
that overnight these countries are not gonna become democratic but at 
least once they have the opportunity to begin to -  
Afareen Practice.  
Behnaz Learn.  
Afareen And then act according to those democratic rules. I think we will find that  
world peace will come about. Really. It is inevitable. I mean we have only 
two choice: to either push the button and extinguish humanity off this 
planet, one way or the other, or bring about world peace.  
 
And in going on to discuss AIAP specifically, it is through these kinds of groups that 
allow for the “practice” of democracy. As Afareen remarked, “They tolerate each other. 
They bring the ideology from the other side and they work together.” The national body 
politic is inscribed onto their individual values. A change in the personal leads to greater 
changes in society, and the only way the Islamic Republic of Iran can move forward is 




learning democratic ideals and notions of freedom. There is also the awareness that it is 
through participation in the institutions of U.S. civil society that Iranians have learned 
about democratic ideals such as tolerance and respect for free and open speech.  
It is noteworthy that this same sentiment about Iranians being able to enact 
democracy through learning how to tolerate different viewpoints has been expressed on 
Iranian.com. Here, a user named Mehrban on October 12, 2012, attributes Iranian.com 
for helping him to learn this skill, and as being the one and only place where Iranians can 
freely express themselves, unlike in social networking sites where you need to present 
your “best face to the world,” 
There has been one feature to IC and only one feature that sets it apart 
from other sites, people (Iranians) with different points of view could learn 
to discuss with one another, it is a habit we have never developed, I 
personally have learned it here (if I have learned it).  
Being from a hierarchical society we have little room for opposing ideas 
and do not have a capacity to even reason through our own ideas because 
often we don't even know why we think what we think. Esfand jaan104, I 
don't expect you to understand the importance of this feature, as you have 
consistently opted to express yourself in leechaar105 as opposed to a 
reasonable discourse.  
This is not a social networking site, where you need to present your best 
face to the world. It is THE ONE AND ONLY [emphasis in original] 
place where Iranians can freely express themselves and learn to tolerate 
each other.  
My conversation here is mostly with Mr. Amin and I am sorry that it is 
taking place in your blog. I think it is my responsibility as a reader and a 
contributor of this site to emphasize to with Mr. Amin what it is that 
actually makes his site not only unique but also worthwhile. 
BTW, Esfand jaan, unlike you I don't find most blogs worthless, by being 
here I have learned a whole lot and cherish my daily visits to this site. 
Now go ahead and try to degrade my heartfelt insistence of something 
extremely important to haggling or whatever your aggressive leechaar 
lexicon prompts you to do. You cannot (yet) delete my reasonable 
comment :).  
 
                                                
104 Esfand was the author of the original blog article that Mehrban is responding to. 
“Jaan” is a common term of endearment meaning “dear.” 




The larger context of this comment was the question of whether the authors of 
blog articles should be able to moderate their own content and delete responses as they 
wished. Mehrban felt that deleting others’ comments, however offensive to the author, 
was akin to shutting down true and open discourse. Another response post by Mehrban 
on October 10, 2012 where there was discussion about the potential of Iranian.com being 
shut down, offers the idea that discourse on IC should aim to be a model of what open 
discourse in society-writ-large should look like. 
Dear Mr. Amin, I am not sure if a blog is someone's home and even if it is 
someone's home it is a home whose door has been opened to the public.   
What does it mean if someone is interested in presenting their ideas to the 
public but not interested in hearing opposing views?  How can you stop 
your site from becoming a propaganda scene, or a hollow self-
aggrandizing venue without any challenge (checks and balances) from 
other readers/bloggers? 
Shutting out opposing views is what we (Iranians) are very good at 
and needless to say it is the root of many of the ills in our society.  At 
IC we have learned that it would not kill us to hear something that we 
don't agree with and in time we each have developed ways of dealing 
with it in a way that has not required killing (deleting) each 
other.[emphasis mine] 
 
Further, Mehrban feels that individual posters need the “checks and balances” provided 
by other users commenting on their ideas to keep the site from devolving into 
propaganda. In other instances it is when discussion breaks down between individual 
members into extreme negativity and name-calling that members might make a general 
statement that Iranians still “have a long way to go” and tolerating different viewpoints is 
a “habit Iranians never learned,” as in the following examples, 
Hafez for Beginners posted on September 6, 2012 
Better luck to the next generation - I guess - and I do think those born in 
the US don't have the baggage and can learn to listen and put up with 
differences better. 
 




And to add - Iranians (especially the older generation) are not used to a 
civilized political discourse.  Look at what I have been called just in this 
blog--by people who don't know a single thing about me---for offering a 
point of view!!  We have a long way to go in learning how to deal with 
differing points of view.   Hopefully, the new generation will fare better 
that these obsolete fossils.    
 
Among the virtual community of Iranian.com, I witnessed more fervent, more 
hostile enunciations of detailed political programs for Iran. Naficy (1993), Mostofi 
(2003) and others have asked whether there is a unified Iranian diaspora community, 
given their heterogeneity in dispersed places of settlement. Certainly, political 
factionalism is a hallmark of the Iranian immigrant public sphere before and after the 
2009 election. I cannot answer if there is indeed a unified Iranian diaspora “community,” 
that can agree on the exact vision of what they want for Iran. But, three years ago I 
thought it was a possibility witnessing post-June 2009 events. I agree with Mostofi 
(2003) in that a hallmark or Iranian-American identity is that Iranians maintain close 
cultural ties to where they come from either through frequent visits, nostalgia or 
memories, maintaining connections to the Iran of the past and present.  
Different Iranians have different ideas about the right kind of political program 
that will “fix” Iran. Some want the return of a constitutional monarchy and the return of 
Shah Reza Pahlavi’s son to power. Others want a secular democracy, while others want 
to keep the theocracy and open it up and modify it to adjust to the realities of Iran today. 
Even within these differences in ideology are more nuanced arguments for or against 
particular political figures in Iran’s past and present. Anti-Islamic Republic of Iran 
sentiment is perhaps over represented among Iranian immigrants in Southern California, 
especially. This is a function of their unique migration history, where the majority 




political asylees fleeing (e.g Bahai’s and other religious minorities), etc. (Bozorgmehr 
1998).  
Even within Iran, there seems to be little agreement about exactly what the future 
should look like. In an interview about the effect of economic sanctions in Iran and the 
plummeting exchange rate, Karim Sadjadpour, a senior associate and Iran analyst at the 
Carnegie Endowment explained that the Iranian people’s central complaint is economic 
in nature, “Iranians are disunited about what kind of a political system they want, but 
they're united in wanting greater economic dignity.”106 Given the multiplicity of voices, 
all shouting at different volumes, to what extent is agreement necessary for there to be 
“community”? 
In conclusion, I would like to consider why the expression of political difference 
takes radically different forms in cyberspace and in the real world, if it is indeed true that 
is through online and offline voluntary associations that Iranians learn about tolerance 
and openness to opposing views. One reason might be the relative safety in anonymity 
that members of IC feel, versus Facebook which relies on users “true” identities. In this 
chapter, I have examined the similarities and differences between Iranian political 
discourse taking place through cyber-communities and through local organizations. I 
have shown that in order to get a more accurate picture of the nature of political agency 
among immigrants, that we must open up our methodological lens to seek political/civic 
acts in as many places as possible, and throughout the individual’s life course. Yet, there 
                                                
106  Memarian, Omid. October 4, 2012. “Iran’s Currency 
Crisis: Bad News For Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.”Source: 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/10/04/iran-s-currency-crisis-bad-news-for-mahmoud-





is something troubling by the fact that the discourse on IC much more often turns hostile 
and negative, so that there are more and more instances of users abandoning the site, as I 
observed. Seemingly, this is alien to the very democracy it attempts to enact. If the ability 
to express differences through the venues in which political discourse takes place among 
Iranian immigrants marks a democratic ideal, then we must accept the irony that it is 
through this expression, however hateful,  that it enacts democracy and creates political 
“community” where community signifies the existence of a diversity and multiplicity of 
voices. Jahanshah Javid, the founder of Iranian.com, sums it up when an interviewer asks 
him whether he thinks the comments sections contribute to constructive dialogue or serve 
as a platform for various groups to attack each other, he responds with, “The comments 
section is not where you'd often find civilized discussion especially when the topic is 
about politics or religion, but it's still better than no discussion at all…”107  
                                                





Chapter 6  Interpretations 
 
In this final chapter, I offer a series of interpretations, as well as suggest 
implications and limitations of where my methodological choices and findings have led. 
This study was designed to understand political ‘talk’ among Iranians in San Diego using 
conventional and virtual ethnography. For conventional ethnography, I investigated the 
types of and meanings attributed to the political and civic activities of a small group of 
Iranians in San Diego using a life course perspective. This in-depth method used for 
interviewing and observations was coupled with discussion content encountered through 
digital observation of three online communities. The value of these findings, addressed 
below, lies not in their immediate generalizability but in the uncovering of processes that 
might challenge, modify or enlarge current theory. 
Linking the Political and Civic Realms of Engagement 
The first major finding has to do with the interrelatedness and interconnection 
between the political and the civic spheres. In this regard, I found that voluntary 
associations were immensely useful as a research tool to access informants, and to 
understand institutional participation and its connection to other forms of civic and 
political action. However, the concept of voluntary associations was less useful as a 
theoretical construct since I did not engage with the framework of social capital. Rather 
what emerged from immigrants’ participation in voluntary associations was the idea of 
“social learning about civic engagement” (Brettell and Reed-Danahay 2012:198). In other 
words, Iranian immigrant participation in San Diego organizations and through online 
communities provided a pathway to learn participatory democracy. “Practicing and 




the necessity and value of civic and political engagement and the importance of “giving 
back” and not “taking advantage” of structures within the U.S. Civic engagement is a 
pathway to political engagement and vice versa. 
Further, I have teased out a potential relationship between diaspora organizations 
and individuals. I have positioned these organizations as evolving through time, 
responding to constituencies’ needs and also reacting to homeland events. I posited that 
in the case of Iranians in San Diego, diaspora organizations and individuals are keyed in 
together in mutually re-enforcing politicization, while also serving a functional role in 
“helping” their members to adapt to new circumstances in the U.S. The organizations 
analyzed for this study contribute to individual-level politicization via homeland and host 
nation, as well as instigating civic engagement in the local sphere. 
Developing a Typology of Political/Civic Action 
Second, by extending the definition of what “being political” among immigrants 
and members of a diaspora might mean as a methodological strategy, I discovered that 
immigrant actors engage in a multiplicity of different political acts. By opening up the 
definition of political action to consider political discourse as talk manifested in different 
areas and in different phases in one’s life, I have helped to unpack what political agency 
among my informants entails. The typology of Iranian political and civic action presented 
in Chapter 5 details these activities108  
Further, I discovered that this political agency has multiple and overlapping 
targets, being transnational in some efforts, local or national in other efforts. For 
                                                
108 The typology that developed included: Green Movement solidarity rallies, 
participation in activist organizations, participation in diaspora organizations, Facebook activism, 




example, Green Movement solidarity rallies taking place in 2009-2010 were intended, at 
least partially, to draw local attention to events in Iran, but were part of a larger 
transnational movement to stand in support with Green Movement protestors. Facebook 
activism for my informant Mohsen is ultimately aimed at regime change in Iran, but he 
sees these activities in concert with his serving on the AIAP board of directors. Yet his 
civic participation through AIAP has helped him find “community” in San Diego and 
eased his transition to life in the U.S. as an immigrant.  
I started this research looking for transnationalism but I am not certain whether I 
found it. It was difficult to extract transnational efforts as distinct from local or national 
ones. Examining my informants’ political agency in San Diego and online provides us an 
idea about the limits and boundaries of transnationalism. Transnational theory was 
developed in part as a response to the failures of methodological nationalism and the 
inability to think beyond the nation-state and to theorize the concept of simultaneous 
incorporation (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). But does my study fit transnational theory 
and do my informants pass the transnationalism "test"? Informants’ political actions that 
reference and aim toward regime change in Iran that might be defined as ‘transnational’ 
by scholars like Basch, Glick Schiller and Blanc (1994) are actually not so defined  by 
scholars like Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt (1999).109 Political transnationalism occurs in 
some types of collective and individual behavior among Iranian immigrants in San 
Diego, but not in others. For example, absentee voting in Iran’s elections described by 
                                                
109 The typology of political transnationalism as laid out by Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt 
(1999) include activities such as: hometown civic committees, alliances of immigrants 
representing home country political associations, fundraisers for home country political 
candidates, consular officials and representatives of national political parties abroad, dual 




informant Malieh is a concrete example of political transnationalism, but most other 
forms of direct cross-border participation in the politics of Iran are barred. 
What happens when the geo-political relations between two nation-states prevents 
most types of transnational participation, to the full extent as one desires for home 
country? I explored the construction, maintenance, and meaning of this type of immigrant 
political agency in order to present the range of possibilities in such a scenario. For 
instance, taking part in Green Movement support rallies as part of a larger worldwide 
movement with Iranians across the diaspora participation can be construed as 
transnational. At the same time, absentee electoral voting is defined as “transnational.” 
Political transnationalism with regards to the global diaspora of Iranians is different than 
transnational political actions that Iranian immigrants might take part in, yet those 
differences in scale and function have not been compared in the literature.  
Additionally, I found that the nation-state, specifically homeland, structures 
possibilities of action. In accordance with my finding, Waldinger and Fitzgerald (2004) 
note, “Dual loyalty becomes a particularly intense issue when belligerency develops 
between host and sending countries…Thus, while international migrants and their 
descendants recurrently engage in concerted action across state boundaries, the use, form, 
and mobilization of the connections linking here and there are contingent outcomes 
subject to multiple political constraints, (1178-79).” Among Iranian immigrants, there is 
the additional factor of mixed migration status affecting and structuring possibilities of 
political action. For example, the refugees in my sample were absolutely prevented from 
returning to Iran in their lifetime. Others returned periodically and maintained dual 




communication between Iran and U.S. is monitored so informants use novel ways to 
disseminate information to their Iranian networks that aims to subvert the Iranian regime 
indirectly. 
If informants’ political actions, as they themselves acknowledge, has little effect 
in Iran, then for what overall purpose does migrant political agency serve? Despite this, 
their actions were not construed as meaningless by them. As Sheffer (2003) rightly points 
out, no diaspora could overthrow a repressive regime in its homeland. Yet their trans-
state networks, such as using Facebook to disseminate news and information to friends 
and family in Iran, and in other cases through the global network of Bahá’ís lobbying in 
host counties, and as seen in the activities of PAAIA, “diasporans can foment internal 
instability and tensions in their homelands” (Sheffer 2003:215). Other examples include 
participating in local Green Movement solidarity rallies. Informants felt that such 
activities, especially in this age of instantaneous communication, helped the overall cause 
of regime change in Iran. 
I have established that no one category—immigrant, exile, diaspora, transnational, 
expatriate, hyphenated ethnic identity—fits the political experiences of Iranians outside 
of Iran. As I showed in Chapter 2 through the literature review, my goal was to approach 
this topic with an open mind, yet also be true to the terminology of the respective 
literature I was drawing from, and what informants offline and online themselves used. I 
argued that the use of such terms is personal (having to do with life course experiences 
and identities), situational (e.g. depends on migration status and (in)ability to return), and 
strategic (depends on audience), with political implications all around. Understanding 




motivations, but where and why those boundaries are drawn between groups. Such 
knowledge lends insight to the following statement excerpted from a discussion on 
Iranian.com, 
If Iranian immigrants had any sense they would draw a sharp line of 
distinction between themselves and exile groups, whether militaristic or 
religious based, and advocate for their rights from an organization that is 
not already predesigned to be a divide-&-conquer operation like PAAIA, 
NIAC, PDMI, PMOI, and the other alphabet soup of groups that exist. 
Primary interests of exiles and immigrants are often far from being the 
same. 110 
 
The poster is distinguishing “Iranian immigrants” from “exiles.” Seemingly, both groups 
of people are Iranians living outside the territory of Iran. Yet the sense of what immigrant 
means is different than what an exile means for this poster, each with differing interests. 
Understanding Modes of Belonging through the Life Course 
If most of the political activities Iranians outside of Iran engage in are not neatly 
bounded by the above categories, then how do we classify the actors? Understanding 
Iranian Americans’ political engagement and participation as an immigrant politics, a 
transnational politics, a homeland politics, and a diaspora politics (cf Ostergaard-Nielsen 
2003), sometimes simultaneously, goes a long way in understanding their various 
political moments. Yet the model provided by Ostergaard-Nielsen (2003) does not 
distinguish between individual level and group level political practices. Some members 
do some activities, while other members do another. Because the model conflates the 
personal with the collective, it is difficult to understand whether and what ‘thresholds’ of 
activity are necessary to warrant a category. It also assumes religious, ethnic and class 
homogeneity among groups, with no accounting for a community composed of people 
                                                




with differing migration statuses, or differing waves of migration (length of stay), or 
subsequent generations (such as 1.5 and 2nd generation).  
Albeit it is a challenge to develop a model that accounts for all these 
contingencies, therefore the value of understanding immigrants’ (1st and 2nd generation 
included) political activities through a life course perspective cannot be underestimated. 
This method, instead of looking at isolated moments of migrant mobilizations, which 
then tries to locate them as either pertaining to home country, host country, or 
transnational, explicitly takes into consideration home country contexts, migration 
process, and host country opportunities and contexts across the continuum of a migrant’s 
life. Further, it leaves room to understand and interpret moments of extreme disjuncture, 
such as the 1979 Iranian Revolution or the 2009 Iranian election crises that have 
profound impacts on the politicization of immigrants, first or second generation. 
I was able to link political and civic action to broader factors in the life course and 
identity aspects of the individual. Thus far, most accounts of immigrant politics have 
favored community-level motivations (i.e. responding to a new ordinance that affects the 
neighborhood, or responding to proposed anti-immigrant legislation, etc.) and less on an 
individual’s patterns and motivations for action. Brettell (2008) notes that “Many people 
initially become civically engaged because some issue or problem touches them 
personally and they want to participate in effecting change” (242). The life course view, 
however, of political and civic action offers something more nuanced than a focus on 
“moments” or events of immigrant mobilization or particular rallies, or even just 
considering electoral behavior. Through this perspective, we can understand values, 




determined that the sentiment of a politically-mediated exile consciousness, whether or 
not the individual is actually an exile, informs and motivates political action. In other 
words, being “separated” from homeland in terms of political sentiment and ideology is a 
driver toward civic and political participation in the host country. I discovered that among 
my informants, political participations was less issue-based than resulting from 
something more fundamental to life experience, and which triggered on-going 
engagement with civic and political institutions in the U.S.  
I initially began this study with the idea of investigating how one incident of 
homeland conflict, specifically the June 2009, affected Iranian Americans. Beyond 
finding generational differences, (for example the 1979 Revolution that brought the IRI 
to power for the older generation of immigrants was more impactful than the June 2009 
events), I learned that although experiencing these incidences of homeland conflict were 
formative, they were not responsible for the continuing transformation and politicization 
of individual immigrants. Appendix 3 presents some of my informants’ narratives about 
their feelings about June 2009 events and the Green Movement through time. There is 
interplay between life course experiences, aspects of identity, and effect of organizations. 
Overall, I concluded that June 2009 provided Iranian immigrants with more fodder for 
political talk; incited political action in the short-term, and in some cases became an 
impetus for more political activism, such as in Sia’s and Niki’s case, members of the 1.5 
and second generation.  
Further, eliciting life histories from informants and documenting the various 
traditions (Caughey 2006) that were important factors in their life, I ascertained that 




identity types with social change and enculturation that occurred with migration. I was 
able to assess what particular aspects of identity were transformed, hybridized, or stayed 
the same as a result of the migration process. I found a strong correlation between 
declining religiosity and hybridized forms of political discourse. While personal political 
identities or ideologies may have stayed the same through the life course, the medium 
and mode of political discourse among Iranians has changed to be more democratic and 
inclusive, without fear of reprisal. There is also a suggestion that practicing a non-
dominant religion and being a member of an ethnic minority (i.e. not Moslem, and not 
Persian) among Iranian immigrants tended to remain relatively unchanged throughout the 
life course and migration experience.  
Connecting Two Sites of Political Discourse through Conventional and 
Virtual Ethnography 
The fourth major area of findings has to do with the methodological utility of 
merging conventional and virtual ethnography, and the relationship between the two sites 
of political discourse. Initially, online data gave foreground to political ideologies and 
potential differences among informants, and functioned to extend the reach of my 
research enabling me to conduct “multi-sited” fieldwork among dispersed Iranians 
(Freidenberg 2011). In some cases evidence from online communities re-enforces what I 
found through conventional ethnography. For instance, I discovered a couple of concepts 
about civic/political participation and its broader meaning that informants had in common 
with Iranian social media users. The first is shared discourses about the lack of 
participation among most other Iranians, and notions of ‘taking advantage’ of U.S. 
society and the need to give back to society. The second is a discourse about Iranians 




tolerance and equality through organizations. I concluded that the replication of these 
discourses across two mediums (online and offline) indicates the formation of a distinct 
Iranian-American civil society. An Iranian-American civil society is distinct because it 
references the unique political history of Iran and Iranian categories of self-responsibility, 
personhood, and the components of communalism. In other cases, the two mediums 
present contradictory views. The most radical difference between online and offline 
political discourse was the nature and tone of the discourse, with the expression of 
political and ideological differences online as being characterized as more hostile and 
divisive.  
In the realm of cyberspace examining the activity level and role of diaspora 
voluntary associations, such as the two Facebook (FB) groups and Iranian.com (IC), I 
found that they too have evolved through time, even since 2009, to reflect their members’ 
changing interests. Both Human Rights for Iran (HRI) and Iranian American Youth 
(IAY), the two groups on Facebook, showed decreased activity since their founding in 
2009 and 2010. HRI continues on as a student group at a university, with their FB 
presence helping to coordinate and organize their efforts. IC users have provided 
anecdotal evidence that activity is an indicator of level of interest, and that readership has 
decreased in the last year. Recent blog discussions between members have speculated 
that IC will soon shut down, with a new website called Iroon.com taking its place. 
Tabulating number of posts through time, one marker of activity, for Iranian.com’s five-
year history demonstrated that indeed subsequent years after 2009 have yielded fewer and 
fewer posts. Therefore this presents an important finding about the multiple ways the 




Mohsen’s Facebook activism and HRI’s use of FB for activism and organizational 
coordination evidences at least two different uses of Facebook for political participation 
and engagement. Furthermore, this differed significantly from the way IC creates a 
political community composed of a diversity and multiplicity of voices engaging in 
political discourse. 
Future Prospects and Recommendations 
In the presentation of these particular findings, I tried to consider online and 
offline findings together as it was most useful when treating them as equal sites for 
political discourse. Yet they are not equal. I can only take at face value the identities of 
Iranian.com members, and moreover that they do not have multiple user i.d.’s or that they 
are not counter-intelligence agents of the IRI, as has been accused by some, attempting to 
take over and sabotage political discourse. I do not have a broader understanding of how 
IC functions in the life of members, or whether they engage in other types of civic or 
political activities. While I know that IC convenes a large number of Iranians in the 
diaspora111 (more than any other site purportedly), and it is a politically and ethnically 
heterogeneous group, I do not know how representative its members are of the actual 
population.  
Further, I did not follow my informants to their online practices. None mentioned 
being part of specific communities like Iranian.com to discuss politics, other than 
Facebook very generally. Therefore in the analysis of findings, the maximum yield of 
virtual ethnography was to be able to note the presence of certain categories of discourse, 
and describe the various political ideologies and controversies, and count frequencies 
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through time. By comparing Facebook groups and Iranian.com, I was able to show that 
different virtual communities are not equal to each other, each characterized by different 
functions, aims, and discourses.  
Conducting research in cyberspace using virtual communities and social media 
means not taking for granted that any site will do. Researchers much first have a general 
understanding of the “universe” of all available cyber communities that align with the 
topic, then be careful and purposive in the selection of such groups. 
In future research combining conventional and virtual ethnography, I would push 
to further maximize the yield of virtual ethnography by making it more focused and 
systematic. By concentrating on one online community, and conducting more 
longitudinal and in-depth content analysis, devise tools in qualitative analysis software to 
help in organizing such data and deciding which pieces of data are most relevant.112 The 
issue remains, however, that the people participating in forums like Iranian.com are not 
the same people who I recruited as informants. Forthcoming studies should make an 
effort to follow active members of online associations off line to see how the two venues 
relate to each other.  
A factor not considered in this research is the class position of my Iranian 
informants, nor of me. All of them are middle or upper-middle class. I did not engage 
with the topic of socio-economic status as such because it was missing from informants’ 
narratives. A few informants were conscious of class hierarchy present among Iranians, 
but no further. Undoubtedly the fact that they are middle class affects the findings. For 
example, my economic circumstances and lack of extra funds affected my research 
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opportunities by limiting the chance for more participant observation in certain settings. 
Specifically, I could not attend most of the special evening events offered by AIAP or 
PCC because these events required tickets that cost upwards of $150 in some cases. It 
could be argued that only someone with a middle- to upper-middle status would have the 
economic means or cultural capital to have the time and resources to participate in 
voluntary associations where the main goal of the organization is networking, as is the 
case with AIAP. This might explain the under-participation critique by some of my 
informants. Participant observation in other venues (like the ethnic markets where I saw 
more recently-arrived Iranians working the cash register, for example) brought me an 
awareness of other classes of Iranian immigrants that was left out in my informants’ 
narrative.  
Among middle class actors, economic and linguistic acculturation is taken for 
granted and un-problematized among middle class actors. On the other hand, the study of 
middle class immigrants has advantages because there are relatively few sources which 
consider the behaviors and activities of such a group. Some examples are Raj (2003) and 
Heiman, Freeman, and Leichty (2012). Further research might interrogate what the 
absence of class position in narratives and discourses tell us, and also examine how much 
of their political agency is tied to class position. 
In terms of immigrant voluntary associations, future research would continue to 
tease out the significance and impact of these associations on everyday life and individual 
and group-level politicization, perhaps by taking a comparative approach through 
examining different countries and sites of settlement. This would allow me to assess the 




immigrant voluntary associations provide a significant window for understanding the 
interplay between individual- and group-level factors and forces in political ideology and 
agency, how do we begin to theorize the non-participants? 
 Finally, the perspective of applied anthropology sheds light on a couple of 
potentialities for this research. Diplomacy is a moving target with Iran, as the 2012 
Presidential debates evidenced. This kind of research is beneficial for forming U.S. 
policy towards Iran by providing a better understanding of the Iranian immigrant 
population: their forms of political agency which range from local to transnational goals, 
their range of ideologies, and their relationship to U.S. civic structures. On a national and 
local level, Iranian voluntary associations make claims of unity under an Iranian 
nationalist discourse, yet underneath the banner of “Iranian” or “Iranian-American” must 
be enough room to include a multiplicity of competing religious ideologies, political 
programs, generational identities, and even sub-national ethnicities. The information 
presented in this research might help organizations address and serve the needs of their 
members better. I have had discussions with one local leader about using the large 
cultural festivals they organize as an opportunity to help them design and implement a 








Appendix 1 Chronology of Major Historical Events for Iran113 
 
Until 1979, monarchical rule had been an almost uninterrupted feature of Iranian 
government for nearly 500 years. However, the tradition of monarchy in the region is 
itself is even older. In the sixth century B.C., Iran's first empire, the Achaemenid Empire, 
was already established. It had an absolute monarch, centralized rule, a highly developed 
system of administration, aspirations of world rule, and a culture that was uniquely 
Iranian even as it borrowed, absorbed, and transformed elements from other cultures and 
civilizations. Although Alexander the Great brought the Achaemenid Empire to an end in 
330 B.C., under the Sassanids (A.D. 224-642) Iran once again became the center of an 
empire and a great civilization.  
The impact of the Islamic conquest in the seventh century was profound. It introduced a 
new religion and a new social and legal system. The Iranian heartland became part of a 
world empire whose center was not in Iran. Nevertheless, historians have found striking 
continuities in Iranian social structure, administration, and culture. Iranians contributed 
significantly to all aspects of Islamic civilization; in many ways they helped shape the 
new order. By the ninth century, there was a revival of the Persian (Farsi) language and 
of a literature that was uniquely Iranian but was enriched by Arabic and Islamic 
influences.  
The breakup of the Islamic empire led, in Iran as in other parts of the Islamic world, to 
the establishment of local dynasties. Iran, like the rest of the Middle East, was affected by 
the rise to power of the Seljuk Turks and then by the destruction wrought first by the 
Mongols and then by Timur, also called Tamerlane (Timur the Lame).  
As Dabashi (2007) and Tehranian (2004), the “genius” of Iranian culture is in its 
syncretism (Shia Islam, Persian Mythology, Mesopotamian influences), and “ability to 
synthesize and transcend differences. Iranian culture absorbed elements of Aryan, Greek, 
Indian, Arab, Turkic, Mongolian, and Western languages, literature, mythologies, and 




Safavid dynasty. Iran was reconstituted as a territorial state within borders not very 
different from those prevailing today. Shia Islam became the state religion, and monarchy 
once again became a central institution. Persian became unquestionably the language of 
administration and high culture. Although historians no longer assert that under the 
Safavids Iran emerged as a nation-state in the modern sense of the term, nevertheless by 
the seventeenth century the sense of Iranian identity and Iran as a state within roughly 
demarcated borders was more pronounced. 
 
1796-1925 
                                                
113 Compiled from Metz (1987), Kelley (1993), Dabashi (2007), Tehranian (2004), and 




Qajar dynasty attempted to revive the Safavid Empire and in many ways patterned their 
administration after that of the Safavids. But the Qajars lacked the claims to religious 
legitimacy available to the Safavids; they failed to establish strong central control; and 
they faced an external threat from technically, militarily, and economically superior 
European powers, primarily Russia and Britain.  
 
1905-1907 
Constitutional Revolution. Foreign interference in Iran. Qajar misrule, and new ideas on 
government led in 1905 to protests and eventually to the Constitutional Revolution 
which, at least on paper, limited royal absolutism, created in Iran a constitutional 
monarchy, and recognized the people as a source of legitimacy. 
 
1921  
Coupe d’état against weakened Qajar monarchy led by journalist, Sayyid Ziya Tabatabai , 
and an army officer Reza Khan. 
 
1921-26 
Reza Khan, in a bid for supreme power, ousts Tabatabai and arranges his own election by 
the Constitutional Assembly. He names himself Reza Shah, King of Kings, and 
establishes the Pahlavi dynasty. 
 
1927-40 
Reza Shah pursues a campaign of secularization. Revolts by Muslim clerics are brutally 
repressed. A centralized government imposes its authority throughout the country. The 
wearing of the veil is banned. Muslim leaders are forced to shave their beards, and men 
are forced to wear Western attire. For the first time, all citizens are required to have birth 
certificates and last names. In addition to the shah’s attempts to break religious hierarchy, 
he overhauled the administrative machinery and vastly expanded the bureaucracy. He 
created an extensive system of secular primary and secondary schools and, in 1935, 
established the country's first European-style university in Tehran. These schools and 
institutions of higher education became training grounds for the new bureaucracy and, 
along with economic expansion, helped create a new middle class. The shah also 
expanded the road network, successfully completed the trans-Iranian railroad, and 
established a string of state-owned factories to produce such basic consumer goods as 
textiles, matches, canned goods, sugar, and cigarettes. 
 
1941 
British and Soviet troops invade Iran. Reza Shah, who had been attempting to lessen 
Soviet and British influence in Iran by developing ties with Nazi Germany is forced to 
abdicate. His son, Mohammad Reza, is acceptable to allied powers and is sworn in as 
new Shah. During this time, the Marxist, pro-Soviet Tudeh party is established. 
 
1951 
Mohammad Mossadeq, the popular prime minister, leads the National Front, a social-
democratic organization to power. When the Persian oil industry is nationalized, Britain 






Iran’s economy is weakened. The Tudeh party gains strength, and the U.S. fears growing 
Soviet influence in Iran. Mossadeq and the Shah struggle for power. 
 
1953  
The Shah attempts to dismiss Mossadeq, but the prime minister resists. The Shah flees 
Iran but the army returns him to power in a coup covertly organized bythe CIA and 
British, toppling the democratically elected government of Muhammad Mosaddeq and 




SAVAK, the secret police organization, is instituted with technical assistance provided 
by CIA and FBI advisors. 
 
1962-63 
The Shah embarks on a campaign to modernize and westernize the country. He launches 
the 'White Revolution', a program of land reform and social and economic modernization. 
During the late 1960's the Shah became increasingly dependent on the secret police 
(SAVAK) in controlling those opposition movements critical of his reforms.  
 
1978 September 
“Black Friday” massacre. Government troops fire on thousands of demonstrators 
violating martial law at Jaleh Square in Tehran. The Shah's policies alienate the clergy 




Hundreds of thousands march in Tehran in support of Khomeini. Strikes spread 
throughout the country. 
 
1979 January  
The Shah leaves Iran. Shahpour Bakhtiar accepts post of prime minister from the Shah 
providing authority is granted to the Regency Council. Three days after the Shah departs, 
a million people demonstrate against the new prime minister. Within a month, Bakhtiar 
resigns and his cabinet collapses. 
 
1979 February 1 
Khomeini returns to Iran, greeted by millions in the streets of Tehran and appoints Mehdi 
Bazargan prime minister. 
 
1978-79 Revolution and founding of Islamic Republic 
The Iranian Revolution which brought a sudden end to the Pahlavi dynasty defied all the 
myths of secular modernization, making the Islamic Republic the firsst theocratic state in 




the Jurist.” The Revolution replaced the monarchy with an Islamic Republic and a secular 
state with a quasi-theocracy. It brought new elites to power, altered the pattern of Iran's 
foreign relations, and led to the transfer of substantial wealth from private ownership to 
state control. There were continuities across the crisis of the Revolution, however; 
bureaucratic structure and behavior, attitudes toward authority and individual rights, and 
the arbitrary use of power remained much the same (Jahanbegloo 2004). 
 
1980 January 
Abolhasan Bani-Sadr is elected the first President of the Islamic Republic. His 
government begins work on a major nationalization program. 
 
1980 July 
Shah dies in Egypt 
 
1980 September 22 
Iraq invades Iran. This bloody war will last eight years 
 
1981 January 
The American hostages are released ending 444 days in captivity.  
 
1981 June  
Bani-Sadr is dismissed, he later flees to France.  
 
1985 
After the US and Soviet Union halted arms supplies, the US attempted to win the release 
of hostages in Lebanon by offering secret arms deals, this would later become known as 
the Iran-Contra affair.  
 
1988 July 
290 passengers and the crew of an Iran Air Airbus are mistakenly shot down by the USS 
Vincennes.   
 
1988 July  
Iran accepts a ceasefire agreement with Iraq following negotiations in Geneva under the 
aegis of the UN.  
 
1988 August 
Iran-Iraq war ceasefire. Over 1 million dead and 2 million wounded on both sides. 
 
1989 February 
Khomeini issues a death sentence against Salman Rushdie, the author of The Satanic 
Verses. 
 
1989 June 3  






1989 August  
Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani is sworn in as the new president.  
 
1989 November  
The US releases 567 million dollars of frozen Iranian assets.  
 
1990 June  
A major earthquake strikes Iran, killing approximately 40,000 people.  
 
1990 Iran remains neutral following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.  
 
1990 September 
Iran and Iraq resume diplomatic ties.  
 
1995 
US imposes oil and trade sanctions over Iran's alleged sponsorship of "terrorism", 




Mohammad Khatami wins the presidential election with 70% of the vote, beating the 
conservative ruling elite.  
 
1998 September  
Iran deploys thousands of troops on its border with Afghanistan after the Taleban admits 
killing eight Iranian diplomats and a journalist in Mazar-e Sharif.  
Student protests  
 
1999 July  
Pro-democracy students at Tehran University demonstrate following the closure of the 
reformist newspaper 'Salam'. Clashes with security forces lead to six days of rioting and 
the arrest of more than 1,000 students.  
 
2000 February  
Majlis elections. Liberals and supporters of Khatami wrest control of parliament from 
conservatives for the first time.  
 
2000 April  
The judiciary, following the adoption of a new press law, bans the publication of 16 
reformist newspapers.  
 
2001 June 






US President George Bush describes Iraq, Iran and North Korea as an "axis of evil", 
warning of the proliferation of long-range missiles being developed in these countries. 
The speech causes outrage in Iran and is condemned by reformists and conservatives 
alike.  
 
2003 June  
Thousands attend student-led protests in Tehran against clerical establishment.  
 
2003 October  
Shirin Ebadi becomes Iran's first Nobel Peace Prize winner; lawyer and human rights 
campaigner became Iran's first female judge in 1975 but was forced to resign after 1979 
revolution.  
 
2003 November  
Iran says it is suspending its uranium enrichment program and will allow tougher UN 
inspections of its nuclear facilities. IAEA concludes there is no evidence of a weapons 
program.  
 
2003 December  
40,000 people are killed in an earthquake in south-east Iran; the city of Bam is 
devastated.  
 
2004 February  
Conservatives regain control of parliament in elections. Thousands of reformist 
candidates were disqualified by the hardline Council of Guardians before the polls.  
 
2004 November 
Iran agrees to suspend most of its uranium enrichment under a deal with the EU.  
 
2005 June  
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Tehran's ultra-conservative mayor, wins a run-off vote in 
presidential elections, defeating cleric and former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.  
 
2006 December  
Iran hosts a controversial conference on the Holocaust; delegates include Holocaust 
deniers.  
UN Security Council votes to impose sanctions on Iran's trade in sensitive nuclear 
materials and technology. Iran condemns the resolution and vows to speed up uranium 
enrichment work.  
 
2007 March 
Diplomatic stand-off with Britain after Iran detains 15 British sailors and marines 
patrolling the mouth of the Shatt al-Arab waterway separating Iran and Iraq.  
 




Protests erupt after government imposes petrol rationing amid fears of possible UN 
sanctions.  
 
2007 October  
U.S. announces sweeping new sanctions against Iran, the toughest since it first imposed 
sanctions almost 30 years ago.  
 
2007 December 
A new US intelligence report plays down the perceived nuclear threat posed by Iran.  
 
2008 November  
In an unprecedented move, President Ahmadinejad congratulates U.S. president-elect 
Barack Obama on his election win. Mr. Obama has offered to open unconditional 
dialogue with Iran about its nuclear program.  
 
2009 February  
Speaking on the 30th anniversary of the Islamic revolution in Iran, President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad says he would welcome talks with the US as long as they are based on 
"mutual respect".  
 
2009 March  
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei tells anti-Israel rally that US President Obama is 
following the "same misguided track" in Middle East as President Bush.  
 
2009 April  
An Iranian court finds Iranian-American journalist Roxana Saberi guilty of spying for the 
US. She is sentenced to eight years in prison.  
 
2009 May  
Iran rejects a US state department report saying it remains the "most active state sponsor 
of terrorism" in the world.  
Jailed Iranian-American journalist Roxana Saberi is freed and returns to US.  
 
2009 June 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is declared to have won a resounding victory in the 12 June 
presidential election. The rival candidates challenge the result, alleging vote-rigging. 
Their supporters take to the streets, and at least 30 people are killed and more than 1,000 
arrested in the wave of protests that follow.  
The Iranian authorities claim foreign interference is stoking the unrest, and single out 
Britain for criticism.  
 
2009 August  
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad sworn in for second term as president presents cabinet - the first 
since the founding of the Islamic Republic in 1979 to include women.  
A number of senior opposition figures are accused of conspiring with foreign powers to 




Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei says there is no proof that opposition leaders 
blamed for the post-election unrest were agents of foreign powers.  
Missile tests  
 
2010 February 
Iran says it is ready to send enriched uranium abroad for further enrichment under a deal 
agreed with the West. The US calls on Tehran to match its words with actions.  
Opposition leader Mir Hossein Mousavi says the opposition will continue its peaceful 
struggle against the government.  
 
2010 July  
International outcry as a woman is sentenced to death by stoning for adultery.  
27 killed as suicide bombers attack a Shia mosque in Zahedan near the Pakistan border.  
 
2010 September 
Sarah Shourd, a US citizen caught hiking with two friends near the Iran-Iraq border, is 
freed after a year in prison. The three deny they were spying.  
US imposes unprecedented sanctions against eight senior Iranian officials for human 
rights violations.  
 
2011 February  
First mass opposition demonstrations in a year amid a wave of unrest rippling across the 
Middle East and North Africa.  
Iran sends two warships through Suez Canal for first time since the Islamic Revolution, 
in what Israel describes as an act of provocation. 
 
2011 August  
Two US citizens arrested on the Iran-Iraq border in 2009 are found guilty of spying and 
sentenced to eight years in prison. 
 
2011 October  
The US accuses Iran of being behind an alleged plot to kill the Saudi ambassador to 
Washington. Tehran rejects the charges as part of an American propaganda campaign. 
 
2011 November/December 
Protesters attack the British embassy in Tehran after London imposes tighter economic 
sanctions. Britain evacuates its diplomatic staff and expels all Iranian diplomats, but ties 
are not severed. 
 
2012 January  
U.S. imposes sanctions on Iran's central bank, the main clearing-house for its oil export 
profits. Iranian threatens to block the transport of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. 
 
2012 March-May 
Supporters of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei beat those of President Mahmoud 





2012 July  
European Union boycott of Iranian oil exports comes into effect.  
 
2012 September  
Canada breaks off diplomatic relations over Iran's nuclear program and support for the 
Assad government in Syria. 
 
2012 October  
Iran's rial currency falls to a new record low against the US dollar, having lost about 
losing 80% of its value since 2011 because of international sanctions. Riot police attack 
about 100 currency traders outside the Central Bank. EU countries announce further 








Appendix 2 Life History Discussion Guide 
 
Life History Discussion Guide         




2. Marital Status 
3. Children 
4. Job/occupation 
5. Household info 
 
Life in Iran 





6. What it meant to be an Iranian there 
7. Mapping identity/ies in Iran 
8. Idea/notions of U.S. 
9. What made you interested in politics? 
10. Diagram a typical day  
 




4. Social life 
5. What it means to be an Iranian here 
6. Diagram a typical day 
à potential opportunity for participant observation.: one thing to observe is how 









7. Media worlds typical in a given week 
à favorite online sites, books, T.V., magazines, etc? How do these connect 





Do you ground your life in certain philosophical or political meanings or ideologies? 
Where do these values come from? Are there any conflicts? 
 
Imagine 10 years into the future for yourself? What’s a good future, a bad future?  







Appendix 3 Case Study: Reactions to June 2009 and Feelings 
about Green Movement through Time 
Though a big issue was made of the Green Movement (Jonbesh Rahe Sabz) after 
the June 2009 movement, and indeed it incited diaspora activist support in the U.S. and 
around Iranian diaspora communities worldwide. In the popular press, we saw students 
adorning themselves with green-colored paraphernalia (scarves, flag, the word, the color 
on anything), three years after these events it seem a promise unfulfilled. Green was 
initially the symbol used for Mir Hossein Mousavi’s campaign but after the election it 
becomes a symbol of hope and unity for those seeking a different outcome. As columnist 
and journalist Shirin Sadeghi wrote two years after the elections,   
Even outside of Iran, if you attend rallies claiming to be of the Green 
Movement, many of them are actually rallies against the Islamic regime. 
Some of the speakers openly address the fact that the Iranians do not want 
more figures from that regime, they do not want the Green Movement's 
leaders, they want the whole regime to be replaced with a government that 
is elected by the people.114 
 
This characterizes how the majority of my informants felt about the Green Movement 
specifically. They all attended support rallies locally during the most active part of the 
Green Movement, and were surprised at the numbers and kinds of other Iranians 
participating. Yet, later they experienced disillusionment with the movement as members 
of the younger generation, or never really believed it signified meaningful change in Iran 
as members of the older generation of migrants who had been in the U.S. longer. Mohsen 
was the outlier in his attitudes about June 2009 and the Green Movement. 
Niki, a college student at a public university in her early twenties, exemplifies 
what might be a typical reaction to the Green Movement among 1.5 and second 
generation Iranian-Americans longitudinally through time. I first interviewed Niki June 
                                                




2011 and asked her to reflect back on her initial reaction to the June 2009 events and 
what the momentum of the Green Movement meant to her at the time, then she 
mentioned the green Movement again in the news stories she currently follows. Finally, I 
re-interviewed her again February 2012. In her statements, we can see her opinions about 
the Green movement changing from positive and inspirational to reflecting doubt and 
misgivings. It is important to note that Niki, unlike almost all of the other informants, was 
actually visiting family in Iran when the presidential election took place. 
Interviewed June 24, 2011-- Reflecting back to June 2009. We can hear that Niki was 
inspired, excited, and felt pride and a sense of connection for those participating in the 
rallies, even in the midst of hearing cynical comments from other family members. 
Niki: A lot of it was excitement, and I wasn’t sure what was going to happen 
tomorrow. I was really excited as to, maybe there’s a better tomorrow for 
the people of Iran. I was really hopeful. I became a little bit jaded after 
watching the political debates between my family saying nothings going to 
happen. And a lot of people were completely cynical about it. So a lot of 
excitement, especially in the beginning. A lot of fear, I wasn’t sure what 
would happen. People were telling me: “Oh don’t take your camera out. 
You know, don’t wear green. Don’t look the guards in the eyes. Don’t say 
anything because you don’t know who’s a spy, you don’t know if the 
guards are going to start randomly shooting into crowds. A lot of fear. A 
lot of inspiration. I would say I was extremely inspired by...[I felt a sense 
of pride] Even if I wasn’t participating in the protests and the rallies, that I 
kind of felt that these people were my brothers and sisters, and they were 
so incredibly brave for doing what they did. I was really inspired. Before 
that I was considering a career in journalism and after that I became a lot 
more inspired to write about these things and to be involved in these 
things. So inspiration was a huge part of it and I think that was the most 
lasting reaction, is the inspiration of it.  
 
June 2011—In answering a question about which news stories she currently follows, 
Niki shows that the Green Movement has become, at this point, the bottom of the list of 




Niki:  I actually actively follow any kind of situation regarding stoning. That's 
the thing that I am really concerned about. Like, stoning as a form of 
execution. So I read up on that any time it's going on. I, there was a 
situation Sakineh Ashtiani, who, that was a very high profile case, so I was 
following that last summer, every single day. I did what I could to get 
people to sign a petition to make sure it didn't happen. That's something I 
follow. Women's rights is something that I follow a lot of. And, even 
[when I visit Iran] I talk a lot about. So women's, any kind of women's 
rights situation. I follow the hikers, the detained hikers who have been 
pretty much hostages for an extended period of time. What else? I 
followed the case of Nasrin Sotoudeh, who was [a human rights lawyer] 
that was jailed for her activity. That's mostly what I follow. And of course, 
trying to see if the Green Movement is, is moving forward in any sort of 
way.  
 
February 2012—In a conversation where she contrasts her parents more traditional 
values and the socially liberal ones Niki says she espouses, she mentions her parents’ 
attitudes about the Green Movement. While still calling it “admirable”, Niki admits to 
being skeptical about it. Yet the overall tone of the following passage is one where she 
sees it as the most viable option for political change in Iran 
Niki:  I would say I am also skeptical, just not to their extent. I am skeptical of 
the green movement. I'm suspicious of certain, certain people that join its 
ranks. Just because of the experience that Iran has with revolutionary 
activity. However, I do feel there is something to be said to the viability, 
about the viability of a movement that wants to change from the inside 
out, rather than a very unpredictable coup or an overthrow. And, I think 
that's a very strong point that the green movement has that could be a key 
to its success. Is that it wants to go in from the inside-out and maintain the 
traditional roots of the Islamic republic. Doesn't want to ignite those anti-
imperialist sentiments that liberal movements in Iran often do. And, 
through that kind of traditionalist and nativist mentality, being able to 
affect the government, I think that's like, that gives it a lot of strength. 
 
February 2012—In describing a fallout with a student organization with which she had 
previously been active, Niki, while drawing an analogy to the 1979 Iranian Revolution, 
admits that differences in opinion about the meaning and vitality of the Green Movement 




Niki:  It's kind of hard for me to remember [what caused the conflict]. It was 
usually small things. I - I think that it's really important to constantly 
analyze and observe the green movement because I don't, I would hate for 
it to become, kind of like what the 1979 revolution was. It was very much 
changed when the revolution actually manifested itself, because the group 
that was calling for the revolution was no longer representative of what 
people wanted. 
 And, I think that the Green Movement is very, very vulnerable to that. 
And, I think that we have to be willing to stand back every now and then 
and say, "do I still support this group of people? Are they still holding to 
the ideals that we believe to? Are they still looking for the same things that 
we are?" Just to make sure that we're not supporting a cause that's no 
longer a cause, the cause that we originally supported. And, I would say 
that we need to analyze certain figures, and be like, "Is this figure really, 
like, a good person? Is this person really, like, someone that we want to 
endorse?" just for the sake of making sure that you know, we're not 
getting, we're getting ourselves into something that we are completely 
aware of. And, I think people were offended by that because they would 
feel that I'm not really supportive of civil rights, or human rights, or 
democracy.  
 
Maliheh, a member of the 1.5 generation, recounts the excitement of the events, and 
feeling of it “slowly fading” over time. 
Maliheh Right. I remember that, my reaction mostly was just like excited  
anticipation of what I was sure was going to happen. That Mousavi was 
going to win and all these great changes that were gonna happen. And I 
was, also my reaction to a lot of the, a lot of the debates and so on was 
that, I mean I was impressed, I was shocked that I actually cared about all 
this stuff. I'm not really like that politically, I guess, involved. Or I wasn't. 
But I remember that I was keenly reading the news, I watched the debates. 
And I, before the elections it was all very exciting. We would talk to 
family in Iran like very often and catch up. But after, I mean in the weeks 
after it, it was also just crazy how, I remember I would go on CNN like 
everyday it was like the front page of CNN. Or whatever news channel. 
Yahoo even was about the Irani protest and so on. And I remember that 
like I was so excited. You would see all these magazines. The times would 
have the comparison of the Islamic Revolution and like the pictures that 
they have now. Like juxtapose them kind of. And I was so excited, I 
thought like this is gonna happen actually. And that feeling kinda slowly 
faded off, obviously because you would see the more real side of things 
and how yes this huge part of the population is doing this but it's not the 
entire population. And also I remember getting in debates with people here 
who I never thought and Iranian in America would be pro- Ahmadinejad 





Tina  Oh wow.  
Maliheh It was just very odd. They were very educated people. And I just, it was so  
odd to have them say things like that or support Ahmandinejad. So I 
remember I would get pretty frustrated with that too. That's essentially, 
yeah.  
Tina  So, let me just go back. So when you said you were so excited because  
you thought maybe something was going to change this time but then, you 
know, some reality struck in. What was it that made you think that maybe 
it wasn't gonna change or what did you see specifically?  
Maliheh  I think when the protests kind of died down a little bit or when their  
government forces. When they were really just like not allowing the 
protests to continue. I guess when I saw fewer people partake in the 
protests. And also actually when Mousavi was, I'm not sure, I don't 
remember if he was detained or if he was put under house arrest. But I 
remember something happened with one of the leaders and that was when 
we just thought, or in my mind it just seemed as if if one of the leaders 
can't do what he's gonna do then people don't know who to follow. So it's 
not gonna get anywhere. And also just thinking about the Islamic 
Revolution, like Khamenei was like this powerful leader who people 
relied on, people loved, and so on. So that was necessary. And if the green 
movement leaders couldn't continue their work it just seemed like it was 
gonna fail.  
Tina   Okay, so you sort of see it as a problem of leadership. Saw it as a problem  
  of leadership. And sort of not a real strong central person to rally around  
  maybe.  
Maliheh Yeah. Yes. And I also I was not as sure that this was a movement that  
  everybody in Iran wanted. And this was yeah.  
Tina  So because, because you realized that maybe it wasn't that everybody was  
on this boat did it make you doubt the legitimacy of the movement or the 
right, the position of the movement of being sort of the right or correct 
way to go? Or just that it wouldn't be successful because it didn't have 
enough people backing it?  
Maliheh Right. So at that time I didn't doubt the legitimacy of the movement or  
how it was right. But I mean later I have. Especially recently, and 
especially with my involvement with HRI. Just because, at that time I just 
thought there are all these pro-government, you know, very lowly 
educated, I guess lower class portion of the Iranian community in Iran that 
is, that takes Khamenei as a divine ruler of kinds and like actually believes 
that. And that's how it is. And obviously the green movement is the right 
way to go because you know the Green Movement is taking things very. I 
mean at that time I thought it was the right thing to do. And I thought that 
the ideals of the green movement were right. Which I think I still do 
believe but with the involvement of HRI actually I got to see what a wide, 
like the Green Movement seems to be kind of an umbrella for anyone who 




guess, pro-marxist Iranian Americans, may it be communist Iranian 
Americans, and so on and so forth. And I guess to me that just seems 
unrealistic that all of these groups are going to get what they want.  
 
Mohsen, who arrived to the U.S. in 2008 was the most impacted through time by the 
events, and remains energized. He regrets not being able to physically be in Iran during 
the 2009 summer events. 
 
Tina    So, so, was that what happened, how did you witness what was happening  
during that, during that summer in June 2009? How did you did your 
information?   
Mohsen I was not lucky to be there. Really, in those days I was wishing 
that I was in Iran 
Tina   Oh really?   
Mohsen  Yeah. But, I was checking it here. Through Facebook, through CNN, with  
  chat.  
Tina   So you were saying you were wishing you were there.  
Mohsen Yeah, I was wishing I was there. But, unfortunately I couldn't. I followed  
  it through Facebook mostly, and CNN was, you know, reporting from Iran  
in those days. And, after they not let the reporters to report anything else 
out of Iran it was only Facebook. I was all the time by my laptop, 
checking the Facebook.  
Tina  And, that, were you checking Facebook for things that people from Iran  
  were posting?  
Mohsen  Yeah. What was happening, videos.  
Tina  And these were your friends, your Facebook friends, or also other people  
  that were reposting? I mean, how - 
Mohsen Usually, it was, no, it was not my friends because my friends, none of  
them was going to, to, to demonstrations. But, it was something shared, 
you'd recieve it and send it to others. But, the thing is that in my Facebook 
friends a lot of things changed. The people that I was never thinking that 
they would do such a thing, they will share this kind of post, they will you 
know care about these kind of things, about political matters, they a lot of 
them has changed.  
Tina   What do you mean?  
Mohsen  I mean that, as I said, I had so many friends. I know them in Iran, these  
Facebook friends, I know them, they are not. And they are, they were not 
political people. They were only living their life. And, some of them even 
don't care about anything else. Still some of them are like that. But, some 
of them has changed.  
Tina   Because of that?  
Mohsen  Because of those days in Iran. Because they saw what happened in Iran,  




  changed. They are angry with the government. They are posting these  
things still because it is, it is, it is dangerous for the people who are living 
in Iran to post these kind of things. But they are doing that. And, they are 
not young. This is the second point, you know, young people doing lots of 
crazy things. They don't think about, you know. But people in my 
generation, they have family, they have life, and they don't want to risk, 
usually they don't want to risk it. But they are doing it in Iran and it is a 
change. I can see that change. Also, some young people that, as I said, 
they were not in political issue, they don't care about it, they just wanted to 
have thier party. Now they have changed, lot of them.  
Tina   And these are young people in Iran?  
Mohsen Yes. 
Tina   Or young people here too?  
Mohsen  No. Here, I was not here before this things happened. Young people in  
  Iran.  
Tina   Mmhm. People that you knew and knew who they were 
Mohsen  Yeah.   
 
Ramin, a member of the post-Revolution generation of migrants, was much more 
succinct in his answer about his activities and responses to June 2009, with the 
perspective that “people have cooled off now.” 
 
Tina   So what, how would you describe what was happening, how you would 
   react, how you were reacting around, June 2009 with 
Ramin   The election? Yeah, the election was a very big news, and not only  
Iranians the non Iranians they followed that too. And uh, I think that, that 
this of another?  Eh, that figured many many people to look into the (?) 
election. I don’t think that anybody was happy at that terrible scene and I 
think from her desk, most Iranian they were very much interested to know 
what is happening, what’s going to come after that. Some people were 
thinking oh the government is going to be gone in three days, (inaudible) 
in five days, six days an and uh, we went with a lot of demonstrations at 
night and I was surprised by seeing how many Iranians are are 
participating in demonstrations. 
Tina   Demonstrations locally? 
Ramin  Locally, yeah in San Diego. 
Tina   And did you participate any 
Ramin   I did participate in some, not in all of them.   
Tina  Who was organizing them? 
Ramin   uh, … I think a new group was formed.  The name Iran Peace 
Tina   I heard of that 
Ramin  Yeah 




Ramin  They are not active anymore, I think they were just a group of Iranians  
that they thought they could eh organize this event but by the time things 
cooled off, I think they cooled off too.  It wasn’t any permanent structure I 
believe. 
And eh, And after the green movement everything cooled off and I think 








Appendix 4  Full Text of Iranian.com Selected Blog Posts 
The Good American: Why the Iranian-American Community Will Never 
Advance 
Posted by Anonymous, September 3, 2012 
 
About a month ago, there was a post on IC about Texas Representative, and the perennial 
Republican presidential candidate, Ron Paul voicing his opposition to the latest round of 
sanctions against the Islamic Republic.  Immediately after the post appeared on this page, 
an IC member posted a comment describing Mr. Paul as a “good American,” and another 
U.S. representative as a “bad American.”  The commenter’s sole criterion for making 
those determinations was Paul’s stance on the issue of sanctions against Iran, and nothing 
else.  
This post is not about that specific commenter, but rather about the larger picture and 
many other Iranians who think like him.  I am sure that you all have met Iranians who 
blindly support Ron Paul because of his foreign policy positions and nothing else.  And 
that, in and of itself, speaks great volumes as to why the Iranian American community 
lacks political power in the U.S. despite its large, educated and comparatively wealthy 
ranks.  
Ron Paul, as POTUS, will be an absolute disaster for the United States—and especially 
for minorities in the United States, such as (if you haven’t figured it out) Iranians.  The 
man has confirmed connections to white supremacist groups.  This means that if he ever 
becomes president, Iranians will be on top of his “target list” of discriminatory 
practices.  He will probably take their citizenships away.  Paul is also for no gun 
control.  In a “Paul world” America will turn into the Wild West, with people packing 
AK-47s on the streets (and [hopefully for his supporters] targeting those brown skinned 
A-Rabs]).  He also had other ideas, such as getting rid of the Department of Education, 
which will cause disparate and substandard education across the country, and most 
importantly for Iranian immigrants, he is against birthright citizenship for U.S. born 
children of immigrants.  This, in and of itself, should give pause to any immigrant.  This 
means that under a Ron Paul presidency, many Iranian Americans who were born in the 
United States will lose their citizenship.  This will include those who have possibly never 
been to Iran.  But Mr. Paul will deport them back to Eye-Ran, just to maintain his vision 
of a pristine white America.  
But none of the above facts, and Ron Paul’s scary vision for America seems to bother his 
Iranian supporters.  They have no issues with America being run by a racist and for their 
children losing their citizenship.  Their only concern in the “old country” and the ability 
of mullahs to have access to the latest technology, free trade and lots of lots of 
petrodollars.  And this, my friends, is the single most important reason why the Iranian 
American community will never advance.  
Iranian Americans are too attached to the old country.  The umbilical cord has not yet 
been cut.  Their main focus should be the United States, but it’s not.  It’s Iran.  Learn 
from Sen. Daniel Inouye, who served in the United States military when it was at war 
with Japan, and when his own parents were being held at a Japanese internment 
camp.  He went on to receive five medals, including the Medal of Honor and a Bronze 




community gained influence by him becoming a United States senator.  Can you imagine 
an Iranian American in a similar situation?!!!  He would have probably suicide bombed a 
few places to show his “disapproval” of the war with Iran.  
Remember: your American passport is not only for ease of travel to Dubai of your way to 
Iran for your annual chelo-kabab feasts.  You took a loyalty oath to this country that 
should not be dismissed as “alaki.”  And you’re not “zerang” for becoming U.S. 
citizens.  This country trusted you.  Don’t betray that trust.  Also, remember this: you 
don’t know more than an average American just because you had a “revolution” back in 
1979.  Look at what that fiasco did to your homeland.  If anything, your 1979 devolution 
is proof positive that you know absolutely nothing about running a country.   
In sum, you cannot gain power and influence in this country by being a perpetual 
immigrant who psychologically lives out of a suitcase with the hopes of one day going 
back to your “own country” (as if the country that you’re supposedly a citizen of is not 
your own country).  You cannot secretly (and sometimes not so secretly) hope for the 
demise for the demise of this country by supporting a nut like Ron Paul.  You have to 
first show your loyalty to your adopted country, and once you have proven that loyalty 
and gained political influence, you can advocate for balanced policy that will benefit both 
the United States and the people (not the tyrannical government) of your country of 
origin.  In the alternative, you can enjoy your kabab and torshi in Iran and complain about 
how you’re discriminated against in the land of the Great Satan.  
 
Response: “Anonymous - Iranian-Americans will be laughed off the Podium” 
Posted by ayatoilet1 on September 4, 2012 
Its pointless to imagine that Iranians can get direct political power in the U.S. As I said at 
least 3 times - Iranian-Americans are NOT electable....unless of course they pretend to be 
American...with names like Sam or Fred. There are however, many other ways to gain 
political influence.  
The one and only area where I agree with you is that Iranian-Americans have NOT united 
to utilize their power as a group to influence policies.  
IT IS NOT that the jewish community has politicians in office that gives them power, its 
the simple fact that they are UNITED and when they see a politician act against their 
interests they pay for ads to defeat them, they finance opponents etc. They have influence 
because they actually vote in groups. AND they DO VOTE. Every single one of them is 
registered and votes. In some districts they make the "critical" difference in guaranteeing 
victories. When Harry Reid won Nevada with 200 votes, you bet - you absolutely bet -- 
he will suck upto groups that vote in blocks in that state. And you know who they are.  
What is disgusting is that TRITA PARSI - President for Life of the NIAC - is the 
representative of Iranian- Americans in the Media. He not even American (he is Swedish-
Iranian).  
Where Iranian-Americans have failed is NOT that they do not have professional 
politicians. Its that they have NOT united to establish real influence. Unity is political 
power. NOT having your own kind in office. You need to understand that.  
In fact, I would even go an extra step and say that the Jewish community made a big 
mistake supporting Lieberman as VP to Al Gore. As a minority, having "visible" 
influence is a big mistake. Influence needs to be much more subtle. If in fact the US gets 




poodle. It will NOT take a lot of thinking for Americans to realize that 2% of Americans 
(Jews) own something like 80% of U.S> net worth (wealth) ... and they have 
monopolized political power in the U.S.  (And by the way, I am not saying that this type 
of thinking is correct, but its a real risk the Jewish community is taking).  
So lets stop focusing on getting Iranian elected, but focus on uniting and developing 
subtle influence. Where I totally agree with you is that this lack of Unity is a failure of 
the Iranian-American community.  
But otherwise, advancement is NOT getting into political office, changing your name, or 
selling out. Advancement means having integrity, valuing your heritage, learning about 
your heritage, and preserving and Iranian Dream.  If getting into political office means 
selling out - then its not for Iranian-Americans. In the current political environment - I am 
afraid, anyone who stands with their full Iranian Name, looking as an Iranian ...would be 
laughed off the podium.  
 
Response: “Zendanian - I believe that you may have misunderstood me” 
by Anonymous Observer on September 4, 2012 
I would like to have a discussion as to why Iranians have such high socioeconomic status 
in the U.S. but very little political power? Why the disconnect? 
 
 
Partition Iran?: Another Misguided Plan by southern California 
Congressman Dana Rohrbacher 
Posted by Touraj Daryaee, August 29, 2012 
 
From time to time it is important that one provide a teach-in to nonacademics and educate 
those who promote wrong and harmful ideas. As a history professor I would like to teach 
a history lesson to Mr. Dana Rohrabacher, the honorable Congressional Representative of 
California’s 46th District in Orange County where I live and work. On July 26, 2012 Mr. 
Rohrabacher wrote a letter to the US Secretary of the State, Hillary Clinton, informing 
her that since the “people of Azerbaijan are geographically divided and many are calling 
for the reunification of their homeland after nearly two centuries of foreign rule,” the 
United States should help them reach that goal. He then goes on to say that: Russia and 
Persia divided the homeland of Azeris homeland in 1828, without their consent. “The 
Azerbaijan Republic won its independence in 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed,” 
continues the letter “Now it is time for the Azeris in Iran to win their freedom too.” 
Finally, Rohrabacher states: “Aiding the legitimate aspirations of the Azeri people for 
independence is a worthy cause in and of itself…yet, it also poses a greater danger to the 
Iranian tyrants than the threat of bombing its underground nuclear research bunkers.” 
Obviously Mr. Rohrabacher is concerned with the immediate issues at hand in the Middle 
East and the interests of the US and Israel in a very twisted way, because he calls the 
MEK (Mojahedin Khalq Organization, an Iranian exile group on the US terrorist 
list), “Israel’s Friends.” This obviously demonstrates Mr. Rohrabacher’s political stance 
and the influence of its supporters which is detrimental to the US policy in the Middle 




indeed exactly the reason for which the US has gotten involved in the Middle East (Iraq 
and Afghanistan), which has bankrupted us. The question is how this kind of interference 
in different countries and plan of dismantling nation-states, recognized by the UN would 
help the US? Or does it simply just help other countries in the region? Well, the short 
answer is that it doesn’t help a bit! Last time I checked, it was the work of colonial 
powers in the nineteenth century which created and divided countries in Middle East. 
Even in Orange County it is taught that such ideas and actions were evil and has caused 
problems in the world for the past two centuries. It has been a long time since any 
country has thought of such colonial plans. 
Mr. Rohrabacher states that the Azeri people have been divided for the past two centuries 
by Russia and Persia in 1828 (I wonder how much travel he has had in the Republic of 
Azerbijan and Iran’s province of Azarbijan to make such a claim). Just a short glance in 
any preparatory college world history book will make it clear that the territory he is 
discussing was part of Iran (known as Persia then), which was invaded by Russians in 
1828 and annexed through a peace treaty. But what is important is that the territory that 
Imperial Russia took as part of her victory over the Persians was never called Azarbijan. 
It was the Soviet strongman, Stalin who in order to meddle in Iran’s affairs renamed the 
region of Arran (historical ancient Albania) as Azerbijan as a thorn on the side of Iran 
and those allies who disagreed with the USSR, namely US and the UK. It seems Mr. 
Rohrabacher is following Stalin’s footsteps! 
As an ancient historian I am also tempted to give Mr. Rohrabacher a history lesson about 
the very ancient past. The name Azarbijan (Turkified as Azerbijan), comes from the 
name of the last Satrap (Persian word now existing in English, check it in any good 
dictionary) of the Achaemenid Persian Empire, named Aturpat, in the 4th Century BCE. 
His family stayed on as local rulers even after Alexander the Great’s conquest and hence 
the region became known as Azarbijan (Old Persian Aturpatakan). The Old Persian terms 
mean “Protector of Fire.” This, however, is only the region south of the Aras River 
(Iranian Azarbijan), while to the north; Arran was named Azerbijan by Stalin. The 
Republic of Azerbijan is a twentieth century creation. Hence, there was never historically 
a unity or connection between the two. The region was turkified in the medieval period 
and that is just one more ethnic group among many others in the modern nation-state of 
Iran and beyond. 
But Mr. Rohrabacher should also be told that it was the Azaris of Iran and Arran who in 
fact invented modern ideas of Iranian nationalism. Akhundzadeh, known in the Republic 
of Azerbijan as Akhundof, a national hero is the man who perpetuated the intellectual 
movement behind the idea of the greatness of Iran. Since then, many if not most Iranian 
statesmen and intellectuals have been of Azai background (Ayatollah Khamenei and the 
previous presidential candidate Mir-Hossein Mousavi are both from Iranian Azarbijan). 
Many of the most famous Iranian historians, linguists and scholars in modern times have 
also been ethnically Azari, but none have called for such a separation. I don’t know why 
Mr. Rohrabacher and his handful of friends (Mojahedin Khalgh in Washington who are 
spending money trying to buy congressmen and congresswomen, along with Israel), are 
making such nonsensical statements. They are both incorrect and historically inaccurate. 
Furthermore, the Iranian Azarbijan is not only inhabited by Turkic speaking, but also 
Kurdish people as well as the Christian Assyrian and few remaining Armenians. Mr. 




multi-ethnic areas and nation-state such as Iran. Lessons from Kosovo and Serbia-Bosnia 
Herzegovina, as well as Armenia-Azerbijan wars among other, places have shown that 
such ethnic divisions leads to ethnic cleansing and horrific acts of violence. Iran has been 
a multi-ethnic civilization for the past 2500 years. It is people like Mr. Rohrabacher who 
have fallen into the trap of Israel and the Mojahedin Khalgh who seek such divisions for 
their own opportunistic aims. 
US involvement in the Middle East, particularly in Iran in the twentieth century, with a 
highlight of US backed coup in 1953 which dethroned the only democratically elected 
prime minister in that nation’s history has made the modern Iran as it is today. I am sure 
the congressman has heard of the term “blowback,” meaning any shortsighted action 
could lead to long-term problems in the Middle East and for the US. It should be a lesson 
to Mr. Rohrabacher to stay out of Iranian affairs and concentrate on unemployment, the 
broken educational system and poverty in his own county. He is needed more here in 
Orange County where things are falling apart. His similar ideas about partitioning 
Afghanistan have made him persona non grata in that country. Let’s save California, 
before others begin to call for its secession from the US! 
First published in counterpunch.org. 
 
Response: “Rohrbacher is a Republican Ignoramus” 
By Ayatoilet1 on August 30, 2012 
If the Iranian expat community had real balls (like AIPAC does in the U.S.), we would 
run radio ads in his district calling him out as an ignoramus. Just like AIPAC does, 
anyone who is against Israel - they spend lavishly to defeat. And we Iranian-Americans 
can do the very same....anyone who decries Iranian territorial integrity - we can go after. 
You know the cost would be something like $2000 ....almost nothing. The problem is 
there isn't a single organization that is willing to do that. That is the shame and 
embarrassment of all these Iranian-American organizations. We really need to call out - 
idiots - with negative policies vis-a-vis Iran. We must simultaneously demand change in 
Iran, while protecting Iranian territorial integrity. “  
 
Response: “Freedom and Independence for South Azaerbaijan”  
By Savalan on August 30, 2012 
According to the UN anti-racism panel statement “Azeri communities were notably 
subjected to "stereotyped and demeaning" portrayals in the media, while ethnic or 
religious minorities faced "limited enjoyment of political, economic, social and cultural 
rights." For over 80 years, all non-Persian minorities in Iran have been victims of serious 
human rights violations. They have endured racial discrimination, forced assimilation, 
suppression of their language and culture under both the Pahlavi and Islamic 
governments. South Azerbaijanis in Iran well might be a numerical majority but is kept in 
a minority situation in terms of access to power and resources. Since early childhood, I 
have been exposed to the racial discrimination against the ethnic group into which I was 
born. As a school boy, I was not allowed to speak my mother tongue, Azerbaijani Turkic. 
I never saw text books written in my language. I was not taught to read and write my 
language or learn about my culture and history. As Iran’s only official language Farsi, the 
Persian language was imposed on us. We were forced to learn Persian language, Persian 
history, and Persian culture as the common identity of all Iranians. I have experienced my 




national press. Even now, my people are depicted as intellectually challenged and are 
dehumanized as “donkeys” and cockroaches”. Racial discrimination is still with us. 
Banning of all non-Farsi languages continues, ethnic groups, particularly Turks and 
Semites are dehumanized. Iranian regimes have been the biggest threat to the realization 
of human rights for Azerbaijanis in Iran. Paralleling the internal repression by the 
government, the Azerbaijani struggle is ignored by the international community and 
remains invisible to western media such as the BBC, and European broadcasts in Persian. 
Even Iranian human rights activists often fail to mention Azerbaijanis and other 








SnakeCharmer’s Posts on Iranian.com  
 
The following comments were posted by me as my avatar, SnakeCharmer, in an effort to 
generate ideas about political discourse on Iranian.com. I selected threads that had 
something to do with Iranian participation in broader civic and political sphere of U.S. or 
remarked something about the nature of discussion on Iranian.com 
 
Back to the "disconnect" comment 
by SnakeCharmer posted on September 7, 2012 
hi,  
I'm new here. I've been reading this thread for the last few days with fascination.  
The level of political talk and discourse (and to be sure lots of dissent and argumention) 
offered here at IC far outpaces what I observe in the "real world" among Iranians in the 
diaspora.  
What gives?  
 
Can someone enlighten me? 
by SnakeCharmer posted on October 18, 2012 
Can someone comment or enlighten me as a recent newcomer to IC on the "good old 
days" of IC? Like maybe exactly when that was, and how it was different from now?  
Thanks to the person who linked to JJ's post from early 2010 about 2009 most popular 
features. I would be interested in looking at similar stats from other years as a 
comparative. I emailed site admin a few weeks back about this but didn't hear from them.  
Charting numbers is one way to compare the viability of this forum for true and open 
discourse, but I am interested in hearing from"old-timers" how (and if) it was 
qualitatively different?  
I am researching the content of IC as part of a larger study on political discourse among 






Glossary of Terms and Acronyms 
 
Terms 
Bahá’í- a monotheistic religion founded in the 19th century in Iran by the prophet 
Bahá'u'lláh. The Bahai Faith is now spread worldwide, with adherents coming from every 
ethnic group and culture, and comprises a global religious community. The teachings of 
Bahá'u'lláh emphasize the unity of humanity. The Bahá’í Faith is one of the religious 
minority groups persecuted in Iran. 
 
Cha’i- hot tea. Several rounds of cha’i are served and shared during any meyhmooni. 
Proper cha’i exchange involves an assortment of pastries and sweets. 
 
Chaharshanbeh Soori- An ancient celebration dating back to the pre-Islamic era 
(Zoroastrian). The “festival of fire” takes place the evening before the last Wednesday of 
Iranian year, and involves lighting huge bonfires. Participants jump over the fires as a 
purification rite in preparation for the new year. 
Hijab 
Hijab/Hejab- a veil worn by Muslim women which covers the hair and neck 
 
Meyhmooni- Literally means party, wedding, birthday, etc. but in reality any social visit 
with food. When people speak of meyhmooni they mean visiting other people’s houses to 
share a meal, or having guests over at their house. 
 
Mujahideen-e-Khalq, the People’s Mujahideen of Iran, also called the MEK, is an 
Islamic and Marxist political mass movement. MEK participated in the 1979 Revolution 
to overthrow the Shah, and now as an opposition movement in exile advocates to 
overthrow the Islamic Republic. MEK, as of September 21, 2012, was removed from the 
U.S. list of terrorist organizations by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. MEK is rumored 
to have many followers/members in the U.S. 
 
Nowruz- a Persian rite celebrating the New Year which takes place the first day of 
spring. In San Diego, and other sites of settlement it means extra parties and chances for 
meyhmooni. There is a host of activities before Nowruz, like cleaning your house, buying 
new clothes and participating in Chaharshanbeh Soori, as well as activities after Nowruz, 
such as Sizdeh Bidar. 
 
Sofreh- a tablecloth or mat on the ground for a picnic 
 
Sizdeh Bidar- literally means the “thirteenth outside” and occurs on the thirteenth day of 
the New Year in the Iranian calendar, and involves an all-day picnic outdoors.  
 
Ta’arof- an Iranian cultural concept encompassing a wide range of behaviors and 




civility and reciprocity. Characterized by indirect and polite language. In speaking, self-
deference is emphasized, at the same time as elevating the rank of the other party. Ta’arof 
governs ruled of etiquette and exchange between speakers, in negotiation, and hospitality. 
 
Zoroastrianism- The pre-Islamic religion of Iran. Zorastrianism is a religion and 
philosophy based on the teachings of the prophet Zoroaster, who preached sometime 
between 1800 and 1000 B.C. Cited as one of the world’s first monotheistic religions. 
After the Arab conquest of Iran in 7th century, Zoroastrians were persecuted and largely 
converted to Islam. Zoroastrian rites of season are still practiced among Iranians. 
 
Acronyms 
AIAP=Association of Iranian American Professionals 
EGBO= Ethnic Grassroots-Based Organizations 
FB= Facebook 
HRI= Human Rights for Iran 
IAY= Iranian American Youth+ 
IC= Iranian.com 
ISSD= Iranian School of San Diego 
ISTA=Iranian Students’ Association 
IRI= Islamic Republic of Iran 
PCC= Persian Cultural Center 
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